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Abstract 
Abstract 
Non-Intrusive Subscriber Authentication 
for Next Generation Mobile Communication Systems 
Philip Maurice Rodwcll B.Eng.(Hons) 
The last decade has witnessed massive growth in both the technological development, and 
the consumer adoption of mobile devices such as mobile handsets and PDAs. The recent 
introduction of wideband mobile networks has enabled the deployment of new services 
with access to traditionally well protected personal data, such as banking details or 
medical records. Secure user access to this data has however remained a function of the 
mobile device's authentication system, which is only protected from masquerade abuse by 
the traditional PIN, originally designed to protect against telephony abuse. 
This thesis presents novel research in relation to advanced subscriber authentication for 
mobile devices. The research began by assessing the threat of masquerade attacks on 
such devices by way of a survey of end users. This revealed that the current methods o f 
mobile authentication remain extensively unused, leaving terminals highly vulnerable to 
masquerade attack. Further investigation revealed that, in the context of the more 
advanced wideband enabled services, users are receptive to many advanced 
authentication techniques and principles, including the discipline o f biometrics which 
naturally lends itself to the area of advanced subscriber based authentication. 
To address the requirement for a more personal authentication capable of being applied 
in a continuous context, a'novel non-intrusive biometric authentication technique was 
conceived, drawn from the discrete disciplines of biometrics and Auditory Evoked 
Responses. The technique forms a hybrid multi-modal biometric where variations in the 
behavioural stimulus of the human voice (due to the propagation effects of acoustic 
waves within the human head), are used to verify the identity of a user. The resulting 
approach is known as the Head Authentication Technique (HAT). 
Evaluation of the HAT authentication process is realised in two stages. Firstly, the 
generic authentication procedures of registration and verification are automated within a 
prototype implementation. Secondly, a HAT demonstrator is used to evaluate the 
authentication process through a series of experimental trials involving a representative 
user community. The results from the trials confirm that multiple H A T samples from 
the same user exhibit a high degree of correlation, yet samples between users exhibit a 
high degree of discrepancy. Statistical analysis of the prototypes performance realised 
early system error rates of; FNMR = 6% and FMR = 0.025%. The results cleariy 
demonstrate the authentication capabilities of this novel biometric approach and the 
contribution this new work can make to the protection of subscriber data in next 
generation mobile networks. 
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CCD - Charge Coupled Device (digital camera light sensor) 
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television 
CDMA - Code Division Multiple Access 
CEIR - Central Equipment Identity Register (ref IMEI) 
CEPT - Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs 
CHEOAE - CHirp Evoked OtoAcoustic Emissions (ref. OAE) 
CPU - Central Processing Unit (a microprocessor) 
DECT - Digital Enhanced Cordless Telephone (range < 300m) 
DPOAE - Distortion Product OtoAcoustic Emissions (ref OAE) 
EDGE - Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution 
EEPROM - Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (ref SIM) 
EER - Equal Error Rate 
EIR - Equipment Identity Register (ref IMEI) 
ENT - Ear Nose and Throat (Medical field) 
EOAE - Evoked OtoAcoustic Emissions (ref OAE) 
ESN - Electronic Serial Number 
ETSI - European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
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FAR 
FIR 
FMR 
FNMR 
FRR 
G3G 
GPRS 
GSM 
HAT 
HCl 
HSCSD 
HSDPA 
IMEI 
IMSI 
INCITS 
ISO 
ITU 
LBS 
M M I 
MMS 
MWIF 
OAE 
OHG 
OMA 
PCM 
False Acceptance Rate (see also Glossary o f Terms) 
Finite Impulse Response (ref. Digital filters) 
False Match Rate (see also Glossary of Terms) 
False Non-Match Rate (see also Glossary of Terms) 
False Rejection Rate (see also Glossary of Terms) 
Global 3"* Generation 
General Packet Radio Service 
Global System for Mobile communications 
originally: Croupe Speciale Mobile (French) 
Head Authentication Technique 
Human-Computer Interface 
High Speed Circuit Switched Data 
High Speed Downlink Packet Access 
International Mobile Equipment Identity 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
International Committee for IT Standards 
International Organization for Standardization 
International Telecommunications Union 
Location Based Services 
Man-Machine Interface (an outdated term referring to an HCI) 
Multimedia Message Service 
Mobile Wireless Internet Forum 
OtoAcoustic Emission (ref AER) 
Operator Harmonisation Group 
Open Mobile Alliance 
Pulse Code Modulation (digital sampling technique) 
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PCS - Personal Communications System 
PDA - Personal Digital Assistant (electronic filofax) 
PCN - Personal Communications Network 
PIN - Personal Identification Number 
PoE - Point of Entry 
QoS - Quality of Service 
RAM - Random Access Memory (ref SIM) 
RCA - Radio Control Authority 
RFID - Radio Frequency IDentification (electronic tagging) 
RIFF - Resource Interchange File Format (Appendix D) 
RMS - Root Mean Square 
ROM - Read Only Memory (ref EEPROM) 
SIM - Subscriber Identity Module 
SMS - Short Message Service 
SOAE - Spontaneous OtoAcoustic Emissions (ref OAE) 
TACS - Total Access Communication System ( IG Analogue) 
TEOAE - Transient Evoked OtoAcoustic Emissions (ref OAE) 
TDMA - Time Division Multiple Access (2G/GSM) 
TMSI - Temporary Mobile Station Identifier 
UMTS - Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
3G mobile technology for Europe, Japan and North America 
WAP - Wireless Access Protocol 
wav - File extension for wavefile format (ref RIFF, Appendix D) 
W-CDMA - Wideband - Code Division Multiple Access 
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Within the context of this document the following definitions are assumed: 
Authentication 
The act of proving the validity of the claimed identity of a user on a system. 
(See also the definition of 'Biometric Authentication' in thesis sub-Section 4.2.4.) 
Broadband 
A bandwidth defined by: 2 Mbps < Broadband < 1 Gbps. 
Biometric Password 
An authorisation code derived fi-om a users distinctive Physiological or Behavioural 
characteristics; known as biometric markers. 
Continuous 
A discrete action occurring indefinitely at either a fixed or variable time interval. 
Cordless Handset 
A low range mobile telephony device specifically for use in the home. E .g . DECT 
Equal Error Rate 
The common threshold value where the FAR and FRR of a system are equal. 
False Acceptance Rate 
The probability that an impostor wil l falsely pass system authenfication: Also known as 
a Type II error (see also FMR). 
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False Match Rate 
Alternative to 'False Acceptance Rate'. Used to avoid confusion in scenarios that reject 
the claimant i f their biometric template matches that of an enrolee. In such applications, 
the concepts of acceptance and rejection are reversed, thus reversing the meaning of 
'False Acceptance' and 'False Rejection' (Link: iAfB/ICSA). 
False Non-Match Rate 
Alternative to 'False Rejection Rate'. Used to avoid confusion in scenarios that reject 
the claimant i f their biometric template matches that of an enrolee. In such applications, 
the concepts of acceptance and rejection are reversed, thus reversing the meaning of 
'False Acceptance' and 'False Rejection' (Link: iAfB/ICSA). 
False Rejection Rate 
The probability that an authorised user will falsely fail system authentication: also 
known as a Type I error (see also FNMR). 
Identification 
The act of determining the identity of an unknown user on a system. 
(See also the definition of 'Biometric Identification' in thesis sub-Section 4.2.4.) 
Mobile Device 
Any hand-held mobile communications device, including though not exclusively: 
mobile handsets. Personal Digital Assistants (PDA), laptop & palmtop computers. 
Mobile Handset 
A mobile (cellular) device, designed primarily, though not exclusively, for telephony. 
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Mobile Terminal 
A wireless interface to a distributed communications network: not necessarily a mobile 
handset. 
Mobility 
The convenience of accessibility o f a distributed communications network via: 
• Terminal - The ability of a mobile terminal to roam within a distributed network 
• Personal - The ability of a mobile user to roam within a distributed network. 
Non-Intrusive 
A service or procedure that is transparent in operation to the system user. 
Smartphone 
Any electronic handheld device that integrates the functionality of a mobile handset 
with a personal digital assistant or other information appliance. 
Subscriber 
The legitimate registered user of: a mobile device, mobile network or mobile service. 
User 
Any person capable of utilising a mobile device; not necessarily the registered user. 
Verification 
See Authentication. 
Wideband 
A bandwidth defined by: 9.6 Kbps < Wideband < 2 Mbps. 
xxvni 
"Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so. " 
Galileo Galilei 
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1 Introduction and Overview 
This chapter introduces the PhD research area, identifies the research focus, specifies 
the research requirements and objectives and provides a complete systematic breakdown 
of the thesis with individual chapter summaries. 
1.1 The Mobile Telephone 
Within a single generation, a vision of personal communications proposed by luminaries 
such as Arthur C. Clarke (1945) & Carl Sagan (1978), has left the realms of conceptual 
theory and become an everyday reality; spearheaded by a multi-functional masterpiece 
of miniaturisation, endearingly referred to, as the 'mobile'. 
With, the introduction of the domestic CD in 1985 (Philips 1985), digitised sound was 
perceived to enter homes en-masse for the first time and the term 'digital' firmly entered 
the vernacular of the general population. The adoption of digitisation of the human 
vocal spectrum for telephony application, brought management of the data stream 
within the control of advancing computer technology and the subsequent convergence 
of communications and computer technology was inevitable. 
The introduction of the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) in 1991 
(CellularOnline 2006a) gave digital telephony the mobile medium it required to appeal to 
a new technology hungry generation. The implications to the consumer were that the once 
dumb shackled telephone has evolved into a mobile, intemationally networked, 
computing device with excellent processing and storage capabilities. By the early years of 
the 21^* Century, GSM based mobile communications devices represented 78% of the 
world's digital mobile market and numbered in excess of 1.6 billion (GSM World 2005); 
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outstripping even the sale of traditional personal computers which themselves 
experienced excellent annual growth in 2005 of 16% (Sharma 2005). 
Figure I - I shows the generational evolution of the mobile handset over the last 15 years, 
from the modem day multi-functional network terminal back to the first rudimentary 
mobile telephone, as presented by one of Europe's biggest handset suppliers: Nokia. 
N O K I A 
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Figure 1-1 : The evolution of the cellular mobile handset: Nokia brand 
The primary selling point of post 2G mobile devices is the plethora of services the 
hardware enables. Having inherited many of the capabilities of the traditional Personal 
Digital Assistant (PDA), including: comprehensive address books, work planners and 
schedulers; current mobile devices offer many functions originally only available on a 
networked computer, including: email, internet, e-commerce and extensive multimedia 
capabilities. The latest *smartphone' mobile devices have evolved into a new generation 
of combined hardware and services, enabling users to perform video-conferencing, 
watch live news, weather or sports broadcasts, locate bars and restaurants near to their 
location and pay for goods with virtual money, locate theatres near to their location and 
book tickets before receiving live directions to the venue (Link: BBC Mobile Services). 
Chapter 1 : Introduction and Overview 
With around I in 4 of the world population now in possession of a mobile 
communications device (CelluIarOnline 2006b), along with the decentralisation o f the 
modem business environment, current mobile service providers are competing for 
unprecedented access to hundreds of millions of customers, for whatever post telephony 
services they care to conceive. It is, however, a disturbing reality that as these services 
probe deeper into the world of personal consumer data, once the preserve of trusted red-
brick institutions, the levels of data protection offered are emerging as secondary to the 
revenue such services can provide. In fact, in many cases, confidential information is 
usually only a 4 digit PoE PIN away firom prying eyes (CellularOnline 2006c). Depending 
upon the security awareness of the user and the capabilities of the mobile device, even this 
basic defence itself, may be rendered ineffective (see Section 3.4.2). Alternate knowledge 
based security approaches such as ones mother's maiden name or even complex 
passwords can usually be bypassed fairly easily using established social engineering 
techniques (Granger 2001). A topical example being the current trend in phishing, the 
spoofing of legitimate service providers via unsolicited communications, maybe emails or 
phone calls, in order to persuade a targeted service subscriber to divulge sensitive security 
details to unscrupulous parties (Link: APWG). This information is then used by a 3"^  party 
to masquerade as the legitimate service subscriber in order to defi-aud the system. 
Mobile devices have consequently become the target of more than the opportunistic 
thief (Chopra 2002). In the UK alone, 2001 saw in excess of 700,000 mobile handsets 
stolen (Harrington & Mayhew 2001), leading the government to set-up a National 
Mobile Phone Crime Unit to specifically target the problem (NMPCU 2003). Even 
more valuable to criminals who target mobile devices is the data which these devices 
carry, and owing to their essential networking capabilities, the wider data and services 
which they have access to (see Section 2.3.6). Eugene Kaspersky, founder of Kaspersky 
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Labs recently warned that hackers will become increasingly interested as mobile phones 
proliferate and "...when they get cheap enough, smart phones wil l become a real 
problem. It will happen sooner or later" (Kaspersky 2006). In the UK in the year of 
2004, identity theft was estimated at £1.3 billion (Home Office 2006) and it would be 
naive to believe that with no apparent end in sight to either the market penetration o f 
mobile technology, or the advancement of the underlying technology itself, that the size 
of this problem is going to do anything other than increase. 
The growth of mobile networks capacity with the introduction of next generation 
networks (Section 2.2.3) and services (Section 2.2.3.3) has placed even more emphasis on 
the mobile device to act as a gatekeeper to both local and network-centric data. The aim 
of the PhD is to research a novel biometric technique, specifically applicable to the 
mobile arena, capable of not only offering a more secure Point-of-Entry (PoE) 
authentication mechanism than the traditional PIN, but subsequently continuously 
monitoring the authentication status of the user beyond PoE. Continuous authentication, 
using existing biometric and non-biometric approaches is wholly impractical owing to the 
intrusive requirement of specific user interaction. Therefore, the proposed solution must 
be transparent in operation to the user; not interfere or impede normal interaction with the 
mobile device. In addition, i f authentication was managed within the network, rather than 
the mobile device (Section 2.3.7.3) it has the potential to revolutionise personal mobility, 
enabling a new level of convenient network accessibility within the mobile community. 
Apart fi-om the security implications of subscriber's biometric signature data, the very 
nature of biometrics themselves, or the measuring of a person's physiology or behaviour 
(see Chapter 4), constitutes personal medical data and therefore itself should fall under 
the jurisdiction of established confidentiality data protecfion protocols. 
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1.2 Research Requirements 
The goal of the research is to investigate, develop and evaluate a novel user 
authentication system for application in the new generation of personal mobile 
communication devices with enhanced services. This work is ultimately aimed at 
addressing authentication issues within the emerging wideband PDA/telephony hybrid 
devices of post 2"** Generation (2G) networks and encompassed under the umbrellas o f 
2""* generation wideband (2.50) and 3"* generation (30) networks: assigned UMTS 
(Link: 3GPP) in Europe. To this end, the aim is to develop a technique, which 
compliments existing mobile equipment and the knowledge-base of existing mobile 
users. The work draws upon the field of biometrics in order to realise an authentication 
system that enables transparent and continuous online monitoring; a significant 
improvement over the current 2"^  generation one-time, PoE authentication system. 
There are a number of objectives to the research as follows: 
• Research Assessment: Review current security systems in place within OSM 
and UMTS based mobile networks and devices and assess the extent to which 
these systems meet the present and future security needs o f the subscriber. 
Establish the need for improved authentication security within the developing 
market for advanced mobile services. 
• Conception: Conceive an original idea for an improved mobile authentication 
technique addressing any deficiencies identified within the research assessment 
and drawn from the discipline of biometrics. 
• Development: Realisation and development of the aforementioned technique to 
the point of a prototype demonstrator, which can subsequently be used for 
validation and evaluation of the technique. 
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• Validation: A Proof of Concept demonstration of the viability o f the technique, 
for trial evaluation approval, using the prototype demonstrator and cross 
comparisons with a small sample set of volunteer users. 
• Evaluation: Statistical evaluation of the technique via an extended trial 
involving a group of volunteers, over an extended period. 
To gain a full understanding of the research requirements, it was necessary to perform a 
complete review of current mobile security systems, from the inception o f GSM in 1991 
to the recent introduction of 3"* generation UMTS networks. The review encompasses 
all aspects of mobile security in parallel with the impact of the offered services, which 
are the essence of the investment effort into misuse and abuse. 
The research subsequently required the inspiration, development and validation of an 
original form of non-intrusive authentication suitable for continuous application within 
the mobile communications arena. In order to achieve the objective, development 
realised an approach incorporating the individual strengths of both physiological and 
behavioural biometric techniques: a hybrid approach which was later submitted to the 
UK and US patents offices (Rodwell 2001) and presented in Appendix I . 
Upon successfijl completion of the development stage, the core research was realised 
within a prototype demonstration and validation tool. For evaluation purposes, the 
demonstrator was suitably modified for general use, via automating the authentication 
process and adding appropriate help information, before being released for an extended 
trial involving a group of volunteers, yielding real-world results. This is essential, i f the 
practicality and effectiveness of the realised technique is to be considered in context. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis can essentially be divided into three main research areas. The chapters 
covering each of these areas will now be introduced in detail: 
• PhD Research Foundations 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 introduce and review the foundations to the PhD research. 
• PhD Research and Development 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 cover respectively; conception, development and evaluation of 
the PhD core research proposal(s). 
• PhD Research Conclusions 
Chapter 8 presents and discusses the research conclusions. 
1.3.1 PhD Research Foundations 
Chapter 2 discusses the results of a review of the evolution of current mobile 
communications technologies, with an in depth look at the security systems in place to 
protect users and their property. Current mobile security systems were originally 
conceived to protect 2"^ generation mobile communications networks, specifically the 
Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), and have remained fundamentally 
unchanged through the subsequent generation(s) of mobile technology. 
The security aspect of Chapter 2 focuses upon mobile subscriber authentication and the 
approaches employed by the network operators and the hardware manufactures. Security 
provisions within current mobile telephony based networks are primarily aimed at secure 
communication: subscriber authentication is achieved via use of a handset serial number 
and a token smart card containing subscription details; authentication is fundamentally 
between the token smart card and the mobile network. Subscriber authentication with the 
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mobile handset relies on a PoE knowledge-based approach, only usually performed at 
handset switch-on and therefore vulnerable to masquerade attack. Chapter 2 discusses 
these issues in detail, before identifying some potential technological areas from which 
solutions may be drawn to overcome essentially what are 1^ generation security 
deficiencies within post 2™* generation and 3"* generation networks. 
Chapter 3 presents the results of a public survey investigating mobile users' views 
towards existing mobile security and subscriber authentication. Participants were asked 
about their personal experience o f mobile fraud or theft. They were also asked their 
opinion on the protection the mobile handset access control, the PoE four digit Personal 
Identification Number (PIN), provides for their network subscription. The survey goes 
on to explore participants usage o f existing mobile services and their requirements for 
future services and the security risks which they may carry. Finally there are a selection 
of questions on participant's awareness and opinion on a selection of advanced security 
approaches to authentication, including biometrics and specific mobile related issues. 
Introduced in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 covers the topic of biometrics, including a 
comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art, and the scope, of current biometric 
approaches and systems. The chapter investigates market penetration of various 
biometric techniques and specific system applicability to the mobile arena. The chapter 
concludes with an extension to the security survey covered in Chapter 3 addressing 
specifically issues relating to biometrics and advanced authentication. Participants' 
views on various generic advanced security issues are explored, their awareness of 
current and emerging biometric techniques and their attitudes towards security issues 
affecting future mobile technology. 
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1.3.2 PhD Research and Development 
Chapter 5 introduces the Head Authentication Technique (HAT), a proposed solution 
to the authentication deficiencies introduced in Chapter 2, discussing the technique from 
conception through to realisation. In order to place the proposed solution in context, a 
number o f alternative approaches are also discussed, two o f which are followed up in 
the research and the others rejected due to feasibility or practicality reasons. As mobile 
handsets are developed far beyond their simple telephony roots, it is accepted that in 
practical terms no single approach is appropriate in isolation to protect all mobile 
services, and that a multi-modal approach to authentication is expected to provide the 
most comprehensive solution. The successful application of such a system, especially in 
a continuously monitoring environment, wil l depend on a comprehensive mobile 
security framework, capable of managing multiple authentication techniques under 
differing scenarios. 
Chapter 6 covers the finalised methodology of the Head Authentication Technique in 
detail, as realised through the HAT demonstration tool discussed in Chapter 7. The 
chapter discusses the HAT operational principles by cumulatively revealing and 
explaining the discrete stages of the HAT process, with the aid of comprehensive, flow 
diagrams. The chapter also discusses some of the developmental processes which led to 
the final HAT methodology, explaining and defending the reasoning behind some of the 
key research direction choices with the aid of empirical data. There is also a section 
discussing an altemafive HAT methodology partly developed in tandem alongside the 
principle choice, and characterised by a modified yet equally novel biometric data 
analysis algorithm, demonstrating some of the future research potential o f the this novel 
biometric technique. 
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Chapter 7 covers the evaluation stage of the research project including the development 
and operation of a HAT demonstration tool. A group of twenty volunteers, including 
different sexes, ages and nationalities, was asked to authenticate themselves in a series 
of HAT trials using the developed demonstration tool. The HAT trials produced twenty 
sets of biometric HAT samples which were used for system evaluation through post 
trials analysis, A complete set of results is presented in Chapter 7, which includes a 
series of graphical outputs demonstrating the authentication performance of the HAT 
process including: 
• how HAT audio spectra ft'om the same user follows a common shape; 
• how HAT audio spectra between different users follow a different shape; 
• the calculations of the system false-acceptance and false rejection error rates; 
1.33 PhD Research Conclusions 
Finally Chapter 8 summarises and reasserts the original research problem, before 
proposing a possible solution: HAT. The research is also critically assessed through 
sections on research achievements and limitations, effectively defining the operational 
envelope of the HAT process. The chapter proceeds to identify areas for future work, 
generally directions where the development of the HAT process was curbed due to 
available resources, before finally demonstrating the contribution that the research has 
made to the subject area of biometric authentication in the mobile arena. 
A ftjll list of References and Internet Links, followed by the appendices, containing 
significant Public Outputs, and the research Patents is included at the end of the thesis. 
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2 Mobile Communications and Mobile Security 
This chapter reviews and discusses current mobile technology and the security 
authentication systems in place to protect users' mobile subscriptions; data link security 
being outside the scope of the thesis. The chapter highlights potential weaknesses in the 
current authentication methodology and their increasing relevance to the enhanced 
services of evolving 2"^ * generation wideband (GPRS, EDGE) networks, the recently 
introduced 3"* generation wideband (UMTS) networks and embryonic post 3"* 
generation broadband (HSDPA) networks. 
2.1 Introduction 
Cordless and cellular mobile communications devices ftinction via the transmission and 
reception of signals within the radio frequency bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Security for these devices must therefore protect three principal areas from compromise: 
the mobile subscriber, the mobile hardware and the radio link, in equal measure. 
Security provisions within the current, predominantly 2"** generation, GSM networks 
addresses each of these security issues as follows: to protect the subscriber from 
masquerade attack, subscriber authentication is performed via the use o f a smart card 
token; to protect the mobile hardware from amongst other things, spoofing, mobile 
terminal authentication utilises an electronic serial number and to protect the mobile 
data on the radio link from eavesdropping, strong data encryption is employed. 
Al l of the UK's, major network operators (at the time of writing: Orange, Vodafone, O2 
and T-Mobile, in order of market share), although still heavily involved with 2"** 
generation technologies, are all actively finalising post 2"^  generation wideband 
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networks. Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile, are in the process o f enabling data 
communications across their 3"* generation UMTS networks, with Hutchison 3G being 
the first operator to market with a commercial system known as '3' in March 2003 
(BBC News 2003). 02, in association with Nortel, recently completed live tests of their 
High Speed Download Packet Access (HSDPA) network, with extended commercial 
field trials scheduled for the second quarter of 2005 (Nortel 2005). Table 2-1 below, 
maps the history and evolution of mobile technology networks. 
Generation 1G 2G 2.5G 2.75G 3 G 3.xG 
EU Acronym TAGS GSM HSCSD G P R S E D G E UMTS HSDPA 
Coding Scheme Analogue Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital 
Technology 
Characteristic 
Analogue 
coding 
Digital 
coding 
Multiple 
time-slots 
Packet 
switching 
3G speed 
over 2G 
Advanced 
Services 
IP Core 
Network 
Download 
Bandwidth 
(Kbps) 
Max X 9.6 < 115 < 171 <384 < 2000 <10000 
Real X - 4 " 12 - 4 0 - 1 0 0 - 4 0 0 >2000 
Frequency (MHz) 900 900/1800 1800 900/1800 900/1800 2000 5000 
Switching Circuit Circuit Circuit Packet Packet Packet Packet 
Voice (Rich) ^ (Rich) 
to 
SMS/MMS X 
u 
> 
Internet X ^ (WAP) ^ (WAP) ^ {WAP) ^ (Rich) ^ (Rich) 
o mMedIa X X >/ 
G P S enabled X X X X X 
/ Wailablllty 1983 1992 2000 2001 2005 2004 >2006 
Table 2 - 1 : The evolution of cellular mobile communicalion technologies 
The £22.5 billion investment in 3G licenses in the year 2000 (Brown ct al. 2001), even 
before any investment in infrastructure (estimated to exceed the value o f the 3G licenses, 
CNN 2001), demonstrates the commercial strength of the current mobile marketplace and 
the confidence existing major network operators have in the continued development o f 
new mobile technology and the revenue streams that the enabled services wil l produce. 
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2.2 Mobile Communications Systems 
The evolution on mobile communications technology has produced a rich heritage of 
revolution and innovation in communications. Table 2-1 introduces key technologies 
which have shaped the industry today and these wi l l now be discussed in greater detail. 
2.2.1 A Basic Mobile Communications Architecture 
Land-line 
Network 
lAuthentication 
Centre 
Base 
Station 
visitor 
Register 
Equipment 
Register 
Home 
Register 
Mobile Service 
Switching 
Centre 
Gateway 
Exchange 
licrowavj 
Link 
Base 
Station Base 
Station 
Subscnber 
Token 
Mobile 
Handset 
Figure 2-1 : Schematic of a basic mobile communications architecture 
Figure 2-1 shows a basic architecture for a distributed mobile communications network 
similar to the cellular networks in use today and covered in Section 2.2.2. Although not 
comprehensive, the schematic and associated information provides those readers which 
require it, with a basic understanding of some of the key elements which come together 
to form a typical mobile network architecture. 
15 
Chapter 2 : Mobile Communications and Mobile Security 
Key to Figure 2-1 
(J) Subscriber Token: Network subscriber authentication token (smart card, aka SIM). 
(D Mobile Handset: The physical terminal interface to the distributed mobile network. 
(3) Base Station: The interface between the radio link and the mobile network. 
® Microwave Link: Employed when base stations are cited in remote locations. 
(§) Network Switching Centre: The mobile network telephone exchange. 
(g) Equipment Register: Database of mobile handsets security status. 
(2) Home Register: Database of mobile network subscriptions. 
(g) Authentication Centre: Database of authentication and encryption parameters. 
(§) Visitor Register: Database for the temporary storage of visiting subscribers. 
(1)(§) Gateway Exchange: Switches connections to landline network. 
(JXD Landline Network: The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
There follows a simplified explanation and walkthrough of the generic mobile 
communications architecture shown in Figure 2-1. Although an in-depth explanation is 
beyond the scope of this text, ftirther information on current mobile network 
architectures can be obtained ft-om their respective goveming bodies, which are 
identified in Section 2.2.2 for 2G and Section 2.2.3 for 3G systems. 
The Mobile Handset © containing, the Subscriber Token (J) (ref Section 2.3.1, The 
SIM Card) for network authentication, communicates with the distributed mobile 
networks' Base-Stations over a secure radio link: Table 2-1 shows the link 
fi-equencies of current European mobile networks. The Base-stations Q) are connected 
to the Mobile Service Switching Centre Q), either via cable or Microwave Link ® , 
depending on location and terrain. The Mobile Service Switching Centre ©con ta ins a 
number of operational databases: the Home Register the Equipment Register (§) 
and the Visitor Register @L The Equipment Register ® (see Section 2.3.2, The IMEI 
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Code) contains security information regarding the validity of the Mobile Handset @ such 
as, 'has it been reported stolen?' or 'is it compatible with the network?' The Home 
Register © (see Section: 2.3.5, Mobile Authentication Methodology), contains security 
information regarding the validity of the network subscription and works together with 
the Authentication Centre to validate the subscription of the Subscriber Token (JL 
The Visitor Register @ is a special database for the storage of temporary subscription 
data for persons visiting the network. I f all security criteria are met, the Mobile Service 
Switching Centre Q) will complete the appropriate connection; either within the host 
network or transfer the link externally to the Gateway Exchange (D®^ which will route 
the connection to the traditional Landline Network 
2.2.2 2"^  Generation Mobile Communications 
Although 3"^  generation mobile networks and their advanced services are now becoming 
available to the consumer, 2"'' generation technology and its hybrid derivatives still 
predominate the European mobile marketplace; the most successful of these is GSM, 
2.2.2.1 Introduction to G S M 
The backbone of the European system for wide area mobile communications came into 
commercial existence in January 1992, when 'Oy Radiolinja Ab' of Finland, opened the 
first GSM network for business (CellularOnline 2006a), the standard having been 
ratified by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSl) some 3 years 
earlier, after taking over control fi-om the original GSM working group. It was in fact in 
1982, that the Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs (CEPT) first formed the 
study group known as the Groupe Special Mobile (GSM) to research and develop a pan-
European public land mobile system: the GSM acronym later being changed, in 1987, to 
the now familiar and broader ranging: Global System for Mobile Communications. 
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GSM is a narrowband digital cellular radio network, originally developed for mobile 
telephony. It has experienced worldwide adoption since its introduction in 1992, with 32 
networks by the following year and over 570 operational networks by 2004, covering 
190 countries supporting 1.6 billion subscribers (GSM Worid 2005), representing 80% 
of the world's mobile market and one quarter of the world population. GSM currently 
provides almost complete coverage in Western Europe, and growing coverage in the 
Americas, Asia and elsewhere. Although GSM supports extensive intemational 
roaming, there are in fact three operational frequencies: 900MHz (Original GSM; 
Europe), 1800MHz (Personal Communications Network (PCN); Europe) & 1900MHz 
(Personal Communications System (PCS): North America), and a tri-band handset is 
required, along with a network operator agreement, in order to roam within the three 
intemational standards. 
2.2.2.2 G S M Services 
The first 2"** generation mobile handsets, circa early 1990s, only supported very basic 
mobile services: telephony, FAX, Short Message Service (SMS). As the technology 
matured and entered its second decade, the digital nature of GSM and its open standard, 
has allowed mobile networks operators to develop enhanced data services and enabling 
technologies like High Speed Circuit Switched Data (HSCSD) and the Wireless 
Application Protocol (WAP) (OMA 2005). Rudimentary data services, such as text 
messaging via Short Message Service (SMS), have proved popular, challenging the 
market dominance of voice based services and although light Internet browsing via 
WAP has not lived up to industry expectations (vnunet 2000), the trend is still towards 
Intemet connectivity via wireless communications with mobile devices, such as laptop 
and palmtop computers, through Bluetooth (Link: Bluetooth). 
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2.2.2.3 GSM Derivative Technologies (2.5G) 
The limited bandwidth of a single standard GSM link is 9.6 Kbps. Where this is 
sufficient for voice and rudimentary data services, the popularity and move towards 
enhanced data based services have driven the market to develop a number of wideband 
GSM derivative technologies, see Table 2-1: 
• High Speed Circuit Switched Data (HSCSD) utilises multiple GSM TDMA 
time slots, to provide up to 115 Kbps. 
• General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) offers bandwidths approaching 10 
times the standard GSM rate: up to 171 Kbps. 
• Enhanced Data Rates for GSIM Evolution ( E D G E ) utilises a new air-interface 
modulation technique to offer data rates approaching 3"* generation performance 
over existing 2"^  generation infrastructure: up to 384 Kbps. 
2.2.3 3^^^  Generation Mobile Communications 
As 2"** generation mobile networks entered their second decade, the growth in data 
services drove the industry to conceive the next generation of wideband networks to 
deliver advanced wideband services, via suitably enhanced handsets or network 
interface portals, including video telephony, always on rich Internet and multimedia. 3"* 
generation (3G) mobile networks offer data rates up to 200 times that of a basic 2"** 
generation network: the 3G service developed for Europe is known as UMTS. 
2.2.3.1 3G Bodies and Standards 
The governing body for both GSM and 3G in Europe, UMTS, is ETSl (European Tele-
communications Standards Institute), formed in 1988. Along with other international 
bodies: ARIB (Japan), T l (USA), TTA (Korea) and CWTS (China), a harmonising 
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project group was established, the 3"* Generation Partnership Project (Link: 3GPP), 
holding its first meeting in Sophia, France on 7^*" December 1998. SGPP's aim was to 
co-operate in the production of globally applicable 3G mobile system standards, based 
on evolved GSM technology. In June 1999, OHG (Operator Harmonisation Group) 
proposed the evolution of 3GPP, along with the USA's 3GPP2 cdma2000 proposal 
group, into a harmonised G3G (Global 3G) standard. Another influential body was the 
Mobile Wireless Internet Forum (MWIF), an international harmonisation association, 
whose key goal was to influence 3GPP and 3GPP2 into the acceptance and adoption of 
a single open mobile architecture, independent of the access technology. 
2.2.3.2 Introduction to U M T S 
The term UMTS was first defined in 1986 as part of the Commission of European 
Communities (CEC) Research into Advanced Communications in Europe (RACE). 
Developed by the European Community as a commercial 3"* generation mobile 
technology, UMTS was adapted by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
standards effort as part of IMT-2000 (International Mobile Telephone for the year 
2000)' (ITU 2001). UMTS is based on the core network architecture of GSM, allowing 
current GSM network operators to protect their infrastructure investments and combines 
evolved current technologies with new developments in the field. UMTS frequencies 
were allocated at the World Radio Conference in Malaga (WRC-92) in February 1992. 
In addition to Europe, UMTS is the interpretation of 3G adopted by Japan and North 
America, One of UMTS's core developments was its packet-based wideband CDMA 
technology, allowing global roaming and always-on networking facilities. The 
technology offers data transmission rates far in excess of the 9.6 K.bps of basic 2"^ 
generation GSM technology, providing up to (best case): 
' IMT-2000 replaced the FLPMTS (Future Land Public Mobile Telecommunications System) initiative. 
20 
Chapter 2 : Mobile Communications and Mobile Security 
• 144 Kbps in macro cellular environments; Roaming: -10km. 
• 384 Kbps in micro cellular environments; Building: -lOOm. 
• 2000 Kbps in Pico cellular environments; Room: -10m. 
UMTS currently represents the ultimate evolution of commercially available public 
access mobile telephony aligned with associated mobile data services: Richardson 
(2000) summarised UMTS as "a revolution of the air-interface, by an evolution of the 
core network." 
The final quarter of 2004 saw strong growth in the demand for UMTS 3G handsets in 
Europe, rising to 16 million subscribers across 60 networks, a 60% increase on the 10 
million subscriber milestone set in September 2004 (UMTS Forum 2005). 
2.2.3.3 3 G (UMTS) Services 
The availability of services that meet genuine market requirements are accepted as the 
key to the success of 3"* generation technology. "Unlike 2G, where services were 
specified within the standard, central to the concept of 3G are services' capabilities and 
toolkits - which enable the creation of customised, operator-specific services to drive 
new revenues streams" (Watson 2001). Further research commissioned by the UMTS 
Forum (2003) showed that, even at a conservative estimate, 30 services represent a 
cumulative revenue potential of one trillion US dollars for mobile services providers' 
between now and 2010. How big is the 3G services market expected to be by 2010? A 
total of 2.25 billion mobile subscribers (both 2G and 3G) are being forecast, of which 
more than 28% are predicted to be subscribers to 3G enabled networks. 
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Figure 2-2 : 3G Services framework 
What wil l 3G services be? Services are expected to evolve in fundamentally three 
different directions: Personal Communications; Wireless Internet and Mobile media. 
Out of these three areas, the UMTS Forum defines a clear structure of six service 
categories, illustrated in Figure 2-2, for discussing, planning and reporting on services 
and applications for 3G over the next ten years (UMTS Forum 2003). The services are: 
• Multimedia Content 
These include: live video, ore-recorded video clips, music (mp3s) and games 
formatted for a mobile handset. 
• Multimedia Messaging 
A development of the popular 2"** generation SMS text only service that enables: 
video clips, music or graphics to be sent to another mobile handset. 
• Internet Access 
A rich Intemet service, not the light browsing environment of the 2"** generation 
WAP service, which proved unpopular on introduction. 
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• Instant Messaging 
A mobile version of the popular real-time PC text messaging service. 
• Location Based Services 
Utilising the global positioning capabilities of 3G. Services could include 
directions from the subscriber's current location to, for example, the nearest fuel 
fil l ing station, cinema or restaurant. 
• Rich Voice 
An enhanced rich voice telephony service. In addition to improved audio quality, 
services include: Presence, the ability to see i f a user is currently 'on-line' to 
receive communications; 'Push-to-talk', a simultaneous group communications 
service, similar to the service offered by private radio networks. 
Conservative forecasts predict that total service provider-retained revenues for 3G 
services in 2010 will reach US$322 billion. Of those revenues, 66 percent will come 
from 3G-enabled data services (VisionGain 2005). Figure 2-3 shows the predictive 
cumulative revenue potential for mobile services providers between now and 2010 is 
estimated to rise in excess of one trillion US dollars. 
Services like e-mail and Web browsing are expected to have little direct revenue 
potential, as users will expect them to be included as part of their service package at no 
additional charge; their benefit comes mainly from their role as drivers of traffic. The 
single largest revenue opportunity is expected to come from multimedia based services 
by virtue of its low cost and mass-market appeal, contributing USS86 billion in 2010. It 
is also predicted that much of the additional revenue wil l be generated from increased 
mobile usage, driven by new services, rather than through new sources o f revenue. 
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Figure 2-3 : Worldwide revenues forecast from all 3G services 
2.2.4 Beyond S'^ '* Generation 
It has been shown that mobile communications is evolving rapidly and the drive 
towards broadband mobile data communications shows no signs of slowing. Although 
the introduction of the first 3G mobile network marks a milestone in both data rates and 
offered services, when compared to the field of distributed computing networks, such as 
Wi-Fi, mobile telephony based technology is still over one hundred times slower. It is 
not unexpected therefore, that development of cutting edge mobile technology is 
continuing apace, before 3G has even firmly established itself within the market place. 
In order to further strengthen the presented case for enhanced authentication security, 
where enhanced services are intimately linked to enhanced data rates, two post 3G 
approaches currently in development are briefly acknowledged below. 
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2.2.4.1 High Speed Downlink Packet Access 
High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) is a packet-based data service based on 
an evolution of the core 3G architecture. HSDPA uses a new modulation technique 
which increases peak downlink data rates by to up to 5 times the peak data rate of the 
most advanced 3G networks; improving spectral efficiency. The Third Generation 
Partnership Projects (Link: 3GPP) standards, Release 4 specifications provide IP 
support enabling provision of services through an all-IP core network. The Release 5 
specifications focuses on HSDPA to provide initially up to 10 Mbps to support packet-
based multimedia services (3GPP 2005). 
The increased bandwidth wil l enable network operators and service providers to offer 
their advanced services at lower costs, owing to the higher number of users supported 
by a single carrier and with greatly reduced delays over the air interface. This will also 
enable new time critical services, like streaming high-definition video. 
In essence the benefits to the HSDPA user wil l be: 
• Higher data rates 
• Shorter service response times 
• New services 
• Better availability of existing services 
• Improved overall quality o f service 
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2.2.4.2 4**^  Generation 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), in addition to the ITU 
working group 8F, are actively addressing the issues for the 4*^  generation of mobile 
communications (4G), like the international coordination of frequencies, spectrum 
harmonisation and standardization. A coarse timetable has been set of establishing the 
necessary 4G technology for mobile communications systems by the end of 2005 and 
putting a system into practice by 2010. 
One debate is currently tackling the issue of whether 4G will be an evolution of existing 
3G standards or a revolutionary development. What is likely is that 4G wi l l be a packet-
switched technology offering bandwidths similar to the broadband distributed computer 
networks of the 2G mobile era. Based on Ethernet and wireless standards of around 100 
Mbps, bandwidths 10,000 times that of current 2G technology are being proposed. This 
would enable the sending and receiving of high quality streaming video, even whilst 
roaming at high speed across cell boundaries, something even the most advanced 
currently proposed technologies, such as HSDPA, cannot do. Although 4G is broadly 
based on similar goals to 3G, with an emphasis on bandwidth enabled services rather 
than purely high data rates, one specific target area for improvement is interoperability 
between hardware and networks, via technologies such as 'software defined radio'. This 
will enable subscribers to freely roam across networks utilising various different mobile 
interfaces without suffering any loss in quality of service. 
These proposals present a very strong case for not only an enhanced subscriber 
authentication system, but also a network-centric security system capable of enabling 
the proposed personal mobility criteria discussed in Section 2.3.7.3. 
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2.3 Mobile Security 
Introduced in Section 2.1, GSM authentication is achieved on two separate levels, 
authentication of the mobile subscription and authentication of the mobile hardware, 
as follows: 
• Mobile subscriber authentication is achieved through use of a token-based, 
Subscriber Identity Module held on a multi-standard smart card. 
• Mobile terminal authentication is achieved via issuing the mobile terminal 
(handset) with an International Mobile Equipment Identifier at point of 
manufacture, uniquely identifying the hardware on the network. 
These two approaches to mobile authentication form the minimum' standard for all post 
2"^ * generation mobile handsets and they wil l now be reviewed and discussed in depth. 
2.3.1 T h e S I M C a r d 
The Mobile Station (MS) consists of the Mobile Equipment (ME, the handset) and a 
smart card containing a micro controller, the Subscriber Identity Module or SIM. 
GSM was the first international mobile communication system to employ a smart card 
based SIM as a secure device for the authentication of a user subscription. The SIM 
contains subscription and security related data as well as user and/or network operator 
specific data. In addition the SIM can contain operator specific applications via the SIM 
Application Toolkit^: this service is completely separate from the GSM functionality of 
the SIM. A schematic breakdown o f a generic SIM is included in Appendix A. 
' Hardware manufactures and/or Network-operators may augment the minimum authentication standard 
with additional security measures, such as a biometric fingerprint scanner (see Section 4.3.1.1). 
~ The SIM Application Toolkit was originally integrated into the GSM standards in Release 96. 
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2.3.1.1 S I M Formats 
SIMs shown actual size 
Figure 2-4 : Plug-in SIMs 
The Sub Technical Committee SMG9, established in 1994 as the successor of the 
Subscriber Identity Module Expert Group (SIMEG) itself founded in 1988, defined 
three formats of SIM. The first and original specification was for an integrated circuit 
card, employing Surface Mount Device (SMD) packages and having a credit-card 
format: the ID-1 SIM. Aware of the inevitable size reduction developments of the ME, 
SMG9 also defined a second smaller semi-permanent plug-in SIM for those units unable 
to accept an ID-1 SIM. This SIM was obtained by removing the excess plastic from an 
ID-1 SIM. The plug-in SIM is 25mm x 20mm and normally installed behind the battery 
as opposed to being slotted externally. 
An altemate specification proposed an integral SIM, a part of the ME itself. Although 
more reliable than the plug-in SIM owing to the removal of the SIM-ME interface, it 
introduced network operator security problems related to the utilisation of operator 
specific algorithms. It would be difficult, i f not impossible, for network operators to use 
their own security algorithms and keep close control over secret keys and other operator 
specific security data without a dedicated security module. It was also believed that non-
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specific mobiles would open the market for manufacturers reducing trade barriers. It is 
interesting however, that the USA took a different view for their PCN network, 
universally adopting the integral SIM. 
Current market forces are also behind a drive for a Third Form Factor (3FF), which was 
recently approved at a plenary meeting of the ETSI Smart Card Platform project (ETSI 
2003). Essentially, with the development of smaller and smaller handsets, the point wil l 
eventually be reached where the plug-in SIM card occupies too much volume in the 
mobile device, especially in those devices whose primary purpose is not mobile 
communications, i.e. miniature digital cameras or watches. The new card is proposed at 
half the size of the existing card, with the majority of the remaining excess plastic cut 
away, whilst leaving the contact area unchanged. In this way, the change will have 
minimal effect on the established standard and not affect existing chip size performance. 
2.3.2 The IMEI Code 
The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a unique 15-digit code 
assigned to every GSM and UMTS mobile handset at point of manufacturer, by the 
Global Decimal Administrator (GDA), identifying the Mobile Equipment (ME) or 
hardware as opposed to the subscriber to the network. It was initially produced for type 
approval reasons so that out of specification mobile handsets may be removed fi-om a 
mobile network. The IMEI constitutes sensitive information, being the mobile handsets 
unique electronic serial number. This form of identification is analogous to the 
Electronic Serial Number (ESN) of 1^ * generation ( IG) systems, such as AMPS. A 
historical' breakdown of the IMEI code is provided in Appendix B. 
' The IMEI code has undergone some evolutionary changes since its introduction in 1992. 
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A list of all the mobile handset IMEIs on an operator network is stored in a central 
location known as the Equipment Identity Register (EIR). This enables, among other 
things, a handset reported stolen to be blocked from further use in the network; 
assuming that the networks infrastructure contain the necessary routines for checking 
the IMEI number against the central blocking register. The status returned in response to 
an IMEI query to the EIR is one of the following: 
• White Listed:The handset is not considered suspicious 
The handset is allowed to connect to the network, 
• Grey Listed:The handset is under observation for possible problems. 
The handset is allowed to connect to the network. 
• Black listed: The handset has been reported stolen, or is not type approved. 
The handset is denied access to the network. 
A Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) is operated by the GSM Association in 
Ireland, allowing GSM network operators to share their individual lists o f IMEIs. (Link: 
GSM Association). The CEIR lists are automatically updated on a daily basis and at the 
same time local EIRs download the aggregated lists for their own use. 
A handsets IMEI code is not kept secret from the user. It can normally be found on the 
retail packaging and on the handset itself, normally on a self-adhesive compliance label 
under the battery. It is also possible to display the IMEI by dialling the code *#06#. 
2.3.2.1 I M E I Black Listing 
A black-list contains the equipment identities, or IMEIs, of handsets barred from using 
the particular network: handsets reported lost, stolen or otherwise unsuitable for use. In 
October 2002, in an attempt to curb the rise in handset abuse, network operators started 
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sharing their black-lists within the GSM Associations CEIR in an attempt to curb the 
rise in handset abuse (GSM Association 2002). 
2.3,2,2 Reprogramming the I M E I ; The Mobile Reprogramming Act, 2002 
It is not a secret that the IME! of a mobile handset can be changed relatively easily. This 
is due to the fact that the GSM specification does not explicitly exclude re-programming 
of the IMEI by authorised individuals. This is quite serious from a security perspective, 
as this places the IMEI in firmware where it is ultimately vulnerable to abuse. This is in 
contrast to the data encryption/ciphering keys, which are masked directly into hardware 
at the point of manufacturer, denying any possibility of software alteration. 
In an attempt to curb abuse of the system, standards for improved IMEI Security were 
drafted and agreed by manufacturers and ETSI members at the ETSI TC SMG#30 
Plenary meeting (ETSI 1999). Their amendment policy statement proposing: 
"77ie IMEI shall not be changed after the ME's final production process. 
It shall resist tampering i.e. manipulation and change, by any means 
(e.g. Physical, electrical and software^. 
This has led to The Mobile Reprogramming Act 2002, which came into force on I^^ 
April 2002. The Act states that it is now a criminal offence to "Offer, change or 
reprogramme any mobile phone from any network which changes its designed purpose 
to allow it to unlock or to change the IMEI Number": the act carries a maximum penalty 
of 5 year imprisonment. The Act does not however include the unlocking of a mobile 
handset fi-om a designated service provider, known as SIMLock deactivation, unless it 
includes changing the IMEI or other identifying features being changed or removed. 
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A brief search on the Internet however, demonstrates that it is still relatively easy to find 
IMEI firmware reprogramming utilifies for mobile handsets, showing that the system is 
still openly abused, see Figure 2-5. 
>^ Universal Nokia IMEI changer ver 1.0 m 
NOKIA 
Q? 21>C>< 
0 51>O</Old 8110 
Q61XK/8810 
Q TAm 
Q N e w 8110 
Change IMEI 
IMEI: Change 
New IMEI: [OOOOOO |j-(or|j-|OO0OOO Open Exit 
Figure 2-5 : Example of an IMEI reprogramming utility 
2.3.2,3 Subscriber Identity Confidentiality ( I M S I and T M S I ) 
Subscriber identity authentication allows mobile subscribers to originate calls, update 
their location, etc, without revealing their International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI) to an eavesdropper on the radio link. It thus prevents location tracing of handsets 
by listening to the signalling exchanges on the radio path. Al l mobiles and networks 
must be capable of supporting the service, though its use is not mandatory. 
Mobile Country Code Mobile Network Mobile Subscriber 
(MCC) Code (MNC) Identification Code (MSIC) 
3 digits 2 digits 10 digits 
Table 2-2: Format of the IMSI 
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In order to provide the subscriber identity confidentiality service it is necessary to 
ensure that the IMS!, or any information which allows an eavesdropper to derive the 
IMSI, is not normally transmitted 'in-clear' in any signalling message on the radio path. 
The mechanism used to provide this service is based on the use of a temporary mobile 
subscriber identity (TMSI), which is securely updated after each successfijl access to the 
system. Thus, in principle, the IMSI need only be transmitted in clear over the radio 
path at registration. In addition, the signalling elements which convey information about 
the IMSI are enciphered. 
The T M S I updating mechanism functions in the following manner. For simplicity, 
assume the MS has been allocated a T M S I , denoted by T M S I o , and the network knows 
the association between T M S I o and the subscriber's IMSI. The MS identifies itself to the 
network by sending TMSIo- Immediately after authentication (assuming this takes 
place), the network generates a new T M S I , denoted T M S I n , and sends this to the MS 
encrypted under the cipher key IQ. Upon receipt of the message, the MS deciphers and 
replaces T M S I o by T M S I n -
2.3.3 The User PIN - Real Subscriber Authentication 
Subscriber authentication within current mobile network architectures is limited to the 
authentication of the SIM (also see Section 2.3.5) which may or may not be in the 
possession of the SIMs legitimate subscriber; handset authentication via the IMEI is not 
a subscriber issue. The only tangible security system existing between the SIM and the 
legitimate subscriber is the user's SIM access Personal Identification Number (PIN); see 
Figure 2-6. The user PIN is the first line of defence against both casual, opportunistic 
unauthorised use and more serious pre-meditated masquerade attack. The PIN provides 
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a personal authentication check at the mobile handset, restricting open access to the SIM 
card and therefore the network; the onus on PIN activation being in the hands of the 
subscriber. With the intrusive nature of this security technique (i.e. requires conscious 
subscriber interaction) it is not uncommon to find subscribers actually choosing to leave 
the option disabled; this issue is investigated in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
Handset Net>»ork 
fM\ ( K^k-
IMSI ( cKle 
I M S I Code 
PIN - Personal Identification Number 
IMFJ - International Mobile Equipment Identifier 
IMSI - International Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
TMSI - Temnorarv Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
Figure 2-6 : The mobile telephony authentication chain 
Although offering a relatively secure form of protection in terms of a brute force attack, 
offering normally 4 digits, with restricted attempts, the traditional subscriber PIN 
remains a Point-of-Entry (PoE) technique, triggered only when the handset is brought 
out of standby. I f a handset is left in active mode, the PIN offers no handset protection 
whatsoever. Some handsets do offer an additional PfN facility to lockout the keypad 
after a specific time period, but generally this feature is limited to prevention of 
accidental activation rather than a security feature, with a simple two key access. In 
essence, the PIN authentication technique remains one of the primary security issues 
that needs to be addressed and improved upon in order to protect the enhanced services 
data of next generation wideband and broadband networks. Current mobile 
authentication therefore depends on two things: 
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• the PIN facility being activate; 
• the user not inadvertently compromising the PIN protection themselves. 
In a similar manner to traditional passwords in desktop IT systems, the PIN is based on 
a secret knowledge approach and is therefore inherently vulnerable to subscribers 
compromising their own security. This can be achieved by a user either selecting an 
inappropriate value, such as 1234, transferring or sharing the knowledge with others, or 
simply writing it down (Lemos 2003, Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989). In addition, the 
secret knowledge approach is not strictly unique to any particular subscriber, leaving the 
technique openly vulnerable to masquerade attack. 
2.3.3.1 Bypassing a handset's PIN code 
In a similar approach to compromising a handsets IMEI, software to break mobile 
handsets PIN codes can be found relatively easily over the Internet in downloadable 
pirate versions. WinTelsa, for example, is a Nokia handset utility, designed to be used in 
authorized Nokia repair centres, for among other tasks, the recovery and maintenance of 
handset security data including the PIN. The very existence of such utilities represents a 
security risk: WinTelsa is already available illegally over the internet. 
Examples have also been found where a mobile handset has been physically opened and 
hard-wired in order to bypass the PIN protection altogether. By inspecting the enlarged 
section of the mobile handset's main circuit board, illustrated in Figure 2-7, notice the 
multiple thin trailing wires around the ICs (Integrated Circuits) effectively 'hot-wiring' 
the board (Geissler 2001). 
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Figure 2-7 : A mobile handset modified to bypass the PIN 
2.3.3.2 Enhancing Authentication Security 
Recognising the security weaknesses of the PIN, highlighted in Section 2.3.3, some 
manufacture!^ have tried to address the issue by introducing some form o f truly personal 
authentication; biometric authentication. In 2002, Sagem released the first mobile handset 
to incorporate a biometrics (see Chapter 4) authentication approach (Sagem 2000): the 
Sagem MC959ID (Figure 2-8) incorporated a buih in fingerprint sensor. Although, the 
device seemed to mark a turning point in the market, acceptance has been slow and 
currently only NTT DoCoMo of Japan offer a similarly equipped device (NTT DoCoMo 
2004): the Fujitsu F505i (Figure 2-9). Although fundamentally more secure than existing 
authentication approaches, the system still suffers the major drawback of requiring 
conscious subscriber interaction with the mobile device: it is therefore only suitable for 
PoE protection of mobile hardware or services. 
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Figure 2-8 : The Sagem MC 959 ID mobile handset (ST/Upek fingerprint sensor) 
i% «i 3X 
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#ii ogt 
Figure 2-9 : The Fujitsu F505i mobile handset {Authentec fingerprint sensor) 
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2.3.4 3'** Party Security 
An already established Internet trend is for service providers to enforce their own 
specific security safeguards, usually some form of knowledge-based (password) 
authentication system. In a mobile context, this security technique would reside after the 
standard security provided by the mobile handset and somewhere between the network 
and the specific service access point. This approach is especially relevant to separately 
billed services such as mobile e-commerce. With the convergence of mobile and land 
based services and the introduction of rich web browsing, provided by the wideband 
next generation systems, this trend is certain to predominate for the short term. 
Looking to the future, in practice, a hybrid approach is likely to represent the most 
appropriate solution, where a security management system determines and maintains the 
most efficient security at the least expense on system transparency, from an available 
cache of security approaches, techniques or protocols. 
2.3.5 Mobile Authentication Methodology 
Anyone who uses a mobile handset is susceptible to masquerade attack and the 
subsequent compromise of personal and potentially sensitive data. Authentication is the 
corroboration that an entity is the one claimed and in mobile terms, this translates to the 
verification of the identity of the SIM registered to a subscriber. The design of the GSM 
authentication and encryption schemes is such that this sensitive information is never 
transmitted over the radio channel. 
The main entities responsible for the authentication of a subscriber to a network are the 
subscribers SIM and the Authentication Centre (AuC) of the home network. Both 
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contain the operator specific one-way authentication algorithm (A3), and a secret 
authentication key Kj , unique to the users SIM subscription. The authentication process 
employs a challenge-response protocol/mechanism between the AuC, a part o f the 
Home Location Register (HLR) and the SIM, using non-predictable numbers. 
When the home network receives an authentication request, and established the claimed 
identity of the SIM, it transmits a non-predictable number RAND as a challenge to the 
MS. The ME passes this number to the SIM, which computes the response SRES to this 
challenge using the algorithm A3 using the arguments RAND and the key ICj stored in 
the SIM. The response SRES is then transmitted back to the network, where it is 
compared with the value pre-computed by the network using the same network 
algorithm A3 and the same arguments RAND and the key K; associated with the 
claimed identity o f the subscriber. The MS is granted network access only i f the value 
generated by the SIM and transmitted by the ME is identical to the value generated by 
the home network; i.e. subscriber authentication is approved. 
Accompanying the challenge-response pairs calculated in the HLR/AuC is a new 64 bit 
cipher key Kc. This is computed using the key K; and the same non-predictable RAND 
number with a new operator specific algorithm A8. The purpose of enciphering is to 
ensure the privacy of the subscriber's information over the radio interface. A discussion 
of ciphering is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Functional descriptions of security aspects are contained within Technical Specification, 
GSM 02.09 (1998), with security related network ftinctions within Technical 
Specification, GSM 03.20 (1999) (Link: ETSI). 
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2.3.6 3G (UMTS) Security Drivers 
It is sensible that the sensitivity of information associated with the services of a given 
network should be commensurate with the levels of protection inherent in that network. 
The proposed services of wideband 2G and 3G networks (Cox 1997) require increased 
amounts of specific user data. This data wi l l , at least, represent sensitive information, 
the user's current location for example and potentially highly confidential information, 
financial details or third party authentication codes. These services demand more secure 
authentication systems to protect the information in the event of a masquerade attack. 
The security functions incorporated into 3G (UMTS) are fundamentally based on those 
established with 2G (GSM), even when considering the enhanced services of 3G. 
Inherited security functions have generally been improved upon, like a stronger air-
interface encryption algorithm and where new security features exist, they are focused 
around stronger protection and storage of the data stream. There is no specific improved 
subscriber authentication aspect to the new security architecture. 
The main security elements inherited from GSM are: 
• Authentication of subscribers via secret knowledge 
• Authentication of handsets via removable SIM 
• Subscriber identity confidentially 
• Radio interface encryption 
Security elements new to UMTS are: 
• Security against using false base stations with mutual authenfication 
• Encryption extended fi-om air interface only to include Node-B to RNC 
• A mechanism for upgrading security features 
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Security data in the network to be protected in data stores and while transmitting 
ciphering keys and authentication data in the system 
The security needs of UMTS are covered by standards drawn up by its governing bodies 
(3GPP 1999), with work progressing within five feature groups (3GPP TS 33.102): 
• Network access security 
Secure access to 3G sennces: protecting the wireless link 
• Network domain security 
Secure exchange of signalling data: protecting the wired link 
• User domain security 
Secure access to MSs 
• Application domain security 
Secure exchange of application data 
• Visibility and configurability of security 
Features to continuously monitor and report the security state of the device and 
also set the security dependence of the device 
Considering the attention 3G enabled devices are currently receiving and the new 
revenue streams covered in the previous Section, 3G is attracting a great deal of interest 
ft-om the criminal element, in a similar way to the public Internet. With services 
suggested including medical records data, e-commerce, and online banking, an 
improved level of subscriber authentication is not only recommended, but a necessity. 
The always-on Internet service further demonstrates the need for not only enhanced 
authentication, but a continuous monitoring scheme capable of detecting an intruder at 
the earliest possible stage. 
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On a typical 2"** Generation GSM handset, the consequences from theft or impostor 
access can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
• Financial loss, as a result of the thief making calls at the legitimate subscriber's 
expense (depending upon the policy of the operator, these losses may not be 
passed on to the subscriber once the handset is reported as stolen). 
• Breach of personal privacy, as a result of subscriber contacts' details being 
stored in the handset; although it is acknowledged that this is a limited amount 
of information, the disclosure of which would not normally be considered highly 
sensitive. Stored text messages may potentially have more significance, but 
would not generally represent a significant body of information. 
When considering the nature of a 3G devices, however, the potential consequences 
become far more severe. The inevitable convergence of current mobile telephony 
devices with PDA style devices, in addition to the novel services, 3G itself will spawn, 
presents a completely different security picture. An always-on 3G mobile device can 
store, in addition to a phonebook: 
• fijl! contact details of friends, business colleagues and associates 
(Microsoft Outlook style contact lists can contain extensive personal contacts 
information, including spouse details, anniversaries etc.); 
• personal financial details enabling mobile e-commerce (m-commerce); 
• electronic certificates for digital signatures; 
• email account details and history archives; 
• miscellaneous information of a commercially sensitive or private nature 
(e.g. entered into a personal scheduler or simply-plain text notepad documents); 
• Possible medical information enabling telemedicine. 
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2.3.7 Terminal vs. Network-centric Security 
An important issue in the subscriber authentication debate is whether fliture security 
authenfication and monitoring systems and/or their enabling data, should reside within 
the mobile handset or within the operator network; or perhaps a hybrid o f the two based 
on, at least, a security weightings for the required service. 
Although UMTS, similar to GSM, shares the concept o f a home network, the 'universal' 
aspect suggested in the name is based upon roaming between operators to suit the 
service requirements. This raises a number of important issues, not least o f which being 
that any future security system designed to protect the enhanced services of wideband 
mobile networks, needs to transcend the technological barriers o f both the systems 
software and hardware, both nationally and intemationally, raised by the different 
operator networks. 
2.3.7.1 Terminal-centric Security 
Considering first the terminal-based approach, where a subscriber's security profile or 
perhaps a biometric template are held within the mobile terminal (handset), or more 
likely within the mobile handsets SIM. This places responsibility for the security o f 
any sensitive authenUcafion data and consequently security of the network portal, in 
the hands o f the subscriber. Although from an operator's perspective, this negates the 
need for specific government legislation on data-protection of potentially uniquely 
personal subscriber data or additional network server security to protect such data, 
ensuring sufficient protection from abuse in such a system may be diff icul t , i f in not in 
practice, impossible. 
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A terminal-centric security based technique would perform and maintain the integrity o f 
its chosen authentication approach completely within the mobile handset. One major 
advantage to this approach, relevant to the current predomination o f 2"^ generation 
networks, is that the technique would not be a burden on network bandwidth; this wil l 
be far less of an issue in post 2"^ generation networks. Subscriber authentication can 
also be performed completely independent of link/bandwidth availability, a potentially 
important issue considering the convergence of mobile with PDA style devices. 
There are a number of hardware issues relevant to the terminal-centric solution also 
worth introducing. Firstly, additional authentication cycles, will require additional 
processing within the mobile handset, requiring a more poweriul handset CPU i f the 
authentication process is not to impact on the normal operation of the handset. Of 
course, this would also have an associated toll on the handsets battery pack and 
subsequent recharge interval, in addition to operational temperature criteria. 
2.3.7.2 NetAvork-centric Security 
There are some very strong arguments for introducing a network based security system, 
in fact some operators have shown reluctance to consider anything less; i.e. that placing 
security into the handset and effectively the control of the subscriber, is inherently 
insecure fi-om the offset. The justification for this approach is not the flexibility offered 
by enhanced personal mobility or the costing of the mobile handset, although these are 
certainly important issues, but the inherent insecurity o f any network access system 
security outside of their own jurisdiction and management. Although this attitude may 
add fijel to the civil liberties debate. Part 2 of the user authentication survey in Section 
4.5 found a strong bias towards terminal-centric security (50%) compared to a network-
centric approach (33%), in practice, the network-centric solution represents a far more 
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elegant and powerful solution. It enables network operators to better protect themselves 
and their subscribers, by centrally managing and securing subscriber security 
information, in a similar way to the IMEI (Section 2.3.2) and better distribute new 
security systems and updates, offering ultimately a more secure solution to both the 
subscriber and the network operator. The discussion in Section 4.5 goes on to argue that 
the survey results may in fact represent participants ignorance of the holistic view and 
the benefits a network-centric solution can offer. 
Apart from the security management benefits offered by a centralised system, when 
compared to a distributed one, the network-centric technique offers the mobile 
consumer a significant convenience benefit, in the form of enhanced personal mobility. 
2.3.7.3 Mobility 
Potentially, one of the most attractive benefits of a network-centric security system is that 
of increased personal mobility (Fumell et al. 1996), where a subscriber may for example 
register with any terminal (fixed or mobile) in order to access their mobile operators 
services, under their own personal subscription. Although GSM was originally designed 
to offer personal mobility via the SIM, operator network incompatibilities (both hardware 
and software) have restricted this to a limited mobility only within the subscribers own 
operator network. In practice, the personal network mobility aspect offered by the mobile 
SIM is rarely utilised: how often is a network SIM card removed from a handset after 
being installed and the battery inserted? Even ignoring the obvious fact that the SIM 
usually resides behind the battery, within the closed body of the mobile handset, it is 
inherently too small and the SIM hardware interface too inconvenient to be of practical 
use as a token of true personal mobility. This argument is even more relevant with the 
introduction of the 3FF SIM standard, see Section 2.3.1.1. The sort of personal mobility 
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proposed for next generation wideband systems (Section 2.2.4.2) can only be enabled 
via a: non-token-based, non-knowledge-based, subscriber based, network-centric, non-
intrusive continuously monitoring authentication system. Current doctrine dictates that 
this can only be achieved through biometrics. 
Of course, this ideal mobility scenario does however suffer its own set o f consequences. 
The primary points of issue being: 
• Increased data (authentication) traffic over the wireless link; 
• Subscriber authentication sample confidentiality; 
• Subscriber location confidentiality; 
• Biometric samples variability. 
Taking each point in turn, the massively increased bandwidth of the next generation 
mobile networks should have little trouble handling the extra handshaking required by a 
subscriber based security system, even i f authentication was performed continuously, 
especially when compared to the bandwidth of say a video conferencing signal. The 
second point of subscriber signature confidentiality reverses the trust issue mentioned 
earlier in Section 2.3.7.1. With the onus of data confidentiality in the hands of the 
network operator, subscribers must entrust sensitive, potentially biometric, data to a 
third party. Considering the current trend of seemingly mass distribution of personal 
contact information to the highest bidder and the albeit justified paranoia of national 
security agencies, after world events like the September 11'^ terrorist attack (9! 1 2001), 
confidentiality of bank, medical or biometric information must be brought into the 
spotlight. Following on with this discussion, confinuously monitoring mobile systems 
also have the potential, whether desired or not, of tracking users across heterogeneous 
networks (Herzberg 1994). When considering the dynamic nature of biometric samples, 
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this is less of an issue when considered within the context of a continuously monitoring 
security system. Such a system could incorporate a middleware architecture, designed 
specifically for the management of biometric templates, including: 
• threshold management of non-Boolean authentication outcomes; 
• continuous maintenance and augmentation o f signature data over time; 
• alternative access provision(s) in the event of authenfication failure due to, for 
example, a change in a users' biometric markers as a resule of physical injury. 
Subsidy Lock and Mobility 
The subsidy lock is popularly used by network operators to lock mobile handsets to the 
service provider's own network, irrespecfive of the SIM card. Once a mobile handset is 
subsidy locked to a specific operator network, inserting a SIM card from an altemate 
operator network will cause the handset to lock. The relevance of subsidy lock to the issue 
of mobility is that by physically tying the terminal to the host network, mobility originally 
designed into the mobile hardware, is being restricted. The reason for this is the business 
model network operator's use, which depend on mobile handsets being sold at subsidised 
prices, in return for the consumer committing to a minimum term contract. 
2.3.8 Continuous, Non-Intrusive Security 
One of 3GPP's requirements for secure UMTS service provision is it should be possible 
for network service providers to "authenticate users at the start of, and during, service 
delivery" (3GPP 1999). Authentication during service delivery represents a departure 
from the established 2G approach and again implies the need for a non-intrusive 
approach to avoid disrupfing a subscriber's legifimate network activity. Options for 
achieving this may be related to periodic or continuous supervision of subscriber 
acfivity, utilising behavioural profiling techniques or continuous biometric monitoring. 
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There is already a significant emphasis upon subscriber profiling in order to counter 
fi-aud, with operators applying data analysis techniques to network data in order to 
identify and flag potentially fi-audulent transactions (Modisette 1999). The same 
principles could be extended to the user authentication environment for anomaly 
detection. Profiling could encompass factors such as the types of services typically 
accessed and the times/durations of access in order to construct a model of the 
subscriber's normal behaviour. Such techniques have been the focus o f work in the 
general IT domain for some time and have already been incorporated into network-
based intrusion detection systems (Porras and Neumann 1997). 
Features of 3G handsets that will enable advanced subscriber services, also offer the 
potential to facilitate more advanced security options. For example, a number of 
biometric approaches (Cope 1990) could conceivably be integrated in a non-intrusive 
manner, depending upon the nature of the mobile device and the service being accessed. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Mobile security within the currently evolving generations of mobile communications 
technology are still predominantly based on the security systems set in place over a 
decade ago when 2"^ * generation mobile communications networks, and rudimentary 
services, were first introduced. As the technology rapidly progresses and new 
individual services are conceived, the supporting security systems need to evolve 
rapidly in order to maintain protection commensurate with the risks and consequences 
associated with the new developments. The next chapter is devoted exclusively to the 
opinions of the general public on the specific mobile security related issues raised 
within this chapter. 
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3 Assessing Subscribers' Attitudes towards 
Mobile Services and Security 
As an integral part of the assessment stage of the PhD, in addition to the technological 
review covered in Chapter 2, a public opinions survey into mobile telephony based 
security and related issues was conducted. This chapter, along with a separate sub-
section on biometrics and advanced security (see Section 4.5), presents an in depth 
discussion and interpretation of the survey results; a full copy of the survey questions is 
included in Appendix C. 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been established in the previous chapters that the current 2"^ * generation GSM and 
3"* generation UMTS systems offer only one line of defence at the Human-Computer 
Interface (HCI), an impersonal knowledge-based system susceptible to masquerade 
attack: the traditional Point-of-Entry (PoE) PIN. In order to gauge public opinion on this 
and other mobile authentication issues, a survey was conducted. The survey was 
primarily distributed online over an extended period of two years, with additional hard 
copy local distribution within the University of Plymouth (Rodwell and Clarke 2002), 
accumulating just under 300 sets of respondents' results. The survey was also marketed 
through various online links and university-based public announcements. 
The primary aim of the survey was to evaluate subscriber awareness and attitudes 
towards the various forms of security available within their mobile devices and their 
understanding and opinions regarding the various forms of enhanced security available 
in general. A hypothesis was formed which the survey aimed to investigate that states: 
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The majority of mobile subscribers either do not understand or are lacking 
well founded opinion on mobile security issues. They are also generally 
ignorant of the security implications of the advanced services being offered 
through the next generation of wideband networks known as 3G, 
This attitude unfortunately reflects the success o f the technology suppliers' marketing 
campaigns, where the latest ring-tones and third party connectivity are highlighted over 
security features, which are usually disabled by default and their activation buried 
within the user manual. Although to date, security has rarely been a marketing attractor, 
a fact highlighted by survey respondent's purchasing priorities, discussed later in this 
chapter, it could also be argued that product marketing is simply reflecting the fact that 
there have been no new or significant security developments to market or promote. 
The survey consists of four main sections, each intended to assess a certain aspect of the 
participant's views and understanding of their mobile usage. These sections are: 
• Demography: Fundamental data on participant's gender, age group and 
affiliation ( i f any) with the University of Plymouth. 
• Services: Questions covering operator networks, hardware and services usage 
and which aspects the user considered important when selecting them. This 
helps gauge the level to which additional security can be considered necessary. 
• Security: A selection of questions covering respondents' views and awareness 
of existing and ftiture methods of mobile security. User's perception of security 
is considered to be fundamental to its acceptance and subsequent adoption. 
• Topic Awareness: A selection of topical mobile related questions, in order to 
gauge the participant's basic depth of knowledge of the subject area. 
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3.2 Demography 
The survey was available online for a period of two years, covering the years 2002 and 
2003. The only formal requirement of participants was that they had experience of 
owning or using a mobile phone at some stage prior to completing the survey. 
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Figure 3-1: Security survey demography 
From the 297 respondents, the majority fell into the '17 - 24' category with a bias 
towards male respondents, as illustrated in Figure 3-1. There are a number of variables 
which should be considered when analysing these figures: 
• Survey marketing: The marketing and distribution of the survey amongst a 
specific population; e.g. Links on Internet websites. 
• Survey distribution: The popularity/penetration of the distribution medium(s) 
within certain sub-groups of a population; e.g. The Internet with Students. 
• Respondent interest: The appeal of the survey topic to specific sub-groups of a 
population; e.g. Mobile technology to Teenagers. 
• Respondent character: The willingness of specific sub-groups to actually 
participate in a voluntary survey; e.g. the unemployed. 
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The survey was hosted on a university campus server through a departmental website 
with a basis towards IT and electro technology; it was therefore expected to have an 
initial majority penetration amongst males of classical university age. It can, however, 
be demonstrated that amongst the general population, adoption of mobile technology is 
predominant amongst those within the age group 15-24 years (Miller 2001; Squires 
2001; Competition Commission 2003), closely reflecting the surveys respondent 
population. It has also been found that the differing views o f men and women on the 
adoption of mobile services are in fact minimal (CellularOnline 2004). The surveys 
results can therefore be accepted, with some confidence, to statistically represent a fair 
reflection of typical mobile user attitudes. 
3.3 Access and Services 
Services are the raison d'etre of mobile communications; especially in the post 2G 
arena. This section covers respondent's selection criteria for both mobile hardware and 
services providers', in addition to their usage o f the services available at the time o f the 
survey and their perceived future services requirements. 
3.3.1 Network Operator Survey Shares 
In order to obtain an overall picture o f service usage, it is necessary to know some basic 
details about subscribers' choices of both network operator and mobile hardware. Figure 
3-2 shows the variation in respondents' choices o f network operator (by market share) 
in comparison to the actual UK Figures (W2F 2004). It can be seen, that although the 
UK market share of mobile network operators is distributed relatively equally, there is a 
marked variation in the survey respondents' choices of operator. 
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Figure 3-2 : Network operators' market-shares 
There are a number of possible reasons for this variation, related primarily to the 
network operators presence in the primary survey location. These are: 
• Operator's mobile coverage. 
• Operators' commercial outlets. 
• Operator specific promotional incentives: services, handsets, gifts. 
• Independent 3"* party supplier promotional incentives: services, handsets, gifts. 
• Survey population. 
Although the main UK network operators share almost complete national population 
coverage, the T-Mobile brand had the weakest network coverage in the survey region at 
the time of the survey; reflected in T-Mobiles poor result compared to its actual UK. share. 
It could be ftirther hypothesized that a high profile presence of the Orange brand within 
the city where the survey was marketed could have also biased the local resix)ndents to 
this brand. As all network operators offer similar services within a standardised security 
architecture, these results will not bias the overall security aspect of the survey. 
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3.3.2 Handset Supplier Survey Shares 
There are currently more mobile handsets in the UK than people (W2F 2004), with 
around 8 out of 10 adults owning at least one of the 60 million active mobile handsets. Of 
those surveyed, 85% left their handset switched on for more than 10 hours a day, making 
it the first choice for instant communication. When considering this, it is worth reasserting 
the point that from the humblest 2G handset to the latest 3G devices, they all share the 
same basic subscriber PoE PIN and hardware SIM card authentication mechanisms. 
Figure 3-3 shows the variation in respondents" choices of handset compared to national 
and global figures for the year of completion of the survey (CellularOnline 2003). 
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Figure 3-3 : Handset manufacturers' market-shares 
Acknowledging slight variations in respondents' choices of handset, compared to UK 
national figures. Figure 3-4 shows the market share results as a line chart of linked 
values to visualise the survey results correlation with UK market shares: a good result in 
support of the validity of the survey. A global plot is also included showing clear 
correlation with international market shares for the named suppliers, with only the non-
UK other suppliers appearing to significantly upset the trend. 
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Figure 3-4 : Handset majiufacturers' market-shares correlation plot 
3.3.3 Neh^ork Operator Selection Criteria 
When considering a mobile subscription, cither contract or Pay-As-You-Go, there are 
essentially two decisions which the buyer has to make: choice of the network operator 
and choice of the handset supplier. Dealing with these issues in turn, the survey first 
investigates the buyers" views on a selection of network operator criteria. The results 
have been sorted in order of importance to the buyer, from let^ to right in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5 : Network operator user selection criteria 
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It was found that 77% of subscribers considered contract cost, or handset subsidy for pre-
pay, to be o f greatest importance, followed closely by network coverage and reliability. 
The results are not surprising as these are quality of service issues and any change or 
variation would noticeably afTect the service. Choice of handset sits in the middle of the 
table, neither strongly persuading nor dissuading potential customers; reflecting the fact 
that not only do the majority of handsets offer similar specifications, but also that all 
network operators offer a choice of nearly all available handsets. With brand loyalty only 
commanding 28% of customers votes, it is not surprising the lengths network operators go 
to in order to keep existing customers, offering the latest handsets and preferential rates 
when a subscriber threatens to change supplier when a contract expires. Finally and in 
support of the hypothesis introduced in Section 3.1, security features reside at the bottom 
of the list of buyer's criteria of importance when considering a network operator. 
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Figure 3-6 : Network operator user selection criteria (linked maximum values) 
The line chart of linked maximum values in Figure 3-6, clearly visualises that security 
was considered the least impi^rtance operator selection criteria, with the highest (26%) 
Low importance vote and the lowest (23%) High importance vote. To further emphasise 
the point, security also received the highest (51%) moderate (no strong opinion) vote. 
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3.3.4 Handset Selection Criteria 
When considering the choice of handset, 61% of respondents considered battery life to 
be of greatest importance from the selection of choices; more than double the second 
most popular issue of 3"* party connectivity (Bluetooth, IR Etc.) With a similar result to 
the network operator result in Section 3.3.3, brand loyalty was considered of higher 
importance than security, albeit by a narrower margin. Although security features 
command a stronger overall position than in the network operator results, they still 
received the highest proportion (49%) of the moderate vote and a significant quarter 
(27%) of the low importance vote, demonstrating either consumer misunderstanding or 
genuine lack of consideration for security issues. Once again, this is an important result 
in support of the hypothesis stated in Section 3.1. It is also interesting to consider that 
the only issues that respondents considered less important than security were essentially 
insubstantial: mobile accessories, handset games and swappable fascias. 
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Figure 3-7 : Mobile handset user selection criteria 
Figure 3-7 shows a complete breakdown of the results, sorted in order o f considered 
high importance. It is accepted that the list of otTercd criteria is not exhaustive: it does 
however enable security to be ranked within a representative selection of options. 
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3.3.5 Ser\ ices Usage 
Having justified the need for enhanced subscriber authentication, based on the enhanced 
services of the new wideband mobile networks, the survey proceeded to explore 
existing service usage and investigate the trend towards acceptance and adoption of 
enhanced data services. It is not unexpected to find that the majority of respondents still 
use their mobile handset principally as a form of mobile communication, either through 
real-time telephony or the data based Short Message Service (SMS), currently in the 
order of 2.1 billion per month nationally (W2F 2004). What is of more interest is that 
5% of respondents DO NOT consider telephony of high importance, preferring the data 
based services of their device; translated nationally this represents around 3 million 
users, or the entire population of Wales (UK) (Link: National Statistics). 
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Figure 3-8 : Mobile services popularity (circa 2003) 
The results shown in Figure 3-8 are representative of the primary existing services of 2 
generation networks at the time of the survey. Although the usage of WAP Internet 
based services only accounted for 36% of respondents' votes, nationally around 780 
million WAP pages were being accessed per month (W2F 2004). To demonstrate the 
recent growth in this area, this figure had risen by 42% the following year to 1.11 billion 
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(W2F 2004), driven by factors such as the massive rise in pc^pularity of ringtones and 
the Euro 2004 football competition, some matches of which were only available live 
online and not available in a mobile context through any other service. 
3.3.6 Preferences for Future Services 
The number of mobile handsets with GPRS-enabled Internet and Multimedia Message 
Service (MMS) capability doubled in the year 2003 to 2004 and is expected to account for 
75% of all UK mobiles by the end of 2005 (W2F 2004). This will bring the total number 
of Internet capable handsets in the UK to around 53 million, potentially connecting up to 
88% of the UK population to the World Wide Web via at least one access terminal. 
Although many of the future services offered for opinion at the commencement of the 
survey are now current technology, such is the growth in the area, all were proposed as 
future services, with only MMS being rolled out nationally by the completion of the 
survey in 2002. The selected services were all based on the enhanced services' 
capabilities enabled by the network access technologies of wideband mobile networks. 
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Figure 3-9 : Future mobile services' user preferences 
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Figure 3-9 shows the results of the respondents' preferences, placed in order of desire. 
Notice the general strength of opinion towards future services, supporting current 
mobile growth trends and consumer's insatiable appetite and desire for more services. 
Coming out top with 82% were Global Positioning Services (GPS) based services, 
offering the facility to not only inform the user as to where they are at any particular 
time, but essentially enabling Location Based Services (LBS); for example, to supply 
real-time directions to a local facility (a bar or a petrol station). With the SMS service 
well established in the psyche of the mobile user, it should not be too surprising to find 
its multimedia equivalent, the MMS, very high in the chart, proving a popular choice 
with 80% of respondents. Two years on and the growth in camera phones has translated 
this desire into a MMS market estimated to be worth £5 billion by 2004 (Juniper 
Research, 2002). From the remaining video based services, video conferencing proved 
marginally more desirable than video on demand (VoD), although it could be argued as 
to the respondent's appreciation of scope of VoD, as its current existence in the world of 
television limits it to films. Scenarios of a VoD file arriving on your handset the instant: 
a favourite sports team scores a goal; an intruder alarm is triggered in your home; a 
local news story breaks from a location outside the UK (for foreign nationals) may not 
have been considered. Mobile commerce is still in its infancy in the UK compared to the 
now well established Internet-based ecommerce. This is likely to change rapidly with 
the growth of wideband networks and the improved rich Internet browsing experience 
they offer The demise of WAP enabled light browsing and slow unreliable 2G data 
links should finally bring ecommerce to the mobile, with subscribers purchasing online 
goods in much the same way and frequency as seen on traditional Internet-enabled 
computers. It is interesting that although only 10% of respondents considered games of 
high importance when selecting a handset in Section 3.3.4, 44% expressed a desire for 
61 
Chapter 3 : A s s e s s i n g Subscr ibers ' Attitudes towards Mobile S e r v i c e s and Security 
more or better games in the ftiture. Although games still reside at the bottom of the 
popularity chart, the growth in wideband enabled online gaming will surely change 
user's perception of a mobile game from being 'Tetris', in a similar way to early 
computer user's view of a computer game as being 'Pong'. 
This section of the survey has shown that the trend in mobile usage is moving 
inexorably towards wideband data services, which the respondents have indicated they 
would be keen to use. The majority of these services wil l require the use o f some form 
of personal data, whether it is stored purchasing profiles or banking details for mobile 
commerce, current subscriber position for LBS or private video messages recorded for 
MMS or video conferencing. These services demand a commensurate level of 
protection to guard against masquerade abuse, protection currently not offered and only 
realisable through a subscriber-based authentication system. 
3.4 Mobile Security 
This section covers a selection of questions investigating respondents' views and 
awareness of existing and future methods of mobile security. User's perception of 
security is considered to be fundamental to its acceptance and subsequent adoption. 
3.4.1 Experiences of Mobile Handset Abuse 
It has been established that the primary method of user authentication for mobile 
handsets is a PoE PIN code. Before ascertaining the survey respondent's awareness and 
attitude towards existing security techniques, they were questioned on their own 
experiences of mobile handset abuse. It was found that 28% of respondents reported 
cases of thefl or abuse of their handset, as shown in Figure 3-10. 
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Figure 3-10 : Personal experiences of handset abuse 
It can be seen from the results that handset theft is the most common form of criminal 
abuse, with half of those handsets stolen being subjected to further masquerade network 
abuse. It can be strongly argued that although abuse of a handset loaned to a friend or 
colleague can be inconvenient (e.g. changing the handset default language) and even 
unexpectedly cost the legitimate user money (for example; calling a premium rate 
number), in such cases a high degree of liability rests with the legitimate user and their 
own judgement. This is not to say that a suitable subscriber authentication mechanism 
would not be appropriate. On the contrary, imagine a scenario where a network had the 
appropriate security infrastructure to reliably authenticate subscribers in real-time and 
immediately react to services that fall outside of a pre-defined operational envelope or 
behavioural profile; without specific permission fi-om the legitimate user. Chapter 5 
introduces a novel authentication system conceived specifically to address this issue, 
when integrated into an appropriate mobile security framework. 
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3.4.2 User Issues Regarding Mobile Handset Authentication 
Section 2.3 of the thesis introduced and discussed the IMEI, the primary mobile hardware 
authentication mechanism. The survey questioned respondents on their awareness of the 
IMEI and its relevance to security, with an alarming 41% of participating users claiming 
no knowledge even of its existence. This could have serious implications for the recent 
security drive to harmonise and regularly update network operators IMEI black lists 
(GSM Association 2002). I f 41% of users are unaware of the existence and significance 
of the IMEI, 41% of users are unlikely to realise the importance of reporting a stolen 
handset, risking the handset's IMEI not being black listed within the CEIR. 
When asked about the primary user authentication mechanism, the Personal 
Identification Number (PIN), it was not a surprise to find more than 99% o f respondents 
familiar with the technique; this approach is universally used outside of mobile circles. 
Although 69% of those users questioned also engage the PIN to protect their handsets at 
switch on, this still leaves 31% of respondent's handsets completely unprotected by the 
only form of subscriber authentication currently available. I f this result is scaled up to 
the UK population (2004), it represents some 18.6 million handsets, or approximately 
the population of greater London (Link: National Statistics 2003). Perhaps the reason 
for this is the fact that a remarkably similar 31 % of survey respondents consider the PIN 
authentication mechanism to be inconvenient and intrusive. This highlights the point 
that no matter how effective a security system may or may not be, i f it is a voluntary 
system and is not perceived as being convenient, it wil l not be widely accepted. Any 
proposed future authentication mechanism must therefore not even be a convenience 
issue, but completely transparent in operation. 
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Of those users questioned who regularly use the PIN, it was found that over a third (39%) 
have never changed it from the factory default (usually *0000*): this would be the first and 
most obvious attack for a potential abuser. As manufacturer hardware default PIN codes 
are easily found, usually printed in the hardware handbooks, by not changing the default 
PIN a user is effectively advertising their PIN code to every similar hardware user, in 
addition to openly on the internet via chat rooms and forums. These users essentially have 
no more protection than the 31 % of users who do not use the PIN at all; they can therefore 
be aggregated to give an overall figure of unprotected handsets in the UK o f 70%! 
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Figure 3-11 : Frequency of mobile handsel PIN changes 
For those users who do change their PIN, Figure 3-11 clearly shows that the vast 
majority perform the action only once at time of purchase and not again. Although this 
is a major improvement over using the default PIN, it does imply another recognised 
PIN-related security issue: PIN multi-casting. With 36% of respondents admitting to 
using the same PIN code for multiple services, the probability of an individual PIN 
being compromised is greatly increased, as are the consequences. A likely reason for 
extensive PIN reuse is the proliferation of knowledge-based authentication mechanisms, 
the average person now having to remember up to 10 password/PINs (Link: CompTIA). 
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With the majority of personal resources now password/PIN protected (bank cards, 
mobile communications, internet based services), users are now required to memorise 
many critical security access codes, with the almost inevitable consequence of reuse or 
multi-casting. When those surveyed were asked i f they have ever used a PIN Unlock 
Code (PUK), due to either forgetting or miss-entering their PIN. It is debatable whether 
the 38% of 'yes' respondents were admitting just poor memory, or good security 
protocol by conscientiously assigning different PINs to different personal services. 
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Figure 3-12 : Users perceived effectiveness of the PIN mechanism 
Considering the PFN-related security issues discussed previously, 86% of those 
surveyed had a definite opinion on the effectiveness of the PIN technique. The curve in 
Figure 3-12 represents a distinct Gaussian distribution around a feeling o f only adequate 
protection offered by the PIN approach. When considering this result, it needs to be 
reaffirmed that around the time of the survey, mobile services were still predominantly 
2"** generation telephony-based services, with data-based services still in an embryonic 
state. A recent joint study by Cranfield University and the London School of Economics 
(LSE) and ftinded by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) broadly supports this 
mood, indicating that consumer confidence in mobile communications devices, 
including wireless devices is at it's lowest point for a decade (lEE IP 2005a). 
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Although the PFN has not moved on as the basis of HCI security for mobile handsets, it 
has been shown in Section 2.2.3.3 and subsequently discussed, that mobile devices, the 
networks which they serve and the advanced services they enable certainly have. 
3.5 Topic Awareness 
To gauge an awareness of the survey participant's level of understanding of mobile 
related issues, the demography performed in Section 3.2 was complimented with a 
selection of three, progressively more specialised, mobile communications questions. 
The first question relates to the issue covered in Section 3.3.1, that o f UK mobile 
network operators and it was expected that the majority of UK mobile users would be 
familiar with the major UK network providers and spot the rogue provider (Nokia). 
Question 2 presented a more difficult choice of IT based acronyms, one of which 
(ADSL) is not related to the field of mobile communications, but wire-based 
communications. The final technical question required the participant to identify the 
basic data-rate of GSM mobile communications. Al l the offered solutions are widely 
advertised valid communications data-rates fi*om both mobile and wire-based 
disciplines and as such present a difficult choice to the respondent not familiar with the 
correct solufion. The multiple-choice options were: 
• 9.6 Kbps - The standard GSM data-rate. 
• 14.4 Kbps - An example of a multiple time-slot (x2) HSCSD rate. 
• 56.6 Kbps - The standard V.90/92 home dial-up internet data-rate. 
• 64 Kbps - The standard (x2 channels) ISDN data-rate. 
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The set of results shown in Figure 3-13 tend to indicate that the survey population were 
relatively familiar with the issues and terminology of mobile communications, primarily 
indicated by the high success rate achieved on question 3. This was not entirely 
unexpected after the demographic results in Section 3.2 indicated that the predominant 
profile for a survey respondent was male, aged 17-24, with a bias towards technology. 
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Figure 3-13 : General user awareness of mobile issues • 
In analysing the results, only 80% of respondents identified Nokia as one o f the dominant 
mobile handset suppliers and not a mobile network operator. This could be due to the fact 
that both are essentially mobile service providers and distinguishing between the two may 
be inconsequential to the consumer. 77% of respondents recognised ADSL as a landline 
telephony delivery service and not a current mobile technology. This is a strong result for 
a technology question and is likely influenced by the heavily marketed broadband intemet 
rollout over the last few years, enabled by ADSL technology and marketed as such. 
Almost half of respondents (47%) knew the basic data transmission rate o f 2"^ ^ generation 
GSM to be 9.6 Kbps. This is anodier strong result, for this technical question and 
indicates a high degree of understanding of mobile issues, by a large proportion of the 
respondent audience; backing-up the survey results on technical questions. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The rapid growth in mobile data services has highlighted the weakness o f the existing 
user authentication system. This survey identified that by the end of 2003, users were 
already using rudimentary data services and that they are willing to use future services 
as and when they became available. Recent research from the Gartner Group suggests 
that currently around 90% of mobile devices are lacking the security to prevent hackers 
from gaining access (Gold 2004). 
The hypothesis introduced in Section 3.1 has been upheld. Although 85% of 
respondents appeared to recognise the need for additional security in future generations 
of mobile devices, this is in clear contradiction to the 70% of respondents who do not 
actively use the existing PIN system. This tends to indicate that it is the authentication 
mechanisms themselves, rather than the concept o f security that users are rejecting. 
To address this issue, what is needed is a non-intrusive subscriber authentication 
mechanism, not token-based or knowledge-based, but user-based. A mechanism that 
can be implemented transparently, reliably authenticating the active user continuously 
and conveniently; acting as a network gate-keeper in addition to protecting sensitive 
subscriber data from masquerade abuse. A system that wil l be: 
• Accepted by network operators and service providers. 
• Tolerated by mobile subscribers. 
• Widely used. 
The next chapter investigates truly personal authentication mechanisms, drawing from 
the discipline of biometrics as a foundation for a solution to the problem. 
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4 Biometrics and Mobile Devices 
Having established a need for enhanced mobile subscriber authentication in Chapter 2, 
this chapter proceeds with a review and discussion of biometrics and its applications. 
The field of biometrics has been chosen as the primary resource for tackling the 
authentication issues raised and forms the foundation of the novel authentication 
mechanism introduced in Chapter 5; which is the core of the PhD research. 
4.1 Introduction 
Biometrics describes the 'automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioural 
or biological characteristics' (ISO/IEC JTCi/SC37 2004). It is the method of 
identification we all use everyday to recognise everyone we meet, from the closest family 
member to the occasional chance meeting of an old friend in a corridor. In its purest form, 
biometrics is incredibly powerftil and enables near perfect recognition in minimal time. 
They allow a person to recognise a familiar character from within a group of almost 
limitless size, almost instantly, then continuously reconfirming the identity with near zero 
error. Even when used with human senses in isolation, we have all recognised a familiar 
voice within the melee of a bar or on the end of a phone, or a familiar face in a crowd 
from a distance or on the television, without giving it a second thought. It is perhaps 
therefore not surprising that security firms are striving to harness this powerfiil technique, 
for i f a system were even to approach the efficiency of the human biometric system, 
masquerade attacks could be reduced significantly, releasing funds currently lost to 
identity fraud and litigation, estimated at £1.3 billion in 2004 (Home Office 2006) and 
enabling a host of new identity-assured services to be brought to market. 
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In practice, the human biometric system has been perfected over thousands of years and 
an artificial implementation of techniques familiar to a young child are incredibly 
complex without the processing resources of the human brain. Nevertheless, ground-
breaking biometric techniques like fingerprint recognition have been in use by New 
Scotland Yard, the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police, since 1901 (MET 1901) and 
as early as 1968, saw the introduction of 'Identimat', the first commercial electronic 
biometric system, costing US$20,000, for a Wall Street (USA) investment bank 
(Konstantinos 1997). Although in IT terms, progress within the field of biometrics has 
been relatively slow, in 2003 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) predicted 
biometrics to be one of the top-ten emerging technologies expected to "change the 
world" (MIT Tech 2003). After the September 11**' terrorist attacks on the United States 
(911 2001), the U.S. Government announced "Biometric Identifiers" as a top priority in 
their fight against terrorism (Bush 2002), forming the InCITS (International Committee 
for IT Standards) M l Technical Committee for domestic biometrics standards. 
Widespread adoption of biometric security systems is still however in its infancy. A 
recent sobering report by the London School of Economics (LSE), rather ironically not 
even addressing the predominant technical hurdles o f biometrics, warned that the 
biometric techniques proposed for the UK governments National Identity Card program 
may fall foul of 'disability anti-discrimination legislation' (lEE IP 2005b). However, 
before negotiating societies politically correct minefield and individual disability issues, 
such as the difficulty a blind person could have positioning appropriately for an iris 
scan, certain biometric approaches consistently work better or produce lower error rates, 
with certain individuals. Even considering these issues, Figure 4-1 shows that 
biometrics is currently witnessing substantial commercial growth, with revenues 
increasing by around 60% year on year, from USS20million in 1996, to USS1.2billion 
in 2004 and predicted to exceed USS2.5billion by 2006 (Norton 2004; IBG 2004). 
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Figure 4-1 : Biometric revenue growth, 2001-2006 
4.2 What You Are 
The process of user authentication, which describes the comparison of an input sample 
against one or more reference samples, can traditionally been broken down into three 
distinct categories, those of: IVhat you know. What you have and What you are. 
Arguable the simplest forni of authentication is the password or ubiquitous PIN 
(Smith 2002, pp.163), representing What you know. As discussed in Section 2.3.3, the 
PIN is the established authentication mechanism for validating a user to their mobile 
handset. To validate the mobile subscription on the network, a SIM is inserted into the 
handset, carrying the appropriate authentication data (Section 2.3.1). This SIM 
represents the second authentication category, that of What You Have and together 
with the PIN, these two mechanisms constitute subscriber authentication within the 
current mobile security framework. Although biometrics are rarely applied to current 
mobile technology, the third authentication category o f What You Are offers networks 
many advantages over existing mechanisms. 
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4.2.1 Authentication Security Focus 
With traditional knowledge-based and token-based authentication systems, the effective 
security resides solely in the strength of the password and location of the hardware, 
respectively, which can exist independent of the authentication system; see Figure 4-2. 
Consequently, any user can use the registered user's authentication mechanism to gain 
access to the protected network, a masquerade; independent of security policy. 
Registered 
User 
Any User 
Any User 
H Security h 
Password 
or 
Token 
Authentication 
Gateway 
Protected 
Network 
Figure 4-2 : Security focus in a knowledge/token based security system 
In contrast, biometric-based security utilises an authentication mechanism or biometric-
markers which are inseparable from their owner and authentication cannot be performed 
independently of the registered user. Authentication is truly personal and unique to each 
registered user, it cannot be shared and security is dependent on security policy. 
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Figure 4-3 : Security focus in a biometric based security system 
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4.2.2 Factors Affecting Biometric Systems 
Table 4-1 compares the three different authentication approaches discussed, with a 
selection of nine key authentication issues, ranking the three approaches of: IVhat You 
Know, Wiat You Have and What You Are, in order of their inherent ability to address 
each chosen issue: M ' being the most suitable and '3 ' being the least. Totals have also 
been included for mutual comparison of the issues raised. The table demonstrates that 
with these nine authentication issues, the inherent properties of biometrics' clearly lend 
themselves to advanced authentication and although not ideal, with the approaches 
currently available and acknowledging possible contextual variations, present the most 
comprehensive set of results and therefore the best generic security solution. 
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Table 4-1 : Comparison of the three authentication categories, with a selection of key 
authentication issues 
Notable by its absence, performance is dealt with separately later in the thesis. A ful l 
discussion of the remaining authentication issues raised in Table 4-1 and their relevance 
to mobile authentication and security wil l now be discussed in greater depth. 
' Cumulative results are subjective and for mutual comparison only. No allowance has been given for 
specific contextual applications. 
75 
Chapter 4 : Biometrics and Mobile Devices 
1. Intrusiveness: Can the technique be applied non~intnisively and continuously? 
In addition to realising the security potential of biometrics, certain approaches 
have the added and very marketable benefit of being able to be performed 
transparently (see Section 4.3), increasing subscriber acceptability. 
Non-intrusive identity-assurance is a key driver in the move towards advanced 
authenticafion systems and has a number of distinct advantages over the intrusive 
PoE techniques which still predominate in current entry systems: 
• The ability to perform subscriber authentication continuously, reducing the 
security emphasis on any single authentication cycle failure; reducing false 
rejections, whilst maintaining identity-assurance. 
• The user convenience of not having to suspend current activity to perform 
an authentication cycle; the system can perform re-authentication as 
security protocols dictates, again, maintaining identity-assurance. 
2, Intimacy: Is the signature truly personal to the subscriber? 
One of the ftindamental properties of biometrics is the inherent intimacy of the 
physiological or behavioural markers, introduced in Section 4.2.1. which cannot 
be forgotten or mislaid any more than the registered users head! Even i f a user's 
personal biometric sample data is illegally intercepted, it would be extremely 
difficult to suitably reconstruct the template and present it appropriately to the 
relevant authentication system collector. This is in contrast to a knowledge-based 
approach, where although authentication data can potentially be personal in nature 
(mother's maiden name), it is not tangibly linked to the user and can be changed 
transferred or re-assigned as conveniently as security protocols dictate, 
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2a. Distinctiveness: The possibility of somebody else adopting the same signature? 
One of the recognised problems of password based authentication systems is the 
fact that many people can hold and share the same password. Company names and 
acronyms, computer names, family names and birthdays predominate in password 
lists everywhere; there are also some ubiquitous passwords which regularly crop 
up: 'God', 'password', 'sex' (Geodsoft 2005). It is accepted that all humans are 
different to some measurable degree, even superficially, all humans look and 
sound different, even twins. It is this inherent individual distinctiveness of humans 
and their biometric markers that biometric systems utilise in order to authenticate 
us. Although when taken as a whole, humans are highly distinctive, biometrics 
focus upon individual physiological or behavioural human traits which in isolation 
have varying levels of distinctiveness. This is discussed in Section 4.2.4. 
2b. Transferability: Is the sensitive authentication data/sample transferable? 
Extending the discussion on the personal nature of biometric markers (issue 2), 
biometric authentication data is non-transferable. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, 
with traditional knowledge-based and token-based authentication, the security lies 
solely in the password and hardware, respectively, which exists outside of the 
authentication system and can be applied by any user, regardless of security 
policy. In contrast, biometric markers cannot be separated from their host, except 
via surgical means, and hence biometric samples cannot be shared. Even i f a 
legitimate subscriber wanted to allow a colleague access to their account on a 
biometrically protected system, they would still have to perform the authentication 
process themselves and ensure that the system security was not enforced 
continuously else even a masquerade without ill intent, would be quickly detected. 
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3. Vulnerability: Is the technique vulnerable to masquerade or brute force attack? 
All authentication systems are vulnerable to some form of circumvention or brute 
force attack; biometric systems being no exception (Ratha et ai 2001a). The 
traditional password can be attacked in a number of ways: either through a social 
engineering (Granger 2001) probability (calculated guess) attack; or via a brute 
force (systematic attempt of every possible combination) attack (Smith 2002, 
pp.258, 274). Even assuming an attacker could simulate a user's biometric markers, 
or devise a way of presenting pseudo-biometric samples in an appropriate format to 
a biometric collector, biometric sample data is generally far more complex than 
traditional passwords. Dependant on the approach, biometric systems utilise up to 
one thousand individual unrelated markers, significantly reducing the chance of any 
trial-and-error attack producing an acceptable sample within an acceptable time. 
Biometrics' vulnerabilities are explored in more depth in Section 4.2.5. 
4. Permanence: Does the authentication data vary in any way? 
Biometrics differ from conventional authentication mechanisms in that each 
authentication cycle produces a slightly different set of biometric samples: all 
biometrics are dependent to some degree on prevailing environmental conditions; 
the majority of physiological biometrics vary with age; and behavioural biometrics 
can change with the subject's mood. This is contrary to password and token-based 
systems where, once defined, authentication data does not change, unless changed 
deliberately. This unique property of biometrics is handled by allowing for the 
variability within either the biometric collector or a middleware architecture, 
capable of managing authentication thresholds and confidence ratings, rather than 
simple Boolean responses. This variability is also why biometric samples cannot be 
protected with a 'hash' function, in a similar way to static passwords. 
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5. Accountability: How accountable is the user for a signature breach? 
Another major benefit of the intimate nature of biometrics' samples is the 
accountability of the authentication system. I f a user is actively logged into a 
system, system administration can be confident that it is in fact the actual account 
subscriber that performed the login. In addition, i f the security system enforces 
continuous authentication, it can be confidently assumed that the user online is the 
legitimate account user and not somebody masquerading in the account. This 
issue has ftirther reaching implications than simple account access: with a reliable, 
continuously authenficating system, it wil l be possible to confidently substantiate 
the location of a particular person at a particular time. The privacy implications of 
this system behaviour will surely set a precedent in the near ftjture. 
6. Assignability: Can the signature be easily reassigned, if it is compromised? 
The benefits realised fi-om the intimate nature of biometric samples, do not 
however present the ftjll picture; biometric authentication does suffer a major 
complication. In the unlikely event of an attacker successfijlly compromising a 
user's authentication template, by whatever means, it is essentially impossible for 
the legitimate subscriber to change their own biometric markers; without surgery. 
Whereas a password or token is as easily changed as a systems security policy 
allows, the possibilities for addressing a compromised biometric are more limited: 
• Increase the resolution o f the system by utilising additional markers. 
• Tighten the authentication threshold(s); at the expense of increased false 
rejection of user(s) (see Section 4.2.3). 
• Offer users alternative biometric approaches (see Section 4.3). 
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7. Selection Criteria: Can a subscriber choose an easily compromised signature? 
It has been well documented that users of password based authentication systems 
regularly compromise system security through the sharing, writing down and poor 
selection of passwords (Smith 2002, pp. 155-192). Although a systems security 
policy can enforce good password selection, this is generally at the expense of 
user's ability to memorise a difficult authentication sequence and the subsequent 
impact on system administration and account recovery services. A biometric 
template is loosely synonymous with a traditional password of between ten and one 
thousand heterogeneous alphanumeric vectors, dependent on the approach chosen, 
which must be presented simultaneously to the authentication system. User 
registration on a biometrically protected system does not introduce the potential for 
human compromise. The user does not need to memorise anything, as the system 
determines the markers for the authentication template based solely on security. 
4.2.3 False Match and False Non-Match Errors 
The inherent variability of biometric markers (Section 4.2, Issue 4) and the subsequent 
variability of the samples generated by the biometric collector, gives rise to two 
characteristic percentage error rates (or likelihood of an error occurring), within a 
biometric system. These are: 
• False Match Rate (FMR): Equivalent to the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) of a 
system. FMR is the probability that an impostor's biometric sample will falsely 
match the stored enrolment template of a random user (of a system). 
• False Non-Match Rate (FNMR): Equivalent to the False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
of a system. FNMR is the probability that a biometric sample wi l l falsely not-
match the stored enrolment template from the same user (of a system). 
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Synonymous with FAR and FRR, FMR and FNMR are mutually exclusive, in that as 
one error rate decreases the other tends to increase proportionally, giving rise to the 
EER (Equal Error rate) where the two rates become equal. Figure 4-4 shows a 
theoretical ideal performance plot for FMR vs. FNMR, with both curves converging at 
zero percentage error; ' t " , representing the ideal threshold setting. There would be no 
point in setting a different threshold in the ideal case, as the EER is already at zero error 
and any variation o f t " would only increase FMR or FMNR system errors. In reality, a 
typical biometrics system wil l produce a plot similar to that shown in Figure 4-5, where 
the EER is above zero percent (Cope 1990). In this case, the system has to trade o f f 
FMR against FNMR, depending on the security requirements of the current operation. 
Starting with a threshold setting equal to the EER of the system, 't^' can be dynamically 
biased, towards either tighter security (at the expense of increased user inconvenience) 
or greater user convenience (at the expense of slacker security), dependent on the 
current operational scenario. For the system designer, FMR and FNMR curves are 
fijndamental in managing the quality-of-service for the system end-users. 
10 
L U 
FMR (False Match Rate) 
FNMR (False Non-Match Rate) 
EER (Equal Error Rate) 
Threshold Setting 
FMR (False Match Rate) 
FNMR (False Non-Match Rate) 
EER (Equal Error Rate) 
(Slack) (Tight) 
Threshold Setting 
Figure 4-4 : The ideal FNMR vs. FMR 
performance curve(s) 
Figure 4-5 : Typical FNMR vs. FMR 
performance curve(s) 
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Table 4-2 below shows some typical EERs and commercial hardware solutions for the 
selection of biometric techniques, identified in Section 4.3, with currently the highest 
market shares (2004). 
Biometric Technique 
Market 
Share^ 
Typical 
E E R 
Example Hardware Supplier (Product)" 
Internet Link: Supplier Homepage 
Fingerprint 48% 1.5% 
IDTeck Co. Ltd. (Finger007/x) 
Web: http://www.idteck.com 
Speaker-recognition 6% 2.5% 
Voice Security Systems (VoiceProtect®) 
Web: http://www.voice-security.com 
Iris-scan 9% 3.5% 
Argus Solutions (Trueldentity®) 
Web: http://www.argus-solutions.com 
Hand-geometry 11% 4.5% 
Recognition Systems Inc. (HandPunch®) 
Web: http://www.recogsys.com 
Signature-recognition 2% n/a Softpro (SignPlus®) Web: http://www.signplus.com 
Facial-recognition (2D) 12% 7% 
Identix Inc. (Facelt®) 
Web: http://www.identix.com 
Table 4-2: Equal error rates of popular biometrics, by technology 
4.2.4 Identification versus Verification 
In further considering biometrics as a method of advanced authentication, there are 
essentially two distinct modes of operation: 
• Biometric Verification (Authentication): "The automated process of assessing 
a claim that [submitted biometric sample(s)] and [stored biometric sample(s)] 
are from the same source." (ISO/IEC JTCI/SC37 2004) 
• Biometric Identification: "The automated process of comparing [submitted 
biometric sample(s)] to return an identifier(s) o f the source(s) of the matched 
[enrolment record(s)]." (ISO/IEC JTCI/SC37 2004) 
' Extracted from Figure 4-7, the Pie-chart: Biometrics market-share, by technology (IBG 2004). 
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Both of these approaches utilise the same essential capture and comparison mechanism, 
a fundamental difference lies in the different strengths of the two approaches in the real 
worid. In an ideal biometric authentication system, it would not matter which approach 
was adopted, as once the system had determined the identity of a user, it would be 
academic as to whom they claimed to be. In reality, biometric systems are not perfect 
and i f presented with the choice, the ability of a system to verify the user is whom they 
claim to be, is preferable from a security perspective, to an approach based on the 
probability of a best fit user, not knowing in advance i f the user under investigation is 
even enrolled on the system. 
The issue is also raised as to the performance and subsequent cost of the 
authentication mode. Identification requires the system to essentially check the 
captured biometric sample(s) against every single user enrolment record (biometric 
template) stored in its database (one-to-many) in order to confidently formulate the 
strongest probable identity; also checking that this probability is above a pre-defmed 
threshold for unknown users. This would require significantly more processing 
(powerful hardware) than verification which, on the other hand, can be performed in a 
single operation: does the captured biometric sample(s) exceed the authentication 
threshold for the enrolment record of the claimed identity (one-to-one). Within a 
mobile environment, all processing imparts a cost on the battery life and inevitable 
performance (time between charge cycles) of the mobile device, therefore it is crucial 
to justify whether an authentication process is PoE or continuous, terminal or 
network-centric (Section 2.3.7). 
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4.2.5 Threats to Biometric Systems 
It can be shown that biometric approaches present less risk in the areas of authentication 
attack when compared to traditional PVIiat You Know, Wliat You Have based systems. 
The classic risk to an authentication system is the masquerade attack, or convincing the 
system security that the actual user is in fact the legitimate user. Biometrics are not 
knowledge-based, consequently there is no transferable knowledge to hijack. Biometrics 
is not token-based (the user is not considered a token), therefore there is nothing 
tangible to steal; although it could be argued that certain dismembered body-parts could 
fit this category! Therefore, to masquerade undetected on a biometrics protected system, 
an attacker must essentially present themselves as a clone of the legitimate user, or at 
least produce biometric samples which beat any system confidence threshold; dependent 
on which biometric approach the system has in place (see Section 4.3). Biometrics 
authentication markers cannot be inadvertently lost or deliberately shared in the same 
way that passwords or physical tokens can (Section 4.2.1), each user template is unique 
to its owner and as such offers increased accountability. 
The second significant risk to authentication systems is that of Trial-and-Error attack, 
sometime referred to as Brute-Force attack. Again, biometrics present a significant 
obstacle to an attacker, as biometric templates are generally based on dozens of 
simultaneously captured, highly variable, loosely related samples, which cannot be 
guessed; compared to a password which is drawn fi-om a set of alpha-numeric characters 
and although recommended against, usually arranged in a logical sequence (as words, 
names, sequential codes etc.). In addition, a well designed biometric system wil l employ 
a process known as seeding to ensure biometric sample(s) are in fact original and not 
replays of previous sample(s) (Ratha et al. 2001b). Certainly to the casual attacker, there 
is no easy or obvious way of defeating a biometric sentinel system. 
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The more determined attacker may attempt to literally steal a legitimate subscriber's 
identity and register themselves with a system, assuming the stolen identity; this is 
known as identity theft (Home Office 2006). Although identity theft essentially 
circumvents the authentication system completely, once system registration has been 
achieved, biometrics may present a solution in the form o f behavioural profiling. I f the 
security system had access to a behavioural profile for the claimed identity, a possibility 
in a network-centric security architecture (Section 2.3.7.2) of a large distributed 
network, such as a national mobile network operator, the system has a window of 
opportunity to flag the intrusion before any potentially defrauding profile refining takes 
place. I f however, an attacker is determined enough and carefijlly chooses the identity 
of their victim, utilises social engineering techniques and chooses the identity of an 
authentication system/network with absolutely no knowledge of the person whose 
identity is being stolen, then only a traditional and thorough human-to-human 
interrogation has any real chance of identifying the fraud. 
4.3 Biometric Techniques 
Biometrics presents a selection of possibilities when it comes to the collection of 
biometric markers for an advanced authentication system. The possible approaches can 
generally be split into two categories: 
• Physiological: Anatomical metrics or What you are, 
• Behavioural: Behavioural metrics or How you are. 
Physiological approaches such as fingerprint, face-recognition and hand-geometry still 
command the majority share of current commercial biometric systems, representing the 
more mature technologies. They are also more invariant and discriminative in comparison 
to the more transient behavioural approaches (Woodward et al. 2003, pp.45-100). 
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Although behavioural biometrics are not a new concept, the inherent need for an 
automated authentication system based on behavioural techniques can be linked with 
the growth of personal computing. A behavioural biometric that has witnessed massive 
growth in recent years is 'behavioural-profiling', although not specifically within the 
area of authentication, but within the area of targeted advertising; advertising based on 
individual users purchasing profile (Bisgaard-Bohr 2002). Another approach which has 
seen recent developments within the field of authentication, is keystroke-dynamics 
(Joyce and Gupta 1990, Legget and Williams 1988), or one's typing style, along with 
the release of commercial applications like: BioPassword (Link: BioPassword). 
BioPassword is interesting in that it adopts a hybrid multi-modal approach to 
authentication, adding biometrics to an established and familiar password authentication 
mechanism, realising a What you type and How you type approach. This is an excellent 
application of biometric technology; it not only strengthens an authentication 
mechanism that the security industry has experience and confidence in, but also enables 
a soft deployment of biometric technology to consumers in a way less brutal than a 
novel, purely biometric approach. 
The question can be asked, 'Is there a best biometric?'. This depends on the application 
environment and the task the user is currently engaged in, as each biometrics' inherent 
qualities will lend themselves more to one particular circumstance than another. For 
example, although speaker-recognition may not be suited to application on either a loud 
factory floor or within a quiet library, it could be appropriate for telephony based 
authentication; whereas hand geometry (owing to the size of the collector) would not; 
behavioural profiling could be suitable for continuously monitoring an online banking 
site, whereas a user having to hold their eye against an iris-scanner would not. 
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The diverse nature of biometrics is well illustrated in the Zephyr diagram on biometric 
techniques, performed by the International Biometrics Group (Link: IBG) in 2004, and 
shown in Figure 4-6. The diagram illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
various current biometric techniques and the subsequent importance of understanding 
and defining a system's environmental and application criteria in order to select the 
optimum technique. The IBG analysis was based on four criteria, selected by the group, 
to be of key importance to both the service provider and the user. These were: 
• Intrusiveness: The level of intrusive interaction required (by the user). 
• Distinctiveness: The level of uniqueness (of the biometric markers). 
• Cost: The cost of deployment (primarily of the biometrics collector). 
• EfTort: The level of work required on the part of the user (for authentication). 
Keystroke-Dynamics 
Face-Recognition 
Retina-scan 
Ins-scan 
Hand-Geometry 
Signature-Recognition 
Fmgerpnnt 
Speaker-Recognition 
• Effort n InlrusA^ness • Distinctiveness • Cost 
Figure 4-6 : Zephyr diagram of key biometric criteria (IBG 2004) 
As a reference, the Zephyr diagram includes the ideal biometric result, with all other 
techniques radiating from a central (worst resuh) point source. By inspection, it can be 
seen that no single current biometric technique approaches the ideal case scenario: 
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although retina-scan exhibits highly distinctive samples, it is very intrusive and suffers the 
greatest cost to both the provider and the user; by contrast, although speaker-recognition 
is non-intrusive (convenient for the user), its biometric markers are indistinct and 
therefore vulnerable to increased false acceptance. The best generic result, with no 
significant weaknesses and moderate to good distinctiveness, remains the fingerprint; a 
result closely reflected in the techniques commercial success, shown in Figure 4-7. 
Considering the uniqueness of the human subject, only a handftil o f biometrics' 
techniques have realised commercial success. Figure 4-7 gives a breakdown of the most 
commercially successful biometric approaches by technology for the year 2004, with 
their respective market shares (Link: IBG). By inspection, the more mature and well 
understood biometric markers, command the greater market shares, with fingerprint(s) 
commanding nearly half the commercial market. 
8lgn«tur« 
Flng#fpf1nt 
4$% 
Figure 4-7 : Biometrics market-share, by technology (IBG 2004) 
The next section of the thesis discusses current biometrics' techniques in more detail. The 
selected list is not considered exhaustive, as research within the field of biometrics is 
constantly realising novel biometric markers and sample collection techniques: an 
example of which is the Head Authentication Technique introduced in Chapter 5, along 
with some recent commercial approaches introduced in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4. 
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4.3.1 Physiological Biometric Techniques 
A literary summary of established anatomical or physiological metrics: Wfiatyou are. 
4.3.1,1 Fingerprint 
The technique of fingerprint authentication is based on the fact that everybody's 
fingerprints exhibit different shapes of ridges and valleys, swiris and loops; even for 
identical twins. The discontinuities and irregularities, known as minutiae, form the basis 
of the oldest and most widely recognised biometric markers (Maltoni et ai 2003), 
dating back to 1858 (Herschel 1858). Fingerprint technology is by far the most 
commonly deployed biometric authentication system and offers a set of distinct 
advantages over other physiological biometrics: 
• Mature and proven core technology. 
• Time invariant discriminative features. 
• Excellent economies of scale have driven down prices. 
• Small ergonomic, easy to deploy devices. 
• Scalable security, with the ability to utilise combinations of fingers. 
Fingerprint based authentication systems are traditionally PoE only, requiring deliberate 
and intrusive interaction by the user with the system. Considering the strength and 
maturity of fingerprint recognition, its limitations have not hindered market dominance, 
see Figure 4-7, in fact the technique has experienced 14% market growth over the last 
five years (IBG 2004) and will likely remain the dominant biometric for some time. 
Although fingerprint recognitions PoE security limitation does not lend itself to 
transparent or continuous authentication, the technique still lends itself to certain 
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advanced mobile services, such as m-commerce, where transactions may only require a 
single authentication. This has prompted mobile suppliers like Sagem to pioneer the 
incorporation of a fingerprint scanner into a mobile handset (Sagem 2000), although to 
date only one network, NTT DoCoMo (Japan), has introduced a similarly equipped 
handset commercially; the F505i (NTT DoCoMo 2004). 
4.3.1.2 Hand-Geometry 
Utilising the same physiological source as fingerprints, i.e. the hands (and fingers), hand-
geometry employs much coarser and less distinct biometric markers; as a consequence it 
is does scale well in isolation for identification or secure authenticafion. hi application, the 
technique uses an image scanner (Link: Recognition Systems Inc.) to capture a featureless 
silhouette of the users hand; biometric markers include measurements of the surface area 
of the user's hand and fingers, along with finger length(s) and width(s). Anything which 
can change the shape of the hand, such as large rings, injury or medical aids, can effect 
system efficiency and increase false rejection. Although the technique has halved its 
market share over the last five years (IBG 2004), the technique still proves commercially 
popular (see Figure 4-7), partly owing to its convenient HCl. 
The continual drive within the mobile community for smaller lighter handheld devices 
sets up a conflict of interests with hand geometry technology. Owing to the markers 
employed (hand area), the required size of hand geometry scanners is restricted by the 
size of the human hand, making diem inappropriate for application within the mobile 
arena. They are more commonly found in access control or Time & Attendance systems. 
Early examples include the system employed at the 1992 Olympic Village in Barcelona, 
and more extensively 4 years later in Atlanta (Washington Technology 1996): more 
recently, Disney (Link: Disney) have employed a system for multi-day park passes. 
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4.3.1.3 Facial-Recognition (2-Diniensional) 
Two dimensional facial-recognition systems are currently the second most popular 
commercial biometric with 12% of the market, a share which has remained relatively 
unchanged over the last five years (IBG 2004). The technique utilises the geometric 
placement of distinctive features within the human face as markers and offers a number 
o f unique advantages over other biometric systems, it can: 
• utilise existing acquisition devices; 
• be applied non-intrusively; 
• be applied without specific interaction with the biometric sensor; 
• remotely search photographic records. 
The biometric markers employed are those which exhibit the least variance over time: 
the size and position of the eye sockets relative to the nose and sides of the mouth 
(Nanavati et ai 2002, pp.63-75). Areas which can suffer significant variance are 
normally avoided such as hair lines around the forehead and for men, around the chin. 
Although in principle, all two dimensional facial-recognition systems utilise the same 
biometric source, their exist at least five competing systems: 
• Eigenface utilises a set of around 115 common facial templates. 
• Feature Analysis utilises sets of common facial features' locations. 
• Neural-Network utilises a neural-network to classify prominent features in the 
fiall face. The PhD research technique proposed and subsequently discussed in 
Chapter 6, utilises a similar approach to sample analysis. 
• Automatic Face Processing utilises geometric mapping of the face. 
• Thermogram utilises a thermal image of the face produced by an infi-ared 
camera. 
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Two examples of commercial facial-recognition products are: Imagis Technologies 
ID-2000 (2004) and Identix Face IT (2004). 
One of the drivers for 3"* generation mobile networks is video conferencing (Secfions 
2.2.3.3 and 2.3.6). A mobile hardware requirement is therefore image capture capability 
which has the potential of enabling non-intrusive and potentially continuous face 
recognition technology to be employed when utilising a service which requires the user 
to interact with the screen and a suitably positioned camera, such as video conferencing 
or web browsing. Unfortunately this approach would be ineffective, when the handset is 
used in the traditional telephony mode, still the predominant mobile application. This 
limitation is addressed by the HAT approach introduced in Chapter 5. 
4.3.1.4 Iris-Scan 
Iris-recognition technology utilises one of the most invariant biometric markers, the 
distinctive features of the iris or richly textured ring of pigmented membrane 
surrounding the pupil of the eye. The techniques requires mapping of the trabecular 
mesh or complex pattem of unique furrows and ridges of the iris via use of, 
ophthalmologists approved, inft-ared imaging technology beyond the range of human 
vision (Daugman 1998). The techniques primary strength is the amount of distinctive 
data within the iris, offering tremendous potential for reliable identification and secure 
authenfication, far exceeding the error rates of the most commercially successful 
biometric approach; the fingerprint. However, perhaps owing to the complex 
authentication process, iris-recognition technologies market share has remained stable at 
a moderate 10% for the last five years (IBG 2004). 
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From a mobile perspective, the excellent security potential of the iris is offset by a 
number of factors, preventing it from realising market application to date. These are: 
• The need for small, dedicated authentication hardware. 
• The limited authentication range of the biometric sensor, usually only a few 
inches; although there have been research projects into advanced systems 
capable of identifying pa^^ers by up to a distance of 10 metres (Zakaria 2003). 
• The authentication process is intrusive and requires training. 
• Some user apprehension towards eye-based technology. 
Table 4-3 summarises the four principal physiological biometrics techniques identified 
in Figure 4-7 and discussed in this section, with a bias towards their inherent suitability 
for application within a small handheld mobile device; like a mobile handsel. 
Market 
Share' 
Non-
Intrusive 
Security 
Strength^ 
Template 
Size^ 
(in Bytes) 
' Mobile 
Application 
1. Fingerprint 48% X 250 Discrete^ 
2., Hand-IGeometry 11% X 10 Unsuitable^ 
3. Face-Recpgriition 12% 1300 Continuous 
4. Iris-Scan 9% X 500 Unsuitable^ 
Table 4-3: Summary of physiological biometric techniques for mobile application 
For a further in depth discussion of the application of biometrics in the mobile arena and 
the suitability of the available techniques to the medium, refer to Section 4.4. 
' Extracted from Figure 4-7, the Pie chart; Biometrics Market Share by Technology. 
Extracted from Figure 4-6, the Zephyr diagram: Key Biometrics Criteria. 
^ Template sizes are not fixed, but represent typical sizes in current commercial systems. 
* Authentication performed deliberately at a specific point within an operation. 
^ Owing to the size and inconvenience of the biomctric collector. 
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4,3,2 Other Physiological Techniques 
In addition to the market dominant physiological techniques discussed in Section 4.3.1, 
a number of less commercially significant techniques exist, with a cumulative market 
share of less than 1%; in addition to some novel techniques which are still in the 
conceptual stages of development. 
Although an in-depth discussion of these techniques is beyond the scope of the thesis, 
they have been included here to demonstrate the diversity and breadth of the 
physiological biometrics field. 
4.3.2.1 Retina-Scan 
Retina-scan is the most well known and mature of the lesser biometrics, dating back to 
the 1930s, and the only technique to realise a successful (albeit limited) commercial 
application (Das 2005). It utilises an approach to authentication not dissimilar to the 
iris-scan discussed previously (Section 4.3.1.4), extrapolating a 2-dimensional map of 
minutiae points from an infra-red image of the blood vessels at the back o f the eye; the 
membrane known as the retina. This produces a biometric template, similar to that of a 
user's fingerprint, though more secure owing to the internal nature of the biometric 
markers being less susceptible to deliberate modification or damage. Also, in the event 
of the subject's death, unlike fingerprint, the retina will deteriorate very quickly 
negating any need for life testing. Although producing invariable and highly distinctive 
markers, the technique is expensive to deploy and suffers from high user inconvenience 
(see Figure 4-6) and as a result, has only realised application in highly secure physical 
access areas, where security outweighs convenience; such as government buildings, 
military installations, power-stations and correction institutions. 
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4.3.2.2 Vein-recognition 
Vein-recognition relies on the mapping of the vascular pattern of blood vessels in either 
the palm or the back of a subject's hand; not-dissimilar, in principle, to the mapping of 
minutiae points of fingerprints. The technique utilises an inft-a-red camera to produce an 
image based on the absorption characteristics of the deoxidized haemoglobin (in the 
blood). The technique offers some advantages over other biometric techniques, as it: 
• can be implemented without contact with the biometric collector (hygienic); 
• is relatively resilient to minor surface abrasions; 
• is relatively easy to capture biometric sample(s). The subject simply holds or 
passes their hand above or below the biometric collector; 
• can be implemented non-intrusively, allowing for continuous monitoring, within 
a suitably designed system. 
These tangible benefits make the technique particularly suitable for high-traffic access 
control areas (such as airports) or time & attendance systems (found particularly in 
industry), presenting a real alternative to less robust hand-geometry systems. Vein 
recognifion technology is currently witnessing steady growth in the marketplace, 
realising a number of new commercial applications (Fulton 2005) (Link: Veid Ltd). 
4.3.2.3 Facial-Recognition 3D 
3D facial-recognition is an extension of the 2D system discussed in Section 4.3.1.3, 
utilising an additional depth plane. The technique constructs a 3-dimensional 
topological map of a subject's face, triangulating each point within a 3-dimensional 
plane, via audio reflections fi-om two sonar style transceivers placed a short-distance 
apart and in front of the subject (Link: DuPont Authentication; A4Vision) 
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4.3.2.4 Ear-Geometry 
Ear-geometry utilises distinctive characteristics of a print of the pinna, or visible part of 
the outer-ear, not dissimilar in principle to a fingerprint; an ear-print. The unique shape of 
the human ear is currently the subject of ongoing investigation (Hoogstrate et al, 2001), 
with various legal bodies investigating its admissibility within criminal courts (Morgan 
1999). In the UK in 1998 a murderer was convicted based on ear-print evidence (BBC 
News 1998), leading to ftirther investigation by the National Training Centre for 
Scientific Support to Crime in the UK (BBC News 1999). In 2001, Alphonse Bertillon, a 
respected pioneer of the science of human identification, pronounced the ears uniqueness, 
stating," It is, in fact, almost impossible to meet with two ears which are identical in all 
their parts." (Moenssens 1971, p. 17). It has even been suggested that the ear has more 
distinctive characteristics than the human face (Carreira-Perpinan and Sanchez-Calle 
1995), although in balance, it has also been argued that there is no empirical evidence to 
support the claim that ear-shape is never duplicated (Morgan 1999). 
4.3.2.5 Facial Thermography 
Facial thermography refers to the pattern of facial heat produced from the distinctive 
flow of blood under the skin. The technique utilises an infi-a-red camera to capture a 
heat image of the subject's face, from which a biometric template is formed. Although 
the technique has the advantages of being suitable for non-intrusive, not-contact 
application, it suffers from highly variant metrics owing to the abundance of blood 
vessels in the human face. Factors which can affect the signature are: 
• ambient conditions (such as temperature affecting sweat production); 
• subjects mood or emotional state of arousal (such as anger); 
• subjects medical state (such as sickness, medication or menopause). 
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4.3.3 Behavioural Biometric Techniques 
A literary summary of established behavioural metrics: How you are. 
4.3.3.1 Speaker-Recognition 
Of^en confxjsed with speech-recognition, speaker recognition (aka voice-verification) 
utilises die physiological individuality of a user's vocal tract, including: vocal chords, 
palate, teeth and the shape and density of tissue along with the inherently behavioural 
characteristics of speech annunciation including: pitch, tone, volume and dynamic range 
(Woodward, et al 2003, pp. 101-136). Additional environmental factors, including: 
colloquial dialect, atmospheric conditions and elocution can also have an affect. Speaker-
recognition is a true biometric, focusing on characteristics of whom is speaking (from a 
security perspective): conversely speech-recognition, concentrates on the generic content 
of the speech, where diversity of biometric markers actually hinders system performance. 
Speech 
Recognition 
Speaker 
Recognition 
(Low - Generic) User Discrimination (High - Distinct) 
Figure 4-8 : The mutually opposed goals of speaker and ^peecA-recognition 
The diagram in Figure 4-8 demonstrates the diametrically opposed goals of the two 
systems: Speaker Recognition performance is dependent on highly distinct samples; 
conversely. Speech Recognition performance is dependent on highly generic samples. 
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Speaker-recognition can be performed in two distinct modes of operation: 
• Constrained: Text-dependent, via pre-determined words or phrases. 
• Unconstrained: Text-independent, via free-speech. 
Although unconstrained speaker-recognition offers a less intrusive user interface and the 
potential for continuous authentication, in use, the restricted text of a constrained system 
has proven to offer reduced FMR and FNMR errors (Section 4.2.3) and to date, proven 
the more popular approach within the 6% market share of commercial speaker-
recognition systems (Link: Persay Inc.; VeriVoice Inc.; Nuance Communications Inc.). 
Within the mobile arena, speaker-recognition is inherently suited to telephony based 
application', not only offering the enhanced non-intrusive security approach required by 
post 2"^ * generation wideband networks, but also offering the opportunity to leverage 
existing acquisition hardware and existing mobile subscriber behaviour. 
4.3.3.2 Signature-Recognition 
Signature-recognition is an automatic authentication technique, derived from the 
established Graphologists art of hand-writing recognition, where it is possible to verify 
the identity of a person purely from their characteristic writing style. Although 
graphologists can claim to ftirther determine a persons character traits solely from their 
hand-writing, signature-recognition focuses only on the verifiable characteristics of the 
user's writing style and separates the biometric markers into two groups: 
• Static Markers: Writing geometry, curvature, shape and histogram. 
• Dynamic markers: Writing direction, speed, pen-up/down and pressure. 
' Generic suitability in principle. In practice, mobile speaker-recognition is limited by factors including: 
handset microphone quality, security system centricity, voice codec, bandwidth of the medium. 
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Signature-recognition systems currently only command 2% of the biometrics market 
share (see Figure 4-7), reflecting the current market trend away from signature based 
authentication, and towards the market dominant and convenient password/PIN based 
authentication in pre-enrolled systems. Some issues affecting signature-recognition are: 
• relatively indistinct biometric markers (see Figure 4-6); 
• debit card(s) widespread replacement o f signature-authenticated cheques; 
• Chip'n'PINs replacement of signature-authenticated debit/credit card receipts. 
However, with the move towards, PDA style mobile devices (Section 1.1), more 
handhelds are appearing with palmtop style touch-screens and stylus, enabling some 
leveraging of existing hardware and software, in the form of handwriting-recognition, 
for authentication purposes. A key issue is how far this particular HCI technology can 
penetrate the mass market of mobile handsets. Touch-screen technology is an expensive 
commodity and is highly unlikely to appear on a device for purely security purposes. 
4.3,3.3 Keystroke-Dynamics 
Keystroke-dynamics takes advantage of behavioural differences in typing style on any 
keyed input device, usually a computer style keyboard or numerical keypad; the input 
device forming the access point to the protected environment. The behavioural markers 
are primarily user's inter-key latency and hold-down latency, which has been shown to 
demonstrate unique personal properties (Joyce and Gupta 1990). In a similar way to 
voice-recognition, keystroke dynamics can leverage existing hardware and be applied in 
two distinct modes of operation: 
• Constrained: Text-dependent, via pre-determined words or phrases. 
• Unconstrained: Text-independent, via free-typing. 
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A natural and commercially successful application of keystroke-dynamics is hardening 
existing password based authentication systems; a hybrid multi-modal approach, adding 
biometrics to a mature authentication mechanism (Link: BioPassword). Although offering 
relatively indistinct biometric samples, keystroke-dynamics non-intrusive nature enables 
it to continuously and cumulatively monitor a users typing behaviour and over time, 
statistically offset this vulnerability and reduce system authentication errors. 
With traditional 2"^ ^ generation mobile handsets, the use of mobile phonebooks all but 
eliminated the use of the keypad in day-to-day use. However, the introduction of 
wideband networks and their enabled online services, has seen the evolution of the 
mobile handset into a device with similar capabilities to a PDA or palmtop computer 
(Section I . I ) , with the associated human computer interface; this shift in technology re-
enabling the possible application of keystroke-dynamics (Clarke et ai 2003). 
Table 4-4 summarises the three principal behavioural biometrics techniques, identified 
in Figure 4-7 and discussed in this section, with a bias towards their inherent suitability 
for application within a small handheld mobile device, like a mobile handset. 
Market 
-Sha i -e" 
; Non-'. 
jntrusive 
Security 
Strehgth^„ 
' 1 - r . 
Template 
Size^ 
(in Bytes) 
. Mobile, 
Appltcatloh 
1. Speaker-Recognition 6% 2000+ Continuous 
2. Signature-Recognition 2% X -1500 Discrete'* 
3. Keystroke-bynamics <1%^ Unknown Continuous 
Table 4-4: Summary of behavioural biomemc techniques for mobile application 
' Extracted from Figure 4-7, the Pie chart: Biometrics Market Share by Technology. 
^ Extracted from Figure 4-6, the Zephyr diagram: Key Biomeuics Criteria. 
^ Template sizes are not fixed, but represent typical sizes in current commercial systems. 
* Authentication performed deliberately at a specific point within an operation. 
^ Inferred from Figure 4-7, the Pie chart: Biomeuics Market Share by Technology. 
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4.3.4 Other Behavioural Techniques 
In addition to the market dominant behavioural techniques discussed in Section 4.3.3, a 
number of alternate techniques are under investigation. An in-depth discussion of these 
techniques is beyond the scope of the thesis and they have been included here to 
demonstrate, once again, the diversity and breadth of biometrics. 
4.3.4.1 Service Profiling 
Behavioural profiling is the process of determining the identity of a person via their 
characteristic interaction with a system. It can describe a path of activity taken by a user 
to achieve a specific goal, or the order in which a list of tasks is usually performed on a 
regular basis; forming a profile. An example may be: Check email, use cursor kevs to 
scroll; read the news on BBC News website, use mouse to select topics; exit system, use 
shortcut kevs. Although the process is not unique enough to perform user identification, 
in a multi-modal system its strength lies in the fight against ft-aud, with its ability to 
non-intrusively and constantly monitoring a systems' users and flag behaviour which is 
out of character (Rogers 2001), for further investigation. 
4.3.4.2 Gait-Recognition 
Gait-recognition is a spatio-temporal biometric which leverages existing CCTV camera 
deployment to classify subjects' walking patterns (gait and stride), for either Simple 
Harmonic Mofion (SHM) or stafistical Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Although 
unsuitable as an access technology, its potenfial resides within automatic surveillance 
systems which can be used to trigger additional security responses, such as CCTV 
recording or a silent alarm, i f a flagged template is detected within a controlled area. 
There are a number of DARPA research projects ongoing within this area (Link: ISIS(a)). 
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4.4 Biometrics and Mobile Handsets 
The evolution of the mobile handset (Section 1.1) from a rudimentary telephony device 
into, a multi-functional personal mobile computer has had repercussions within the field 
of mobile biometrics. Although physically smaller than traditional palmtop and laptop 
computers, mobile handsets now incorporate many of their advanced human computer 
interfaces, which biometric systems designers can lever in order to realise hiometric 
security approaches previously impossible owing to the size and cost o f the enabling 
hardware. Figure 4-9, illustrates the biometric approaches discussed in the previous 
sections that are relevant to application within a mobile handset. 
Camera 
Face-
Recognition 
Camera 
Iris-
Scanning 
Reader^ 
Fingerprint 
Touch-sc reen^ 
Signature-
Recognition 
Keypad 
Keystroke-
Dynamics ^Advanced features not necessarily 
available on ttie product shown 
Microphone 
Speaker-
Recognition 
Figure 4-9 : Biometrics applicable to mobile handsets 
With the addition of a high resolution camera', initially for photographic use and later, 
with the introduction of wideband networks, for video conferencing, 2-dimensional 
face-recognition and potentially even iris-scanning, is now a possibility. 
' Pixel resolution of the C C D in the latest generation of mobile handsets is now realising 3 megapixels, 
with some specialist units reaching up to 6 megapixels (Grundig Mobile X5000). 
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Touch-screen technology from the PDA market, along with hand-writing recognition 
software, is enabling techniques such as signature-recognition. The improved dynamics 
of high-quahty audio microphones, part of the 3"* generation rich-voice service (Section 
2.2.3.3), is enabling speaker recognition. Although the reduction in size o f the handset 
has dictated the size of the keypad, this has not eliminated the potential for keystroke-
dynamics, research in this area has shown that even using just thumbs^ there is still 
enough of a residual signature to perform authentication (Clarke et al. 2003). 
Biometric Technique^ Market Share^ 
Non-
Intrusive 
Security 
Strength^ 
Lever 
Existing 
Hardware 
Mobile 
Application 
Fingerprint 48% X Limited^ Discrete^ 
Hand-Geometry 11% X y y X Unsuitable® 
Face-Recognition (2D) 12% Continuous' 
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
I r is-Scan 9% Limited* Continuous' 
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
Retina-Scan <1% X X Unsuitable^ 
Ph
ys
 
Vein-Recognition n/a Possibly X Unsuitable® 
Face-Recognition (3D) n/a n/a X Continuous' 
Ear-Geometry n/a X n/a X Continuous' 
Facial-Thermogram n/a n/a X Unsuitable® 
Speaker-Recognition 6% y y Continuous' 
Signature-Recognition 2% X Limited* Discrete^ 
o 
'> 
CD 
Keystroke-Dynamics n/a Limited* Continuous' 
B
eh
 
Service-Profiling n/a Continuous 
Gait-Recognition n/a n/a Unsuitable 
}^/a = infomiaiion not available at time of writing 
Tabic 4-5: Suitability of various biometric techniques to application within a mobile handset 
' Techniques in bold arc currently predominant within their panicular discipline (see Figure 4-7). 
^ For the year 2004. Extracted from Figure 4-7, Pie chart: Biometrics Market Share by Technology. 
^ Extracted from Figure 4-6, Zephyr diagram: Key Biometrics Criteria. 
* Leverage dependent on availability of advanced hardware. 
* Authentication performed deliberately at a specific point within an operation. 
^ Owing to the size and inconvenience of the biometric collector. 
' Whilst within a suitable mode of operation, e.g. video-conferencing for face-recognition. 
^ Requires the use of a suitable infra-red camera. 
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4.5 Assessing Subscribers' Attitudes towards Biometrics and 
Advanced Mobile Security 
As part of the survey into public opinion of mobile telephony based security and related 
issues, covered in Chapter 3, four questions were composed to probe survey participants 
understanding and views on a selection of advanced authentication issues, including the 
topic of biometrics. The following section is a discussion and interpretation of the 
results to these questions. A full copy of the survey is included in Appendix C; with 
biometrics and advanced security being covered in sub-Section 3. 
4.5.1 Users' attitudes towards biometric authentication 
Participants were initially asked how they basically felt about biometrics and more 
specifically their own biometric markers, being used for the purpose of mobile 
authentication. The available responses were: Good, Bad or Indifferent. 
Figure 4-10 shows a majority of 83% of respondents expressing the view that it is a good 
idea in principle. If this total is combined with the 13% of respondents who expressed no 
definite bias either way, the total without obvious objection to biometric authentication 
being incorporated into mobile handsets is 96%; a significant positive result. 
<3-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Survey respondents 
Figure 4-10 : Surv ey respondent's acceptance of biometric authentication 
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4.5.2 User's awareness and understanding of biometric techniques 
Having established that the majority of respondents were accepting o f additional 
authentication measures, the survey proceeded to assess their preferences towards the 
forms that the authentication could take. Having determined that PIN-based protection is 
problematic at best, it is considered that other authentication methods based upon 
something the user knows (e.g. password) would be equally under-utilised, inconvenient 
or vulnerable to similar masquerade attack. The implication of this is that the most 
sensible route for improving authentication is to base the approach upon some form of 
physiological or behavioural characteristic. Focusing on proven biometrics, participants 
were questioned on two levels: firstly, their awareness o f a range of proven biometrics 
(Polemi 1997), both physiological and behavioural, and secondly their willingness to use 
the respective techniques within a mobile handset. Figure 4-11 summarises the results. 
100% 
75% {— 
• Aware Of 
• W o u l d Use 
0) 
4) 
£ 
50% 
25% 
0% 
Fingerprint Speaker- Ir is-Scan 
Recognit ion 
Hand- Face- Keystroke-
Geometry Recognit ion Dynamics 
(2D) 
Figure 4-1 i : Survey respondent's awareness and acceptance of biometric techniques 
Having been known about for approaching 150 years (Herschel 1858) and forming the 
basis of police forensics for almost as long, the fingerprint received the greatest positive 
response in both the level of awareness and participants" willingness to use the 
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technique. Although the technique suffers the disadvantage of not being able to lever 
existing mobile handset hardware, but requires the incorporation of a dedicated 
biometric collector, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.1, confidence in this technique has 
already been demonstrated with some limited commercial success, through NTT 
DoCoMos fingerprint enabled handset; the F505i (NTT DoCoMo 2004). However, the 
fingerprint does not naturally lend itself to non-intrusive implementation (Table 2-1), as 
the user traditionally needs to pass his/her finger over a scanner at discrete times within 
a process, such as at the checkout within an ecommerce operation. 
Speaker-recognition was also rated highly by respondents in both awareness and 
acceptance. Performing almost as well as the fingerprint, speaker-recognition has 
attracted much attention through the media and computer software, in addition to the 
mobile telephone industry, albeit predominantly as a means of voice activation of 
services, rather than as a means of authentication. As speaker-recognition depends upon 
the distinctiveness of the human voice, the development of hardware to support the 
increased fi-equency and dynamic-range of 3G's rich-voice service (Section 2.2.3.3) wil l 
lend itself naturally to the employment of this technique. However, owing to the 
vulnerability of this technique to pre-recorded authentication data, this technique can 
only realise its potential within a continuously monitoring environment. 
Out of the biometric techniques provided, it is iris-scan which received one of the best 
results. Generally being considered an esoteric biometric approach, it was recognised by 
76% of respondents and acknowledged by over half of all survey participants as being 
an acceptable biometric approach to authentication. This was somewhat unexpected, as 
biometrics relating to the eye, have traditionally been regarded with apprehension (IBG 
2004). More unexpected, was the result that iris-scan was not only more familiar than 
face-recognition, but also preferred by a significant 14% of respondents. 
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Of the remaining techniques, which received less than half of respondent's confidence 
vote, hand-geometry received the healthiest vote, with 49%. However, it would have 
been interesting to question the 43% of respondents, who agreed to having used it, 
about how they expected the technique to be realised in practice within physically 
diminishing handsets! With only a third of the votes, face-recognition was an 
unexpected fifth in popularity; it is worth remembering at the time o f the survey 
(during 2003), 3G was still undergoing testing and commercial video-conferencing 
was generally confined to desktop-computing. Although keystroke-dynamics naturally 
lends itself to non-intrusive authentication, facilitating a continuously monitored 
environment during appropriate keypad-oriented activity, the techniques' indistinct 
biometric markers (Figure 4-6), generally consign the approach to a support role 
within a multi-modal security system. 
Caution should be exercised when drawing any conclusions ft^om these results, as it is 
likely respondents may have responded more positively to those techniques with 
which they were already familiar, or which are proven in the eyes o f the general 
population. For example, fingerprints have long been known to provide a means of 
successful and reliable identification, long before any forms o f electronic scanning. 
The point, therefore, is not to regard the results as a conclusive attitude towards one 
technique over another. The key observation that can be made is that, in support of the 
previous question, all techniques were considered favourably, by at least 25% of 
respondents and i f a particular technique were to be implemented that was less well 
known, a degree of re-education and awareness raising would be necessary before 
wide scale acceptance. 
107 
Chap te r 4 : B i ome t r i c s a n d Mob i l e Dev i ces 
4.5.3 User's impression of continuous authentication 
One advantage certain biometrics offer when compared to the PIN technique, is that 
they offer the potential for authentication to be performed on a continuous basis rather 
than as a one-off, usually PoE, judgement. Respondents were, therefore, asked whether 
they considered continuous authentication during mobile service usage to be acceptable; 
with the possible responses again being: Good, Bad or Indifferent. 
The results, shown in Figure 4-12, reveal that 61% of respondents considered continuous 
authentication to be a good idea, which i f accumulated with the indifferent respondents in 
a similar way to Section 4.5.1, gives a healthy 83%. Accepting that these 83% of users 
would likely be unwilling to regularly break their normal mobile activity to perform 
manual authentication, as discussed previously (Table 4-5) certain non-intrusive 
authentication techniques clearly lend themselves to this task more than others, such as: 
• Speaker-recognition: talking is still the top activity on mobile handsets. 
• Face-recognition (2D) : with the introduction of mobile video-conferencing. 
• Keystroke-dynamics: with the popularity of mobile texting (SMS). 
• Service Profiling: for security, rather than targeted advertising 
(3-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Sui \ey respondents 
Figure 4-12 : Sun ey respondent s acceptance of continuous authentication 
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4.5.4 Storing biometrics' templates 
For all authentication techniques, including the PIN, a template needs to be stored as a 
reference, so as to enable the comparison with new authentication input data. The final 
objective of the survey was to establish users' opinions on where they would prefer their 
biometric template(s) to be stored; either in the handset and the responsibility of the 
subscriber, or in the network and the responsibility of the network operator. In Section 
2.3.7, the advantages and disadvantages of terminal vs. network-centric security profiles 
were discussed in detail, with the conclusion that a network-centric solution ultimately 
offered the more elegant and powerful solution. 
Where a preference was expressed, survey respondents clearly favoured the profile 
being stored in the handset, with 50% of respondents selecting this option. By contrast, 
33% favoured the network and 17% had no preference. The discussion in Section 2.3.7 
highlights that this issue is in fact far more complex than simply a matter o f privacy, but 
systematically affects issues such as, personal mobility and corporate liability. It would 
be wise, therefore, to acknowledge that as respondents were not explicitly made aware 
of all the issues, that perhaps a part of this result is biased by respondent's ignorance of 
the holistic view and the benefits a network-centric solution can in fact ofTer. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Survey respondents 
Figure 4-13 : Surrey respondent's preference for biomelric-tcmplale storage 
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4.5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an introduction to the area of biometrics and biometric security, 
with a bias towards the authentication system within current 2"** generation (GSM) 
mobile telephony handsets. 
Much research has already gone into developing biometric techniques into practical 
systems, and many are already employed as alternative authentication methods within 
the desktop PC environment. For example, 9% of respondents to the 2001 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey claimed to use biometric security technologies 
(CSI 2001). In the year 2000, Sagem were one of the first commercial companies to 
incorporate biometric authentication into a mobile handset; a fingerprint scanner 
within the back panel of the Sagem MC959 (SAGEM 2000), this technique being 
more recently incorporated into NTT DoCoMos, F505i (NTT DoCoMo 2004) handset 
in Japan. Although many biometric approaches would have traditionally required the 
incorporation of dedicated capture hardware, the move towards wideband 3"* 
generation handsets and services is enabling operators to compliment the existing 
PlN-based system, with a more powerful continuously monitored authentication 
system, through leverage of the new advanced services enabling hardware. For mass-
market devices component cost is a major consideration, handset prices are already 
heavily subsidised by network operators in the current business model in order to keep 
the start-up cost down for the consumer, at the expense of buying into a contract. 
It is the consumers in todays market that dictate the success or failure o f a product, so 
some accommodation for their attitudes and opinions is not only wise, but fundamental. 
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The user survey continued fi^om Chapter 3 addressed consumer views on the topic of 
advanced authentication and biometrics, with strong support for the more popular and 
familiar biometric techniques, and good overall support for biometrics in general. 
Since none of the biometric techniques discussed can provide non-intrusive 
authentication under all possible scenarios, it would seem logical that a hybrid multi-
modal authentication system presents ultimately the best solution, drawing on a 
number of non-intrusive techniques as the first line o f security, with perhaps the PIM 
(or some other knowledge-based methods) providing traditional PoE security and a 
fallback line of defence, i f required. 
In the next chapter, an innovative authentication technique appropriate to mobile 
application is introduced, which in addition to leveraging existing mobile hardware, 
presents a completely novel hybrid approach to biometric authentication, utilising both 
the physiological composition of a user's head along with the behavioural 
characteristics of the speakers voice to realise a unique biometric sample. The technique 
is known as the Head Authentication Technique. 
I l l 
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5 Conception of the Head Authentication 
Technique 
Security deficiencies within the current mobile authentication methodology highlighted in 
previous Chapters, are not themselves a product of the grovrth in mobile communications; 
they have always been present, it is the grovrth in data services enabled by developments 
in mobile communications infrastructure, which has resulted in the imbalance in security 
commensurate with the services they are now expected to protect. 
This chapter introduces a novel biometric technique conceived to redress this 
imbalance. Building on the biometric approach proposed in Chapter 4, and the advanced 
authentication findings (Section 4,5), of the security survey covered in Chapter 3, the 
proposed technique levers existing mobile HCI behaviour to enable a unique multi-
modal approach where selected physiological and behavioural characteristics work in 
symbiosis. The technique is known as the Head Authentication Technique. 
5.1 Introduction 
The Head Authentication Technique (HAT) was conceived out of the established need 
(Section 2,3) for an effective and reliable authentication system, capable of 
continuously verifying the claimed identity of a user accessing the advanced voice 
activated services of a wideband mobile network', usually through use of a compact 
mobile handset. The main requirements, fi-om both an academic and commercial 
perspective (Orange PCS), were for a novel authentication approach that could deliver 
the following four key security advancements; 
' The PhD requirement, as defined by the researches industrial sponsor, specifically targeted the data 
services enabled by 3"* generation wideband mobile networks: Orange P C S (Link Orange). 
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• Improved user-identity verification, through use of more unique and personal 
authentication templates. 
• Non-intrusive authentication; authentication transparent in use to the network 
user, enabling an authentication cycle to be initiated at wil l by either an 
application, a security sub-system or the network operator. 
• Continuous authentication; overcoming, for example, circumvention of the 
traditional PoE authentication request by simply not turning the device off. 
• Capable of leveraging existing mobile hardware, and recasting it into 
additional security roles, such as facial recognition through use of mobile video 
conferencing hardware. 
To further elaborate on these requirements: improved user-identity verification can only 
realistically be achieved through use of more personal user authentication data. The 
discipline of biometrics naturally lends itself to this task, providing various proven 
techniques (Section 4,3) designed and refmed to distil unique personal physiological 
and/or behavioural characteristics from a human subject. Biometrics also offers the 
added benefit of a selection of current techniques capable of passive implementation, 
not requiring the conscious interaction of the subject, conveniently providing a path to 
the second research requirement of a non-intrusive authentication system. Non-intrusive 
authentication is itself a pre-requisite of a iisable continuous authentication system, thus 
mutually addressing the third research requirement. The fourth requirement for a 
solution suitable for application specifically within a mobile device, preferably utilizing 
the established tools of that context, was fundamental in defining the scope of the 
research, and although tempering many otherwise promising authentication solutions, 
did ultimately realise the original and novel approach of HAT. 
114 
Chapter 5 : Conception of the Head Authentication Technique 
Once it was established that biometrics theoretically offered the best research area fi-om 
which to draw a solution, as an intellectual exercise preceding any development work on a 
novel biometric approach, all known biometric techniques' were reviewed in depth 
(Section 4.4), with a view to potentially leveraging attractive and/or relevant features into 
a mobile context. During a number of brain-storming sessions many new and original 
ideas were considered outside of their original design context, such as keystroke dynamics 
on a mobile handset keypad using only ones thumbs (acknowledging the phenomenal 
growth in SMS), or the more controversial (though not entirely novel) idea of human 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) 'SliVI' chip implants (BBC News 2004); similar 
in principle to the established procedure of electronic animal tagging (Link: Biomark). By 
taking the idea of applying established biometric approaches out of context to the 
extreme, selected biometric techniques were considered completely outside of their 
traditional operational envelopes. If applied in unconventional ways, certain biometrics 
theoretically offered a novel lease of life, such as voice-recognition where biometric 
samples are captured at a user's ear, rather than traditionally at the mouth. It was fi^om 
these sessions that a set of head authentication approaches based on sound (covered in 
Section 5.3.2.2), was conceived and submitted for patent approval (see Appendix I): one 
of these approaches was developed through proof-of-concept into HAT. 
5.2 The Human Ear and Auditory Analysis Techniques 
The Head Authentication Technique utilises the ear as part of a multi-modal biometric 
approach. Although the HAT process itself is original, identifying a person by some 
unique characteristic of their ears alone is not, and an example of this is discussed after 
a description of the human ear and its natural acoustic partner, the voicebox. 
' Including: established commercial (eg. Fingerprint, Hand geometry), developmental (eg. 3 D facial 
recognition. Gait recognition), and experimental (eg. Ear geometry) techniques. 
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5.2.1 Hearing and Anatomy of the Human E a r 
The human ear is a bi-functional organ, containing structure for both the primary sense 
o f hearing, and the bodies balance organs. The structure o f the human ear extends up to 
60mm into the average adult head and is connected to the brain by the eighth cranial 
nerve (the vestibulocochlear nerve), carrying nerve impulses for both o f the 
aforementioned functions. A young and healthy ear has an operational frequency range 
o f approximately 20Hz to 20,000Hz' and a dynamic range o f about 100 decibels (see 
Figure 5-7). With reference to Figure 5-1, the human vocal range is restricted to the 
frequencies 80Hz to 7000Hz, wi th the natural spoken voice covering the narrower band, 
80Hz to 300Hz (Baken & O r l i k o f f 1999): trained operatic (singing) voices cover the 
extended frequency range 80Hz to 1400Hz (Link: Vocalist). 
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Figure 5-1 : Frequency ranges of the human vocal and auditory systems 
Physiologically, the ear can be divided into three basic parts, defined by their function: 
• Outer-ear: Collection and channelling o f sounds into protected middle-ear. 
• Middle-ear: Translation and amplification o f sound waves into vibrations. 
• Inner-Ear: Filtering and transmission o f individual frequency data to the brain. 
Over time the ear's upper frequency limit naturally degrades, reaching around 1 SKHz by age 60 years. 
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Figure 5-2 : The anatomy of the Human Ear 
The actual function o f hearing is caused by sound pressure waves s tr iking the pinna, 
or external structure o f the outer-ear (see also Section 5.2.2), where they are 
channelled into the auditory canal and down to the tympanic membrane, commonly 
referred to as the ear-drum. The ear-drum forms an air interface between the outer-ear 
and the semi-sealed ai r - f i l led cavity o f the middle-ear . The middle-ear contains a 
triplet o f small bones (unique to mammals) called the ossicles, referred to in Latin as 
the Malleus, the Incus, and the Stapes; sometimes called the hammer, the A n v i l and 
the Stirrup, owing to their shapes. The Malleus is attached directly to the ear-drum, 
and the triplet forms a mechanical linkage evolved to ampl i fy the pressure wave at the 
ear-drum by a factor o f around 22 times ( in a healthy ear), converting it f r om a 
mechanical wave into vibrations for transmission into the cochlea. The cochlea is part 
o f the inner-ear and comprises a f lu id filled spiral canal separated b y a membrane 
called the basilar membrane which contains tens o f thousands o f small hairs divided 
' Adapted from an original image located on the *New York State Disabilities Awareness' website. 
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into four rows o f inner and outer hairs. The outer hair cells (OHC) receive input from 
the brain influencing their moti l i ty and the sensitivity o f the cochlea to d i f fe r ing 
amplitudes o f sound. The OHCs are also the source o f the auditory response 
anomalies known as otoacoustic emissions (see Section 5.2.3.1). The inner hair cells 
( IHC) provide the primary neural output o f the cochlea. The hairs are a l l o f sl ightly 
different lengths and individually have natural sensitivity to specific frequencies. 
When the frequency o f the compression wave in the cochleal f l u id matches that o f an 
IHC, the cell induces a unique electrical impulse in the auditory nerve; collectively, 
these impulses are interpreted by the brain as sound. 
5.2.1.1 The Eustachian tube 
The Eustachian tube performs the vital role o f maintaining the compliance o f the ear-
drum, by balancing the pressure in the air-cavity o f the middle-ear with the outside air 
pressure: it also forms the most direct l ink between basic HATs two sample capture 
points.: the mouth and the ear. The tube directly connects the middle-ear to the upper 
nasal cavity, and contains a selective valve which opens and closes to balance the 
intemal and external air-pressure; this can sometimes be felt as the famil iar 'popping' 
sensation when large changes in air-pressure are experienced in a short period o f time. 
Leading up to the effect, the subject w i l l also usually notice a reduction in hearing 
efficiency caused by the pressure imbalance reducing the compliance o f the ear-drum 
and the efficiency o f the middle-ear apparatus. A similar effect can be experienced 
when the Eustachian tube becomes blocked due to infection, such as a cold, and is 
unable to equalise the pressure: the unnatural (unbalanced) middle-ear pressure at these 
times can also, in extreme cases, lead to dizziness and headaches. 
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5.2.2 Ear-prints and 'earology' 
Almost a century before fingerprints were first used as a mode o f identification, Johami 
Caspar Lavater ( l 7 4 1 - l 8 0 l ) ( L i n k : Lavater), Theologian and physiognomist, had been 
working on the Mndividuahzation in the design o f the human ear', a practice which 
came to be known as 'earology'. In the 1960's Alfi-ed lannarelli, a deputy sher i f f in the 
United States, tried to turn the concept o f ear-identification into a recognised science, 
devising an ear-print classification system and wri t ing the first book dedicated solely to 
the subject, "Ear Identification" (lannarelli 1964). Although lannarellis's work and ear-
prints in general have never been widely accepted by the scientific community, recent 
cases within the criminal justice system have brought the subject o f ear-prints and ear-
print classification to the fore. 
In October 1991, in the first case o f its type in the United States, ear-print evidence was 
used to convict David Kunze o f aggravated murder, burglary and robbery (Morgan 
1999). At the Court o f Appeals, the conviction was later overturned after essential ear-
print evidence, previously deemed admissible by the judge, was subsequently ruled 
"unsafe". The change was primarily due to forensics expert witness testimony 
describing the ear-print technique as "not generally accepted" as a form o f forensics due 
to the discipline being in its infancy (CoA 1999). The case did however highlight the 
first appearance o f ear-print evidence in a court o f law. 
In a similar burglary and murder case in the U K in 1998, Mark Dallagher was convicted 
o f unlawft i l ly k i l l ing an elderiy lady after the prosecution showed that ear-prints on a 
newly washed window could only have been left by the accused as he listened for 
movement inside the house (BBC News 1998). The case set a precedent and fo l lowing 
the conviction, the British police force, through association with the National Training 
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Centre for Scientific Support to Crime Investigation (NTC-SSl)(Link: N T C ) , pioneered 
a national database o f ear-prints to provide evidential support l inking suspects to crime 
scenes, in a similar procedure to fingerprints (BBC News 1999). Since the database was 
started, police have invesfigated over 100 cases o f ear-prints at crime scenes. 
The importance o f these developments in relation to the research is the formal 
recognition o f the unique nature o f the outer-ear, or pinna (Figure 5-2), which forms 
part o f the physiological authentication chain effecting the biometric template produced 
by the Head Authentication Technique. 
5.2.3 Auditory Evoked Responses & Otoacoustic Emissions 
In the Introduction, H A T was presented as an authentication system borne out o f the 
novel application o f selected established biometric disciplines in unconventional ways. 
Possibly the closest recognised field to the proposed research approach, is the clinical 
auditory diagnosis technique o f Otoacoustic Emissions (OAE), part o f the broader 
discipline o f Auditory Evoked Responses (AER) . 
A n Auditory Evoked Response can be described as activity wi th in the auditory system, 
(consisting o f the ear, the auditory nerve and the brain), that is produced or excited by 
acoustic stimuli. Major AER techniques like Auditory Brainstem Response ( A B R ) and 
Electro-cochleography (ECochG) rely on a 'brain response' to a specific stimulafing 
sound to produce their output. Although they do not require explicit subject interaction, 
from an overall research perspective the dependence o f these techniques upon medical 
procedures unsuitable for translation into a distributed mobile environment, ruled out 
further research into the procedures: specifically their dependence on multiple skin-
contact electrodes strategically positioned on the subjects forehead. 
120 
Chapter 5 : Conception of the Head Authentication Technique 
OAEs depend upon similar non-interactive stimuli to generic the AERs but d i f fe r in one 
major area, their stimuli delivery and data collection procedure depends on a single 
transducer device positioned in the subject's outer-ear. As this is the natural position o f 
a mobile handset when being used for a traditional voice call, the procedure warranted 
further investigation within the context o f the research. 
The investigation into OAEs was conducted wi th the dual research objectives o f 
investigating the techniques potential for re-engineering and deployment wi th in a 
security orientated role or as a potential enabling technology for a novel biometric 
authentication approach. To achieve these objectives, the investigation was performed 
on three levels: 
• A familiarisation with OAEs operational medium, the human ear (Section 5.2.1). 
• A n investigation into OAEs in their various forms, and the enabling technology. 
• A practical evaluation o f OAEs, through tests at a suitably equipped local 
hospital in order to experience and assess OAEs real-world potential f rom a 
user's perspective. This was performed at the Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) 
department o f Derriford Hospital, Plymouth, U K . 
5.2.3.1 Introduction to OAEs 
Discovered in 1978, by Dr. David Kemp (Hall 2000, pp.9-14), Otoacoustic Emissions 
are a relatively new field o f audiology. The emissions are a spontaneous and naturally 
occurring bio-mechanical process caused by the compression and rarefactions o f air in 
the ear canal (o f a person wi th normal hearing ability), by inner-ear stimulation o f the 
ear-drum (Figure 5-2). The difference between OAEs and the normal reactions o f the 
ear-drum to the functions o f breathing, speaking and the beating o f a heart, are that 
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OAEs originate f rom the rows o f outer hair cells (OHC) in the cochlea o f the inner-ear 
(Section 5.2.1). Travell ing sound waves entering the cochlea which are not entirely 
absorbed by the inner and outer hair cells build up and eventually can no longer be 
completely contained wi th in the cochlea. This process causes the OHCs in the cochlea 
to scatter energy back to act upon the middle-ear apparatus, where it is relayed to the 
ear-drum producing the reactive sounds wi th in the ear canal known as OAEs . 
The medical discipline o f OAEs is the retrieval and analysis o f these natural responses 
to artificially shaped acoustic stimuli, and are used to compliment the traditional and 
well-established audiogram in the diagnosis o f auditory problems. Although OAEs are 
produced solely by the outer hair cells o f the cochlea, the technique can also reveal the 
condition o f the ear-drum and middle-ear apparatus, by producing recognisable 
responses for specific auditory problems, including: 
• congenital hearing loss; 
• abnormal middle-ear ftinction; 
• dysfunction o f the nerve cells in the cochlea. 
In common with biometric techniques for authentication (Section 4.2.2), normal OAEs 
vary over time. The primary factors influencing O A E variance and performance are: 
• Age. 
• Gender. 
• Body temperature. 
• State o f arousal. 
• General condition o f the ear apparatus. 
• Additional medical conditions and/or medication. 
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5.2.3.2 Capturing OAEs 
In order to record the OAEs, a probe containing an earphone and microphone, is fitted 
into the ear canal o f the outer-ear. As the emissions would otherwise dissipate in the 
fi-eely moving air o f the ear-canal, the probe must make an air-tight seal w i t h the outer-
ear, isolating the small trapped volume o f the ear canal and producing internal pressures 
up to an audible 30dBs. The probe, which is connected to an O A E analyser (currently o f 
similar size to a laptop computer), delivers the auditory stimulus and the response to the 
stimulus is measured by a microphone in the probe tip. As the OAEs derive f rom the 
originating stimulus, they are synchronised and contain the same frequencies, only 
delayed by a few milliseconds, due to the slower travelling wave in the cochleal f lu id : in 
addition, subjects' left and right ears exhibit a high degree o f correlation. 
5.2.3.3 O A E Stimuli 
Although the inner-ear w i l l apply the same effective transfer function to all acoustic 
stimuli, otoacoustic emissions can be divided into two broad categories; spontaneous 
emissions and art if icial ly evoked emissions, where: 
• Spontaneous Otoacoustic Emissions ( S O A E ) are the naturally occurring 
emissions f rom the normal everyday uncontrolled stimulation of the acoustic 
worid. These emissions, caused perhaps by a car dr iving past, are rarely used for 
analysis purposes, and thus are not pursued further wi th in the research. 
• Evoked Otoacoustic Emissions ( E O A E ) are the emissions occurring as a direct 
result o f a tightly controlled artificial stimulus. Evoked emissions are grouped 
according to their type o f acoustic stimulus, which can be varied in frequency, 
intensity, spectral shape and duration according to the requirements o f the 
analysis and the condition (response) o f the subject's ear. 
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There are generally three accepted forms o f evoked OAEs, divided by st imuli : 
• Transient Evoked Otoacoustic Emissions ( T E O A E ) are generated by a series 
o f short duration tone-bursts, heard by the subject as clicks. Each click is a 
combination o f overlapping frequencies designed to stimulate those hair-cells in 
the cochlea sensifive to the respective frequency. Owing to the relatively poor 
signal-to-noise rafio o f TEOAEs, accuracy is highly dependent on the averaging 
o f a suitably large set o f test data, and the upper test frequency is l imited to 
4000Hz. The average time needed to perform the otoacoustic analysis using this 
technique is 1-2 minutes (Grason-Stadler ca.2000). 
• C h i r p Evoked Otoacoustic Emissions ( C U E O A E ) are an evolution o f 
TEOAEs protocols, where the stimulus is engineered to provide an improved 
system signal-to-noise ratio. The 'chi rp ' , which consists o f a short frequency 
sweep, produces similar emissions to the ' c l i ck ' ( o f TEOAEs), but contain a lot 
more energy for the same amplitude (Newmann 1997), reducing analysis times 
to less than 1 minute (Grason-Stadler 2000). 
• Distortion Product Otoacoustic Emissions ( D P O A E ) are emissions generated 
by a series o f close ratio primary tone pairs (where F R = F 2 / F I = 1 :1.2), presented in 
an ascending or descending frequency pattern. When the pure tone pairs arrive at 
the cochlea, they stimulate their respective groups o f hair cells, setting up 
vibrations in the hair cells located between the two groups. These additional 
vibrations generate a third tone, known as the distortion product or 
intermodulation product. DPOAEs exhibits a far better signal-to-noise ratio than 
TEOAEs, are therefore more efficient at producing reliable results and can test 
frequencies up to 8000Hz. The average time needed to perform an otoacoustic 
analysis using this technique is 30 seconds (Grason-Stadler 2000). 
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5.2.3.4 A Practical Evaluation of OAEs for an Authentication Role 
In March 2002 arrangements were made f o r the author to experience a series o f 
otoacoustic tests first hand; to be performed at the Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) 
department o f the local hospital: Derriford Hospital, Plymouth, U K . The aim o f the tests 
were to access OAEs practical potential for reassignment f rom an auditory diagnosfics 
role to a user authentication role, both f rom a technological viewpoint and from a public 
acceptance viewpoint. Wi th the authentication objective firmly in mind , the test 
environment was also conducive with conceiving alternate research ideas, ut i l is ing O A E 
techniques as donor technology. 
As stated in Section 5.2.3.1, otoacoustic emissions rely on a healthy auditory chain f rom 
the ear-drum to the hair cells in the cochlea o f the inner-ear. It is therefore standard 
procedure to first ascertain the nonnal working function o f both the middle-ear and 
inner-ear via altemate established test procedures, in this case the tympanogram and the 
audiogram respectively. A l l auditory tests took place in a closed sound proof room, wi th 
an ambient noise level less than lOdBs. Tests were conducted in the fo l lowing order: 
• Tympanogram for ear-drum and middle-ear function. 
• Audiogram for IHC (hearing) and inner-ear fi inction. 
• O A E tests for OHC and fijil auditory chain function. 
5.2.3.4a Tympanogram 
The Tympanogram is used to detect disorders o f the tympanic-membrane or ear-drum 
and the triplet o f small bones comprising the middle-ear (Figure 5-2). The test involves 
inserting a tight fitting probe into each ear, then pressurising and rarefying the air wi th in 
the ear-canal in order to test the mobil i ty o f the middle-ear apparatus, detecting 
disorders such as a perforated ear-drum, detached ear-drum or middle-ear fluid ingress. 
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Figure 5-3 : Clinical Tests - Tympanogram 
Figure 5-3 shows the tympanogram for the right-ear. The result shows a typical 
response for a normal ear, symmetrical around room pressure and indicating that the: 
• eustachian tube is clear and the middle-ear is correctly at outside air-pressure; 
• ear-drum is responding appropriately to pressure waves input in the ear-canal; 
• ear-drum is correctly seated at the juncture between the outer and middle-ear, 
forming a compliant pressure seal with the outside air-pressure; 
• small bones o f the middle-ear are mutually connected and moving normally. 
5.2.3.4b Audiogram 
The audiogram is the traditional hearing test and is used to reveal the condit ion o f the 
inner hair cells ( IHC) o f the cochlea (Section 5.2.1), after determining normal middle-
ear behaviour. The test can be performed via either bone-conduction or air-conduction, 
the latter being the more prevalent where the subject wears a set o f good quality ' f u l l 
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cup' headphones. The test consists o f a frequency sweep o f discrete pre-selected pure 
tones into each ear at random time intervals in the frequency range 250Hz to 8000Hz; 
the approximate frequency range o f the voice human box. The subject either 
acknowledges receipt o f each tone via pressing a button on a handheld unit, or not i f the 
tone went unheard. The random nature o f the inter-tone time interval excludes guesses. 
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Figure 5-4 : Clinical Tesls - Audiogram 
The audiogram result is shown in Figure 5-4, and indicates all frequencies between 
250Hz and 8000Hz were detected successftilly at less than a test amphtude o f lOdBs, 
with only a slight reduction in sensitivity in the right ear at around 500Hz. Results up to 
20dBs are considered normal, making this an excellent result, indicating healthy cochlea 
frinction: the IHCs are frmctioning across the frill test frequencies spectrum showing no 
signs o f auditory abuse or premature aging, transmitting the appropriate impulses into 
the auditory nerve which are being received and correctly interpreted by the brain. 
127 
Chapter 5 : Conception of the Head Authentication Technique 
5.2.3.4c Otoacoustic Emissions 
Having establishing normal function o f the middle-ear and IHCs o f the inner-ear via the 
tympanogram and audiogram respectively, the OAEs test can be performed on the outer 
hair cells (OHC) o f the cochlea. The testing required the insertion into the ear canal o f a 
suitably selected bung in order to form an air-tight seal with the outer-ear enabling 
pressurisation o f the ear canal. The test equipment available to the ENT department at 
the time was an 1L088 OAE analyser (one o f the first and most popular O A E analysers) 
utilising two simple air tubes passing through openings in the bung and into the O A E 
analyser, retaining the transmission and reception circuits within the analyser. Being an 
early device, the analyser utilised the original technique o f TEOAEs detailed 
previously, averaging over time a discrete frequency sweep f rom 500Hz to just over 
4000Hz, with transient click stimuU o f 1ms duration at a pressure o f 3 Pascals. 
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Figure 5-5 : Clinical Tests - Otoacoustic Emissions 
Figure 5-5 shows the result o f the O A E test. By inspection, the 'Response Waveform' 
indicates the clear presence o f OAEs in response to the click 'Stimulus' , indicating 
healthy cochlea OHCs and middle-ear function. Test duration was 1 minute 14 seconds. 
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5.2.3.4d Clinical Tests Conclusion 
In association wi th the resident audiologist, the clinical tests proved a h ighly valuable 
exercise wi th regard to the research. The OAEs tests highlighted a number o f 
important points which, in their current fo rm, precluded TEOAEs from meeting the 
research requirements outlined in Section 5.1. In order o f severity the precluding 
points were: 
• A l l OAE techniques rely upon the insertion o f a hermetically sealed probe into 
the subject's ear canal. 
• The resultant unnatural and uncomfortable pressurisation o f the subject's ear 
• A normal test duration cycle in excess o f one minute. 
• The need for a quiet environment for the collection o f usable O A E data in an 
acceptable time; around 1 minute for a normal clinical diagnosis. 
The outcome did however jus t i fy the exercise, as the tests spawned the concepts which 
shaped the future direction o f the research. The Head Authentication Technique was 
developed from the fo l lowing ideas borne out o f the O A E clinical tests: 
• Biometric templates derived from acoustic stimulation o f bio-matter. 
• The use o f the voicebox as an internal stimulus; in the range 50Hz to 8000Hz. 
• The capture o f biometric sample data at a subject ear. 
• The bio-matter between a subject's voicebox, their mouth and their ear(s) 
providing the source o f variance in the stimulus. 
The next section o f the thesis explores these concepts in more detail, and introduces the 
ftjndamental principles for the head authentication technique, including the intellectual 
property which came to be included in the patent protecting the research. 
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5.3 The Human Head and Acoustic Head-Recognition 
The head is the most visually individual and distinctive aspect o f the human body, 
providing the primary form o f post-natal' person-to-person identification. Collectively, 
it contains many unique biometric markers, which humans are capable o f assimilating 
instantly and continuously, comparing the visual data ( f rom persons in *line o f sight') 
wi th a memory o f templates stored in the brain. Many o f the current biometric 
approaches also harness the authentication potential o f the human head: 
• Behavioural techniques, by definit ion, are dependant on the brain, wi th any 
respective physiological traits having only a minor influence^. 
• Physiological techniques based on some property o f the head include: face 
recognition, face-thermography, iris-scan, retina-scan, ear-print (Section 4.3,1). 
The Head Authentication Technique takes a completely original and novel approach to 
the subject o f authentication. With the exception o f face-thermography, current head 
sourced biometric approaches are based on individual visual aspects o f the head, a 
natural progression o f the primary form o f human identification. H A T however, uses 
sound rather than light to authenticate a user; producing a biometric template based on 
the spectral variance introduced by the human head on an acoustic stimulus, not an 
artif icially generated stimulus such as OAEs use, but the richly complex stimulus o f the 
human voice. H A T simultaneously captures and compares two separate samples o f the 
sounds produced by the larynx (henceforth referred to by its common name, the 
'voicebox') situated in the throat, recorded at two separate locations on the subjects 
head: the mouth (when talking) and the outer ear. i t then compares the average 
amplitudes at multiple frequency points to produce a biometric 'absorption' template. 
The principles supporting this approach are detailed in the fo l lowing subsections. 
' Up to the age of 2 months, infants identify their parents primarily using the senses of smell and sound. 
' The physiological effects on a behavioural biometric will be increased if physiological defects exist. 
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5.3.1 Anatomy of the human head 
The biometric authentication principle utilised by H A T are dependent upon the way 
sound propagates through the human head. H A T ' s biometric template is essentially a 
record o f spectral variance on a band-limited acoustic stimulus introduced at the base o f 
the head, and measured at the head's two natural sound interfaces w i t h the outside 
world: the mouth and the (outer) ear. To understand what is happening to the sound 
waves as they propagate through the head, it is necessary to understand the biological 
composition o f the head. 
Eustachian Tubo 
Nasal CAvlty 
Tongue 
Voice-box 
Figure 5-6 : MRI vertical bisection of a human head 
One o f the best ways to dynamically look inside a healthy l iv ing head for research 
purposes is using Magnetic Resonance Imaging ( M R I ) ' . M R I is a technique for creating 
cross-sectional images, or slices, o f opaque organs inside o f l iv ing organisms (Homak 
2006). Figure 5-6, shows an M R I vertical bisection o f a human head. 
' MRls correct title is, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging (NMRJ). It was found however that, within 
medical practice, the tenn 'nuclear' encouraged a negative client image and is therefore usually dropped. 
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The head forms the upper part of the human body. The front (ventrum) contains the 
face, with organs enabling four of the five senses and associated physiological 
biometrics (Section 4.3.1): the head is also the repository of the brain enabling all 
behavioural biometrics (Section 4.3.3). The bones which encase the majority of the 
human head, of which there are in excess of 20 plates, are collectively called the skull, 
and separately the mandible or jawbone; in addition to enabling eating and chewing, the 
jawbone is fiindamental to the formation of speech. The majority o f the skull is filled 
with the brain, one of the largest and the most important organs in the human body. The 
brain is important to HAT, not directly for its mental capacity but, as with the other 
elements of the head, for its physical characteristics and the resultant effect on the 
propagation of the sound waves which describe the HAT template. 
5.3.1.1 Propagation of sound waves in the head 
Sound is the propagation of pressure waves through any compressible medium. Within 
the complex heterogeneous structures of the head, sound waves are accelerated, 
decelerated, reflected, refracted and attenuated; dependent upon the physical 
characteristics of the individual elements of transition. The principal properties affecting 
the behaviour of the waves in the head elements are: 
• Volume. 
• Mass. 
• Density. 
• Temperature. 
• StiffhessA^iscosity. 
• Humidity (in air). 
• Frequency of the wave. 
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The first three of these elements, volume, mass and density, are closely related and are 
described by the following equation: 
m 
Where: 
p is the density of the medium (in Kg/m^) 
m is the total mass of the object (in Kg) 
V is the total volume of the object (in m^) 
The speed of sound propagation through media is dependent on the physical state of the 
matter (solid, liquid, gas), but is fundamentally a property of density: plus stiffness in a 
solid, viscosity in a fluid and temperature and humidity in air. For a dispersive 
medium like the head, the speed of sound is generally described by the equation: 
C = 
Where: 
C is the speed of sound (in m/s) 
C is a coefficient of: stiffness in a solid; viscosity in a fluid 
p is the density of the medium (in Kg/m^) 
By inspection, the speed of sound increases with the stiffness or viscosity of the 
material, and decreases with the density. Although an in depth discussion on the speed 
of sound in media is beyond this text, and comprehensibly covered elsewhere', an 
awareness of the principles governing the speed and propagation of sound in various 
states of matter helps the reader appreciate the underiying principles of HAT. 
' E.g. Speed of sound: Wikipedia online encyclopaedia @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed of sound 
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Following on from the previous discussion. Table 5-1 (Cala et al. 198!) shows the 
relative densities and associated effect on the speed o f sound for a selection o f the 
biological media which compose the human head. 
Component ' Density ; (Hounsfield units') 
Speed of sound 
(m/s@ 15°C) 
Air -1000 340 
Fat -50 1450 
Water 0 1480 (fresh) 
Brain +34 1541 
Soft tissue (muscle) +40 1540 
Blood +25 1570 
Bone (skull) +1000 4080 
Table 5-1: Relative densities of the biological components of the human head 
The research work that culminated in HAT also realised a number of notional 
derivatives which, although not pursued as part of HAT, are part of the intellectual 
property associated with the work, and as such are covered in the research patents (see 
Appendix I). The alternative techniques are based upon essentially the same principles 
of induced variances in acoustic stimuli, but using artificially created stimuli. 
5.3.2 Acoustic biometrics of the human head for user authentication 
Early investigations into acoustic head authentication realised a number of different 
conceptual approaches. The adopted technique, which came to be known as the Head 
Authentication Technique^ was the result of preliminary evaluations o f the various 
techniques, and represents a distillation of the best ideas into a single approach. 
' The Hounsfield unit, named after Sir Godfrey Hounsfietd, is a measure of density relative to water, and 
more commonly used in medical circles than Kg/m^ The human body is between 55% and 60% water. 
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5.3.2.1 Acoustic Stimuli 
It was realised early on that for any acoustic technique to be truly transparent to an end 
user, any sounds introduced into the head had to be, at best, completely undetectable 
and at worst, effectively non-intrusive in order to maintain an acceptable Quality of 
Service (QoS). This premise resulted in three possible approaches. 
5.3.2.1a Out-of-band stimuli 
Out-of-band stimuli are sounds that exist outside of the natural audible frequency and/or 
dynamic range of the human ear. A healthy ear has a broad, essentially linear', dynamic 
range extending from below 20dbs (a whisper) up to 140dBs (a gunshot); illustrated in 
Figure 5-7. It is impractical to attempt to cite an acoustic stimulus outside of this range. 
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Figure 5-7 : Intensity of common sounds encountered by the human ear 
In frequency tenns, although it is possible to produce suitable infrasonic or ultrasonic 
frequencies; the question once again is whether it would be practical. There are a 
number of potentially contentious issues surrounding this approach for the hardware 
supplier, the network operator and the user. Respectively, these issues are: 
• Hardware Cost: What would be the additional hardware cost ( i f any), for 
transducers and microphones capable of working at the extended frequencies at 
either end of the audible spectrum? 
' The dynamic range of the human ear is non-linear outside ot the range 40dbs to 1 IQdbs. 
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• User Acceptance: What would be the commercial impact of an operator 
introducing a technique that could be perceived by the general public as a 
possible health risk? Even i f it were scientifically proven, through trials, that 
introducing ultrasonic pulses into the head was safe, one only has to cite the on-
going 'Can mobile phone radiation cause cancer?' debate (BBC News 2005) to 
realise that it is just as important for users' to perceive a technology as being 
safe as it is for the designers and operators to prove it is such. 
• Health Risks: What would be the actual impact upon user's health ( i f any), of 
exposing them to extended periods of infi-asonic or ultrasonic energy? How long 
would the clinical safety trials take before the approach could be certified as safe? 
5.3.2,1b In-band Stimuli 
In-band stimuli are sounds that can exist within the operational fi-equency and/or 
dynamic range of the human ear (Figure 5-1) yet remain effectively non-intrusive. This 
can be achieved in wither of two ways: 
• Low Intensity: Although it is possible to produce conceivable non-intrusive low 
intensity stimuli (<20dBs), the practical use of these sounds is minimal. Low 
intensity sound carries minimal energy and would need to be administered over 
long periods of time in relative silence to have a chance of propagating effectively 
through the head. This approach was therefore ruled out on a practical level. 
• Short duration: In considering short duration high energy pulses, it is important 
to recall that amplitude and time are inversely proportional to energy: as pulse 
duration is reduced, in order to maintain the same energy level, the intensity of 
the pulse must increase proportionally or, once again, the pulse would not have 
sufficient energy to propagate effectively through the head. These pulses would 
sound similar to OAE style clicks and would be highly detectable by the user 
and therefore negatively impact on the systems QoS over a period o f time. 
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5.3.2.1c Naturally Occurring Stimuli 
Natural stimuli are those sounds produced naturally by the body itself, and in terms of 
the research refer to the sounds made by the voicebox. I f the voicebox is used as the 
stimulus, it positively addresses many of the concerns cited for the other approaches: 
• Talking is a natural process and cannot be considered intrusive to a user (of a 
voice-activated mobile service) when harnessed as an acoustic stimulus. 
• Being non-intrusive (when used in normal conversation or for voice-activated 
mobile services) the voice carries a large amount of energy, in the order of 
10,000 times more than low intensity sounds of less than 20dBs, containing 
sufficient energy to propagate throughout the head. 
• Sounds from the voicebox are naturally harmless and are perceived as such. 
• Current mobile acoustic hardware (microphones, transducers) are designed to 
efficiently handle the human voice, and as such can potentially be levered as part 
of the authentication process. 
5.3.2.2 Authentication Approaches 
Once the decision was made to use the body's two natural acoustic interfaces of the 
mouth and (outer) ear as the capture and/or stimulus input locations, it was necessary to 
ftirther select one of four possible input/output permutations of the technique for the 
proposed research solution. Al l four approaches effectively harness the same acoustic 
variations of a stimulus, as a result of the composition of the human head. The final 
decision was therefore also subject to the suitability of each solution to the proposed 
application of mobile communications. Each of the different approaches is included 
within the intellectual property of the patents (see Appendix I), and ftirther described in 
the subsections that follow. 
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5.3.2,2a Artificial stimulus: Ear-in, Ear-out 
Not dissimilar in outward appearance to OAEs (Section 5.2.3.1), where a stimulus is 
introduced into the outer ear and then dynamically monitored at either ear, and compared 
to the original reference waveform to determine a consistent quantifiable variance. The 
concept is illustrated in Figure 5-8. Artificial stimuli have the advantage of proactive 
triggering, in contrast to reactive triggering of naturally occurring stimuli. 
Figure 5-8 : Acoustic authentication using artificial stimulus: Ear-in, Ear-out 
5.3.2.2b Artificial stimulus: Ear-in, Mouth-out 
Although it may be possible to non-intrusively introduce stimuli into the outer-ear, this 
approach relies on the user opening their mouth in order to capture the propagating 
waves at a mouth-microphone. Figure 5-9 illustrates the principal. By definition, a non-
intrusive technique cannot prompt a user to perform an action like opening their mouth, 
therefore this approach removes artificial stimuli's main advantage over natural stimuli, 
proactive triggering of the authentication process. This makes the approach inefficient 
and impracfical for continuous monitoring: the alternative of the user opening their 
mouth on a signal fi-om the authenticating system would make the system intrusive and 
inappropriate for the research. 
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Figure 5-9 : Acoustic authentication using artificial stimulus: Eor-in, Mouth-out 
5.3.2.2c Artificial stimulus: Mouth-in, Ear-out 
This approach, illustrated in Figure 5-10, has the advantage o f being more robust than 
the previous approach as the mouth (in isolation) has no means of detecting sound, the 
stimulus can therefore contain more energy without being intrusive. However, the 
approach still suffers the same arguments as the previous approach, where the user must 
consciously open their mouth in order for authentication to be performed. This approach 
therefore has to be considered intrusive and inappropriate for the research. 
Figure 5-10 : Acoustic authentication using artificial stimulus: Mouth-in, Ear-out 
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5.3.2.2d Natural stimulus (Voicebox): Ear-out, Mouth-out (HAT) 
Early experiments to prove the concept of acoustic head authentication used artificially 
created pure tones (sine waves). These were introduced at the mouth and collected at the 
(outer) ear, in order to verify the existence of any acoustic variance due to the head 
against a clean reference. It was with the knowledge of the various arguments discussed in 
Section 5.3.2.1 however, that the best long-term solution for the research was to pursue 
the approach of natural stimuli utilising the complex sounds produced by the human 
voicebox. The decision eliminated any choice of application permutations as the approach 
naturally defined its own operational parameters; the stimulus propagating up from the 
voicebox, with monitoring at the subjects mouth and ear, as shown in Figure 5-11. 
Voicebox 
Figure 5-11 : Natural voicebox stimulus approach to acoustic head authentication 
The human voicebox (larynx) is located in the front of the neck and contains the vocal 
cords, a pair of membranes stretched across the wind-pipe (trachea), which vibrate when 
air from the lungs is expelled over them modulating the air-flow and producing 
distinctive sounds (phonation) at the mouth. The vocal cords have a frequency range of 
80Hz to 7000Hz, with the natural spoken male voice covering the range 80Hz to 200Hz, 
the female voice I60Hz to 300Hz (Baken & Orlikoff 1999); trained 'operatic' voices 
cover the range 80Hz to 1400Hz, illustrated in Figure 5-12. 
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Figure 5-12 : The frequency ranges of the human voice (voicebox) 
Utilising the voicebox as a natural stimulus for acoustic head authentication offers a 
number of significant advantages over deliberate and artificial stimulation; these are: 
• The voicebox presents naturally occurring and harmless acoustic stimulation to 
the head. HAT is essentially utilising an untapped resource. 
• Voicebox stimulation is not only safe, but cannot be perceived as anything other 
than safe by users; the propagating wave energy being present in the head every 
time we speak, whether harnessed or not. 
• The acoustic spectrum of an individual's voicebox is ditTerent for every user, 
increasing system security. As the HAT process is a function of the head and 
NOT of the stimulus, this variable stimulus is an asset and not a complication. 
• The voice easily contains sufficient energy to propagate throughout the head, 
without the need to mask the stimulus in any way. 
• Mobile hardware is naturally configured for operation at vocal frequencies. 
In balance, voicebox stimulation does however suffer one obvious limitation: 
• The user must be vocalising for authentication to be f>erformed. HAT does not 
therefore naturally lend itself to authentication during use of purely data services. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter defined the research requirements for a novel authentication technique 
designed to redress the imbalance of mobile security commensurate with the data and 
services the security is designed to protect. 
This chapter summarised the investigative and decision process that led to the 
identification of a novel biometric option based on a natural multi-modal approach, 
where selected physiological and behavioural characteristics work in symbiosis. Having 
considered all the arguments for and against the various permutations of acoustic head-
authentication, the final option chosen for development utilises naturally occurring 
vocal stimuli in a unique ear-out, mouth-out monitoring arrangement. The technique 
came to be known as the Head Authentication Technique (HAT). 
In conceptual terms, HAT addresses all of the researches requirements, offering the 
following key security advancements: 
• Improved user-identity verification. 
• Non-intrusive authentication, transparent in use to the network user. 
• Continuous authentication, not just PoE. 
• Capable of leveraging existing mobile hardware into additional security roles. 
The HAT technique was proven in preliminary tests to realise unique quantifiable 
authentication data. In the next Chapter, the HAT process is broken down into discrete 
stages, which are described in detail, along with some rationalisation of the key 
developmental decisions which led to the final HAT architecture. 
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6 Realisation of the Head Authentication 
Technique 
The Head Authentication Technique is a novel biometric technique developed 
specifically for application in mobile devices and conceived out of an investigation into 
numerous original advanced authentication ideas discussed in Chapter 5. 
This chapter discusses the Head Authentication Technique in depth; introducing and 
explaining each discrete stage of the HAT authentication process. The chapter also 
discusses the developmental process which led to the final HAT architecture, along with 
an alternative architecture, and explains the reasoning behind some of the key research 
direction decisions. 
6.1 Introduction 
HAT is a multi-modal biometric technique capable of continuously and transparently 
verifying the claimed identity of a user accessing the advanced' data services of a 
wideband mobile network. This novel technique harnesses the natural symbiotic 
relationship of the 'behavioural characteristics' of the human voice stimulating the 
'physiological anatomy' of the head. The resultant activity is monitored at separate 
locations on the head and a hybrid biometric template extrapolated fi-om multiple spot-
fi-equency spectra analyses beKveen the data streams. 
The key to the HAT authentication process is the unique way in which the human head 
is classified through natural audio stimulation. The research realised two distinct 
methods of processing the separate audio data streams: 
When compared to the data services of a traditional 2 generation mobile network. 
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• The Absorption method utilises variations in spectral amplitude between 
discrete spectra of the audio data stream introduced by the propagation path. 
• The Correlation method utilises temporal delays between discrete spectra of the 
audio data stream introduced by the propagation path. 
Although each of these two methods is discussed in the following sections, it was the 
absorption method that ultimately proved to offer the better solution, and it was this 
method which was developed into H A T and refined within the H A T demonstration tool. 
A discussion of the correlation method nonetheless is justified, as it defends the decision 
to develop the absorption method, offers supporting evidence for some of the findings in 
the absorption discussion, and suggests a possible area for future work. 
6.2 The Head Authentication Absorption Method 
The absorption method of head authentication employed by H A T is a novel way of 
extracting a unique biometric template from a user's head, through use of a single 
source stimulus, and multiple audio data streams captured fi-om discrete locations on a 
user's head. The process is broken down into five distinct stages of operation: 
1. Capture multiple voice stimulated PCM audio data streams. Basic H A T ' utilises 
two extemal capture points: the Mouth and the Ear, 
2. Filter each data stream discretely at multiple pre-selected frequencies using a high 
roll-off, narrowband FIR filter. Basic H A T adopts twenty-five spot-frequencies. 
3. Absorption calculation; the difference in RMS (Root-Mean-Square) energy 
between captured waveforms at each spot-frequency. Basic H A T compares 
discrete mouth and ear frequency pairs. 
' 'Basic HAT' in this context defines the minimum operational requirements of the HAT tool. HAT does 
however have the potential of increasing both the number of sample capture points and the effective 
system resolution (number of spot frequencies); see future work in Section 8.3. 
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4. Analysis of the RMS absorption difference output, by feeding the resultant data 
array into a pre-trained (for authentication) neural-network. The training data for 
the HAT neural-network consisted of one of the data sets collected during the 
HAT field trials in Chapter 7. 
5. Classification of the neural-network result by comparison with a preset 
authentication threshold. The HAT authentication threshold was determined using 
a second data set collected during the HAT field trials in Chapter 7. 
These five stages of the absorption method are also shown schematically in Figure 6-1. 
Stage 1 
Mouth 
Ear 
Capture 
Stage 2 
Mouth 
Ear 
Filter 
Stage 3 
tttt t 
stage 4 
•3 -
Neural-Net 
Absorption | Analysis Classification 
Stage 5 
Threshold 
Figure 6-1 ; The five discrete stages of the HAT (absorption) auihenlication process 
The HAT software tool (see Section 7.2.2.2) additionally safeguards users against false 
rejections (Section 4.2.3) by applying a soft lock-out, where the user has to fail a pre-
defined number of authentication cycles before being rejected by the system. This is 
only made possible by the continuous and non-intrusive nature o f the head 
authentication process employed by HAT. 
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6.2.1 Stage-1 Capture H A T Sample Data 
As introduced in Chapter 5, HAT takes advantage of different acoustic responses to 
natural vocal stimuli, produced by the voicebox, at different locations on the human head, 
due to the propagation effects of longitudinal waves in bio-matter (Section 5,3.1). The 
two most easily accessible acoustic locations to monitor the propagation effects inside the 
head, due to the voicebox stimulus located in the neck, are at the mouth and the outer-ear; 
HAT captures its samples from these two locations as illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
Isolation 
Cup 
Ear 
Microphone 
Mouth 
( M i c f o p h o n e 
voicebox 
Figure 6-2 : The HAT Headset microphones configuration 
Development of the first HAT headset placed the ear microphone inside o f an isolation 
cup (Figure 6-2), minimising: 
• side-tone' cross-contamination; 
• microphone misalignment with the ear canal; 
• extraneous noise; 
• headset discomfort for the trial users. 
' Side-tone is the sound heard at the ear due to sound uttered at the mouth. Although usually active in 
nature, in this case, side-tone refers to unwanted propagation between mouth and ear via the air-path. 
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Capture Ear 
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Figure 6-3 : HAT Stages flowchart - Stage-1 (Capture waveforms) 
The flowchart in Figure 6-3 summaries the HAT Stage-1 capture process schematically. 
This flowchart is referred to as the HAT Stages Flowchart and will be expanded upon 
in subsequent HAT stage descriptions until it shows the complete HAT absorption 
methodology in Stage-5. 
6.2.1.1 H A T Microphones 
To maximise the chance of capturing quantifiable differences in the audio sample pairs, 
HAT utilises two identical high-quality voice microphones. It is fundamental to the 
HAT process to capture predominantly the head-based propagation waves, and as the 
microphones are positioned relatively close to each other, they are configured in such a 
way as to minimise cross contamination effects: 
• Ear Microphone Configuration 
The ear microphone is identical to the mouth microphone. It is placed inside an 
isolation ear-cup in order to minimise air-path (mouth-to-ear) acoustic cross 
contamination and positioned on the pinna (Section 5.2.1) of the outer ear using 
a headset similar in design to a normal computer-based headset (see Section 
7.2.1). The isolation cup has the added benefit of minimising extraneous sound 
contaminating the low-amplitude ear sample. 
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• Mouth Microphone Configuration 
The mouth microphone is positioned in front of the mouth in a similar 
configuration to a normal computer-based voice microphone (see the HAT 
headset in Section 7.2.1). The microphone captures a reference sample, being 
located nearest to the acoustic stimulus, which is later used to compare with the 
altered ear captured sample to determine the propagation variance. 
6.2.1.2 Captured Soundfile Format 
HAT captured soundfiles conform to a standard digital P C M ' format, and are stored as 
uncompressed Microsoft Windows wave files^, a subset of the broader independent 
Resource Interchange File Format (RTFF) (see Appendix D). This makes the files easy 
to manipulate on a PC within the following standard commercial development software: 
• Mathworks Matlab v6.1 
Used for all HAT development work, before coding HAT stages into Visual 
Basic to form the HAT demonstration tool. Due to Matlabs excellent built-in 
neural-network toolbox, for convenience stage-4 analysis remained in Matlab. 
• Microsoft Visual Basic v6.0 
Used for development of the HAT demonstration tool, including generic 
Microsoft Windows Graphical User Interface (GUI). After the HAT process was 
finalised, all stages except Stage-4 were ported across to Visual Basic®. 
The size and quality of HAT captured waveforms are governed by the standard PCM 
specifications: Number of channels, Sample size (2^ where X > l ) and Sampling rate (in 
Hertz). The values of these parameters were individually determined during the 
development stages of the research and are described here: 
Pulse Code Modulation is a sampling technique for digitising analogue signals, especially audio signals. 
^ Microsoft® Windows® wave files are identified by the extension '.wav'. 
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o HAT Channels 
Function: Number of capture channels. 
HAT Value: 2 
Development: 2 channels are the minimum requirement the HAT comparison 
process to be performed. Basic HAT utilises the two channels: 
Mouth and Ear. 
o HAT Sample size 
Function: Number of bits-per-sample. 
HAT Value: 16-bit 
Development: bits-per-sample determines the number of quantisation levels-per-
sample (sometimes called the resolution), and the dynamic range 
of the captured sound (Table 6-1). 
Blts-per:sanrip|e : 
(bps) 
Quantisation L e v e l s D y n a m i c Range ' 
4^  16 24dBs 
8 256 48dBs 
16^  65.536 96dBs 
24^ 1.677.216 124dBs 
32^ 4,294,967,296 193dBs 
Bold = HAT Selection 
Table 6-1: Quantisation levels and dynamic-range based on biis-per-sample 
It can be seen from the typical capture shown in Section 6.2.1.3, 
that the low-amplitude ear waveform is particularly sensitive to 
signal resolution; therefore HAT maintains a sample size of 16-bit. 
' Not in general use, included for comparison purposes only. 
^ Domestic CD audio standard. 
Domestic CD audio mastering and DVD-Audio Standard. 
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• HAT Sampling rate 
Function: Number of samples-per-second. 
HAT Value: 11025Hz (11025 stereo sample pairs-per-second) 
Development: Initial tests of the HAT process adopted a frequency bandwidth of 
50Hz to 16000Hz, approximately the bandwidth o f a healthy 
human ear (Section 5.2.1). During subsequent development, this 
was refined to lOOHz to 8000Hz; and finally lOOHz to 4000Hz, 
when it was found that frequencies above 4000Hz contained 
minimal absorption information. This is illustrated in the example 
plot shown in Figure 6-4 (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz), where useful 
absorption information has tailed o f f above 4000Hz. The effect on 
sampling rate was a reduction from an initial 44100Hz to 
11025Hz. This topic is covered in greater depth in Section 6.2.6. 
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Figure 6-4 : Compound frequency absorption curves of the numbers'0'to'9' 
HAT trial participant *u03_viv' (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz) 
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6.2.1.3 The Captured Soundfile Waveform 
An example of a typical HAT captured wavefilc pair is shown in Figure 6-5: the upper 
trace represents the prominant reference Mouth waveform; the lower trace the 
difference Ear waveform. Notice particularly, HATs effect on Ear ampltiude. 
Noise Floor 
Mouth W a v e f o r m 
1 
E a r W a v e f o r m 
Figure 6-5 : A Typical HAT wavetlle pair 
In Figure 6-6, the noise floor in Figure 6-5 has been vertically zoomed to illustrate 
typical ambient noise levels experienced in the HAT trials discussed in Section 7.3. The 
values are around -40db for the Mouth, and around -48db for the Ear; the additional 
damping effect due to the isolation cup covering the ear, illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
-40r ih 
r m Mouth W a v e f o 
- 4 H ( l h -
E a r W a v e f o r m 
Figure 6-6 : Typical noise floor(s) of a HAT wavefile pair. 
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6.2.2 Stage-2 Filter HAT Sample Data 
The basic authentication metric utilised by HAT is the mouth-to-ear pass-band RMS 
absorption figures of multiple narrowband frequency spectra, at pre-selected spot-
frequencies, within the vocal range of the human voice (Section 5.2.1). 
HAT Stage-2 filtering involves the cyclic application o f a narrowband high roll-off 
digital bandpass filter to mouth-ear pairs of captured waveforms. Starting at a lowest 
frequency of lOOHz, a lOOHz bandwidth filter (see Section 6.2.2.1) is discretely applied 
twenty-five times, at pre-selected spot-frequencies, up to a highest frequency of 4000Hz 
(see Section 6.2.6.1) with additional Stage-3 Absorption processing being performed as 
an integral part of each filter cycle. The number and spectral locations of the spot-
frequencies were determined empirically, and are shown in Figure 6-7. 
Spot Frequency Index 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
LULU 
n 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
Spot Frequencies (Hz) 
Figure 6-7 : HAT Stage-2 Filter spot-frequencies 
By inspection of the filtered frequency spectrum, there are a number of important 
observations which can be made: 
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• Spot-fi-equencies are mirrored in the range lOOHz to lOOOHz, crossing over at a 
figure of -60db, maximising system resolution within the natural spoken 
fi-equency spectrum of the human voicebox (Figure 5-12). 
• The actual number of spot-fi-equencies was partly governed by the hardware 
processing capabilities of the HAT system, as each spot-fi-equency feeds directly 
into a discrete input mode in the HAT Stage-4 Neural-network. The number of 
spot-fi-equencies also govems the number of (hidden) layer neurons in the 
neural-network (see Section 6.2.4.1). It was found empirically that a figure of 
twenty-five spot-ft"equencies (and neural-network neurons) maximised the 
available processing resources, realising good neural-network user classification, 
whilst maintaining acceptable authentication cycle times of a few seconds. 
• The stopgaps between spot-frequencies above lOOOHz, when analysed, were 
found to offer minimal additional information to that already provided by the 
lOOHz filter passbands; filter bandwidth uniformity was therefore maintained 
across the full HAT spectrum. 
• Although use of a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) was considered for Stage-2 
filtering, the HAT methodology currently in place (specifically the discrete 
stepping filter) draws parallels with the fi-equency component voice banding (of 
formant and carrier), found in Vocoder' voice synthesisers (Fellbaum 2005). 
The flowchart in Figure 6-8 is the systematic continuation of the HAT Stages Flowchart 
introduced in HAT Stage-1 Capture (Figure 6-3), and places HAT Stage-2 Filtering in 
context with the previous stage. 
A vocoder is a voice synthesiser, often used to reproduce a human voice with a metallic and monotonous 
sound. An early example is the song 'We are the Robots' (1977), by the Genman band Kxaftwerk. 
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Figure 6-8 : HAT Stages flowchart - Stage-2 (Filter waveforms) 
Note that the flowchait only shows one cycle of the filtering process, a single iteration 
o f the HAT template creation process, the completed filter/absorption loop is illustrated 
in the description for Stage-3 RMS Absorption (Section 6.2.3). 
6.2.2.1 Finite Impulse Response H A T Filter 
The requirement for the HAT Stage-2 filter was for a design that would minimise the 
risk of spectral distortion, extracting only the desired signal spectrum. The digital filter 
design chosen was a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter with symmetrical coefficients 
and incorporating a Hamming window. The choice o f symmetrical FIR filter with an 
odd number of coefficients was used so that the group delay of all frequencies passing 
through the filter would be an integer and be defined by the equation: 
Group delay = 
filter coejjicien is - I 
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A Hamming window was used so that out-of-band rejection would be greater than 
-40dB (or less than 1%). Without the Hamming window there could be undesirable 
(Gibbs) ringing at the edges of the filter passband. The filter was developed initially in 
Matlab, before being ported into Visual Basic and the HAT Demonstration Tool (see 
Section 7.2). The filter development code has been included in Table 6-2. 
f x i n c t i o n [ c o e f f ] = bpf ( f a , f b , n c ) 
%BPF B a n d p a s s - F i l t e r p o l y n o m i a l c o e f f i c i e n t g e n e r a t o r (Hamming) 
% B P F ( f a , f b , n c ) 
% f a - lower c o r n e r f rec juency 
% f b - upper c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y 
% nc - n - count p o l y n o m i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s ; group d e l a y { n c - l ) / 2 
% 
% Example: c o e f f = b p f ( 5 0 0 , 6 0 0 , 5 0 1 ) ; 
% 
%Author : PMR 
% F i l e : bpf .m ( v . 2 ) 
%Local v a r i a b l e s : 
% c o e f f - f i l t e r p o l y n o m i a l ( c o e f f ) i c i e n t s 
% f a - l ower c o m e r f r e q u e n c y of f i l t e r 
% f b - upper c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y of f i l t e r 
% l o - ( l o ) w e r c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y of f i l t e r 
% n - ( n ) - c o u n t c o e f f i c i e n t s range 
% nc - ( n ) - c o u n t p o l y n o m i a l ( c ) o e f f i c i e n t s 
% up - (up)per c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y of f i l t e r 
n = ( - ( n c - l ) / 2 
l o = m i n ( f a , f b ) 
u p = m a x ( f a , f b ) 
( n c - l ) / 2 ) ; %define n - c o u n t r a n g e 
%check lower c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y 
%check upper c o r n e r f r e q u e n c y 
%- c o r e f u n c t i o n 
%default hamming window f u n c t i o n 
hamming_window = (0 .54 - 0 . 4 6 * c o s ( 2 * p i * n . / n c - p i ) ) ; 
% c a l c u l a t e n - c o u n t f i l t e r c o e f f i c i e n t s 
c o e f f = hamming_window.*(2*up*s inc(2*up*n) - 2 * l o * s i n c ( 2 * l o * n ) ) ; 
Table 6-2: Matlab Code for ihe HAT Stage-2 Filter 
When deriving the performance of the digital filter, an important consideration was the 
processing payload of the filter cycle(s). Although it is possible to produce a HAT 
software filter with an almost ideal fi-equency response, an example of which is shown 
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in Figure 6-9 (OdB passband, greater than -60dB stopband), the processing payload is 
high; especially with the filter polynomial count of 6001 illustrated. As discussed 
previously in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.7), all processing within a mobile device will have 
a negative effect on the recharge cycle time of the unit's power-pack. As basic HAT 
Stage-2 filtering is performed twenty-five times on two discrete waveforms, it was 
especially important to reduce processing to a minimum whilst maintaining overall 
system integrity; this was achieved through experimentation. 
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Figure 6-9 : Frequency response of an ideal HAT Stage-2 Filter (n = 6001) 
Examining the other end of the performance curve, the filter fi-equency response curve 
shown in Figure 6-10 shows a very fast, low processing requirement, digital filter; with 
only 101 polynomial coefficients (n = 101). However, notice at least 6dBs of 
attenuation at the passband centre fi-equency of 4000Hz and the extremely poor roll-off. 
For the purposes of HAT, this particular filter was found to introduce unacceptable 
cross-contamination within the adjacent spot-fi'equency passbands data. 
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Figure 6-10 : Frequency response of an inadequate HAT Stage-2 Filter (n = 101) 
By increasing the digital filters polynomial n-count above 500, see Figure 6-11, it can 
be seen that the filters frequency response improves dramatically, with: 
• OdBs attenuation at centre frequency (HAT spot-frequency) of passband. 
• High roll-off with 6dBs of attenuation at the filter comer frequencies. 
• Better than 50dBs attenuation (< 0.1 %) in the filter stopband. 
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Figure 6-11 : Frequency response of an improved HAT Stage-2 Filter (n = 501) 
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Although the filter in Figure 6-11 was an improvement, it was determined through 
extensive experimentation, that the optimum filter performance balance for the system 
as a whole was achieved with a digital filter whose ft-equency response is shown in 
Figure 6-12 (n = 1301). It was discovered that although many filter designs produced 
what initially appeared to be good Stage-3 Absorption results, the Stage-4 Analysis 
neural-network could not reliably extract a signature fi-om the sample data. It was 
discovered that the performance of HAT Stage-2 Filtering and HAT Stage-4 Neural-
network analysis were in fact highly mutually dependent, and the design of the filter 
was heavily dependant on the design and subsequent performance of the neural-network 
in HAT Stage-4 Analysis (see Section 6.2.4). 
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Figure 6-12; Frequency response of the final HAT Stage-2 Filter (n = 1301) 
HAT Filter Design Specifications 
• FIR digital filter incorporating a Hamming Window (n = 1301). 
• lOOHz bandwidth, with OdB passband attenuation 
• High roll-off with 6dBs attenuation at comer ft-equencies. 
• 60dBs attenuation (< 0.01 %) in stopband. 
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6.2.3 Stage-3 Absorption between Filtered Frequency Pairs 
RMS absorption of frequencies within the human-head is essentially the novel aspect of 
basic HATs interpretation of head authentication. Although sample data must be: 
captured, filtered and subsequently analysed, classified and a suitable response issued, it 
is the RMS absorption figures of the multiple narrowband frequency spectra which 
determine and define the HAT biometric template. 
HAT Stage-3 Absorption attempts to quantify any variance in RMS amplitude between 
a captured audio sample at a user's mouth, and a simultaneously captured audio sample 
at the user's ear, at pre-determined spot-frequencies. Any absorption is a result of the 
propagation effects of the 'ear-wave' through the intervening bio-matter (Section 5.3.1) 
in contrast to the more direct path of the 'mouth-wave'. The HAT absorption figure 
represents the preservation of the RMS value of a lOOHz snapshot of the 'ear-wave', at 
a pre-determined spot-frequency, compared to the value of the paired 'mouth-wave'. 
Example: An absorption figure of 40% at a particular spot-frequency represents a 60% 
reduction in the RMS amplitude of the lOOHz bandwidth ear-wave spectrum, compared 
to the reference 'mouth-wave' spectrum, at that frequency point. 
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1.3, an absorption calculation is perfomied between the 
filtered mouth/ear spectra within each cycle o f the twenty-five cycle HAT Stage-2 Filter 
process. This is shown schematically in Figure 6-13, Stage-3 of the HAT Stages 
Flowchart. The Stage-3 flowchart also includes detail of the Stage-2/Stage-3 finite 
filter/absorption loop. 
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Figure 6-13 : HAT Stages flowchart - Stage-3 (Absorption calculation) 
By following the Flowchart in Figure 6-13, it can be seen how HAT Stage-2 filtering 
and HAT Stage-3 Absorption cycle together to accumulate the H A T absorption 
template, within the 'HAT User Template' container. Upon completion o f a HAT user 
template (twenty-file cycles), flow is passed to HAT Stage-4 Analysis for processing 
within a neural-network; either for Stage-4 network training (of a new user) or Stage-4 
authentication (of an existing user), before passing to final Stage-5 Classification and 
response discussed in Section 6.2.5. 
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6.2.4 Stage-4 Neural-Network Analysis of Absorption Frequency Pairs 
Each time a (basic) HAT authentication cycle is performed, HAT Stage-3 Absorption 
(or Stage-3 Correlation for the correlation method, see Section 6.3) produces a curve 
defined by a set of twenty-five non-integer variables; one for each of the HAT spot-
frequencies. To analyse this set of biometric markers and extract the unique HAT user 
template, a neural-network was employed. 
The choice to use a neural-network was based on a number of factors. A computer's 
ability to analyse the constantly varying data produced by a biometric system, even when 
it comes from the same user, traditionally lies in its computational speed (Table 6-3). 
Combined with custom analytical software, a computer can perform what in essence is a 
brute force attack on the data, to attempt to authenticate a user against a stored template. 
Good at. Not good at 
Fast Arithmetic Handling noisy data 
Following programme code precisely Massive parallelism 
Fault tolerance 
Adapting to changing circumstances 
Source; Centre for Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience (Link: C C C N ) 
Table 6-3: Computers traditional strengths and weaknesses 
Neural-network differs in that they adopt a generic learning process when analysing sets 
o f data. They are not programmed, in a traditional sense, but given examples of right 
and wrong behaviour and then allowed to configure themselves to learn the difference 
for future encounters. Although neural-networks are still computational engines they 
can appear to exhibit pseudo intelligence when processing data where: 
• an algorithmic solution cannot be formulated; 
• lots of examples of behaviour are available; 
• we need to pick out the structure fi-om existing data. 
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Figure 6-14 : HAT Stages flowchan - Slage-4 (Neural-network analysis) 
The Stage-4 evolution of the HAT Stages flowchart is shown in Figure 6-14. To register a 
new user, a new neural-network is trained using their HAT template in opposition to all 
existing user templates. I f authenticating an existing user, their HAT template will be 
processed within all existing user neural-networks, and the most positive results assumed. 
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6.2.4.1 A N e u r a l - N e n ^ o r k f o r H A T 
The neural-network design used by HAT was determined through extensive network trials 
designed to optimise performance against speed of execution. The final design was a 
feed-forward single-layer neural-network consisting of twenty-five inputs, one for each of 
the HAT template sjx)t-ft^equencies, twenty-five neurons, and a single output defined by a 
hyperbolic tangent-sigmoid transfer function' (An introduction to neural-networks and 
their transfer fianctions is included in Appendix E). A schematic of the 25-25-1 neural-
network is shown in Figure 6-15, the enlargement illustrating the complex web of 
connections for each neuron providing the network with its inherent analytical power. 
Input 
(Spot Frequencies in Hz) 
100 
Hidden Layer 
(25- Input Neurons) 
O u t p u t 
(Hyperbolic Tangent Sigmoid) 
1400 
1800 
Figure 6-15 : The single layer, twenty-five neuron neural-network adopted by HAT 
Each individual neuron of the single hidden-layer contains twenty-five inputs and one 
output; this is illustrated in the single neuron example in Figure 6-16. 
The tansig transfer function is a logsig transfer function symmetrical about the X-axis (sec Appendix E). 
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n 
Figure 6-16 : A twenty-five input HAT neuron 
The HAT neuron incorporates a symmetrical tan-sigmoid transfer flinction, which 
scales the neuron output into the range -1 a 1, where a is defined by the function: 
a -
The final neural-network configuration, illustrated in Figure 6-15, was refined through 
extensive experimentation, in order to realise the best balance of performance against 
process cycle time: a key variable within this balance was the networks training error 
rate. Although it is feasible to specify error rates in excess of 1 in 1000 (le-4), the 
processing time can easily exceed acceptable limits, as shown in the next example. 
10" 
Performance is 9 . 99^e -0O5 , Goal is 0,0001 
10-
10" 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 
2492 Epochs 
Figure 6-17 : Training a new user's HAT neural-network for 1 in 10,000 errors 
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Example: The processing time of the HAT neural-network for a new user, within a user-
base' of only four users, at an error rate of 1 in 10,000 (le-4), is in excess of 2500 epochs^ 
(Figure 6-17). This equates to around 30 seconds processing time on a current (2005) 
desktop PC, with a CPU typically drawing in excess of 50 watts; by comparison mobile 
handset CPUs generally draw less than 1 watt (AMD 2005). It is acknowledged that the 
power/performance profile of desktop and mobile CPUs is constantly being improved. 
HAT therefore defines a performance error goal during training of 1 in 1000 (le-3). With 
a user group of around twenty users, and the available hardware, this was found to offer 
the best performance/processing-time balance, with a full training cycle consistently 
taking around 400 epochs (Figure 6-18), less than 20 seconds. 
Performance is 0.QCD997987. Goal is Q.OOl 
10" 
10 
10 
10 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
405 Epochs 
Figure 6-18 : Training a new user*s HAT neural-network for 1 in 1000 errors 
Although a new user only has to train their personal neural-network once at registration, 
all biometric templates require refining over time due to the changing character of their 
owner (Section 4.2.2). System accuracy also benefits from training a user's template(s) 
against as many of the systems user-base templates as is practicable, identifying goo^f and 
bad training data (behaviour): HAT trains all users against all other users in the user-base. 
' The complete set of registered system users: for HAT, this is the set of twenty trial users in Section 7.3. 
^ An epoch is a neural-network processing cycle. 
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6.2.5 Stage-5 User Classirication and System Response 
The final stage of the HAT authentication process is the classification o f the neural-
network output data. The authentication stage involves the comparison o f the HAT 
Stage-4 output against a pre-determined authentication threshold. 
It is an aspect of the HAT authentication technique that the threshold(s) defined by HAT for 
user authentication are unique to each registered user, and are dependent upon: 
• the consistency of individual users' templates (data sets); 
• the variance in users' templates across the entire user-base; 
• the performance error of individual users' HAT Stage-4 neural-networks. 
An individual user's authentication threshold is calculated during HAT Stage-4 Analysis 
by feeding examples of known good and bad data into the neural-network, monitoring the 
resultant outputs, and setting a value which minimises FMR and FNMR (Section 4.2.3). 
TTie variance in user-base templates, generic threshold values and match error rates are 
mutually exclusive and defined by the relationship shown in Figure 6-19. 
(Low) User-Base Template Variance (High) 
Figure 6-19: The mutually exclusive relationship between HAT authentication 
thresholds and match error rates vs. user-base template variance 
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Figure 6-20 : Complete HAT Stages nowchart - Stage-5 (User Classification) 
HAT Stage-5 User Classification is the final stage in the HAT authentication process 
and is placed in context within the HAT stages flowchart illustrated in Figure 6-20: this 
flowchart now describes the complete HAT process. 
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6.2.6 The HAT Template 
The HAT absorption' template is defined by the unique shape contained within mouth-
to-ear absorption curves of an individual user, and is governed by: 
• the number and specifications of spot-fi-equencies^ discussed in HAT Stage-2; 
• the consistency of individual users' mouth-to-ear absorption responses. 
Each of the twenty-five spot-frequencies (Section 6.2.1.3) is used to determine a discrete 
bio-metric, which collectively define a user's HAT template. Each spot-fi-equency mouth-
to-ear (MEa) absorption metric is described by the following formulae: 
Mouth 1 
...where the Mouth and Ear values are defined as the RMS value of the relevant spot-
fi-equency passband (Figure 6-12). The root-mean-square (RMS) interpretation is required 
to accommodate for the signed quantisation levels^ of 16-bit wave files. The resultant 
MEa value is preserved as a percentage, rather than a difference value, to allow for 
amplitude fluctuations in the individual spot-fi-equency stimuli, hi Figure 6-21 and Figure 
6-22, two examples of Mouth and Ear input stimuli are shown along with their associated 
HAT absorption template, for the individual numbers '0 ' and '3 ' respectively. These plots 
are extended in Figure 6-23 and Figure 6-24, to include fiall sets of fixed (number ' 1') and 
variable (numbers '0' to '9') stimuli respectively on a single axis. By inspection of this 
pair of graphs, the fixed stimuli control set exhibits very little spread, compared to the 
greater spread of the variable data set. However in both cases, and allowing for the 
varying input stimuli, the HAT template(s) show consistent shape. 
' Although absorption is not the only factor effecting mouth-to-ear variance, it is the predominant 
modifier, and hence the method was named as such. 
^ HAT Stage-2 *spot frequencies' are referred to in some analyses plots as 'centre frequencies'. 
^ Quantisation levels of 16-bit wave file samples are in the range: -32768 to +32767. 
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Figure 6-21 : Mouth, Ear input and HAT template output curves of the number *0' 
HAT trial user 'uOI_phi' (lOOHz < bw < 4OOOH2) 
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Figure 6-22: Mouth, Ear input and HAT template output curves of the number '3' 
HAT trial user *u01 _phi' (lOOHz < bw < 4000Hz) 
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Figure 6-23 : Compound Mouth, Ear input and HAT template output curves of the 
number' T . HAT trial user 'u01_phi' (lOOHz < bw < 4000Hz) 
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Figure 6-24: Compound Mouth, Ear input and HAT template output curves of the 
numbers *0' to *9\ HAT trial user *u01_phi' (lOOHz < bw < 4000Hz) 
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By comparing the HAT templates in the previous example, with those of another user 
from a series of trials (see Section 7.3), Figure 6-25 through to Figure 6-28 show that for 
both a fixed stimuli control set (using just the number ' 1 a n d for the numbers '0' to '9' 
trial participants' individual response curves exhibit a clear collective pattern match or 
correlation with themselves; even though the numbers are phonetically quite different. 
The key observations are summarised as: 
• the consistent shape of the individual users' sets of discrete curves; 
• the unique shape of the individual user's collective response: 
6.2.6.1 The 4000Hz Cut-off 
In Section 6.2.1.2 (Figure 6-4), the 4000Hz information roll o f f was introduced. Through 
experimentation, this was found to be the upper limit of unique head authentication data. 
By further inspection of the wideband (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz) plots shown in Figure 
6-25 through to Figure 6-28, this trend can be observed above the 4000Hz spot-frequency. 
It was also found during HAT development that an alternate cross-correlation head 
authentication methodology (see Section 6.3) exhibited the same information break down 
above 4000Hz. Following the Nyquist^ sampling principle, with the highest HAT Stage-2 
spot-frequency set optimally at 4000Hz, a system sampling rate of at least 8000Hz was 
required: the nearest standard sampling rate"* to this was 11025Hz. This optimisation of 
the system sampling rate offered the following advantages: 
• smallest efficient sample sizes (in bytes); 
• removal of unnecessary (unproductive) system resolution (above 4000Hz); 
• reduced HAT analysis time, resulting in reduced system authentication cycle time; 
• reduced processing requirements, resulting in reduced system power requirements. 
The captured sample filenames are displayed in the individual plot legends, and adopt the following 
syntax: <name (3 characters)>_<capture set (1 character)>_<spoken text (2 characters)> 
^ The Nyquist rate is the minimum sampling rate required to recover all Fourier components of a periodic 
waveform. It is calculated as at least twice the highest frequency component of the capture waveform. 
^ A factor of 44.1 KHz, the domestic CD sampling rate and a standard Windows® supported rate. 
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Figure 6-26: Compound frequency absorption curves of the numbers '0' lo '9' -
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Figure 6-27: Compound frequency absorption curves of the number * I ' (x 10) -
HAT trial user *u02 nit' (1 OOHz < bw < 8000Hz) 
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Figure 6-28: Compound frequency absorption curves of the numbers *0' to '9' 
HAT trial user 'u02_nit' (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz) 
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Figure 6-29: Five mean frequency absorption curves of the numbers '0' to *9' 
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Figure 6-30: Three mean frequency absorption curv es of the numbers '0' to *9' -
HAT trial user •u02 nit" (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz) 
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When the same two users were subjected to multiple testing sessions over a number of 
days, statistical mean response curves were calculated for each session, and the results 
are displayed collectively in Figure 6-29 and Figure 6-30 respectively. These results, 
along with the results for other trial participants in Section 7.3.4, present a strong case in 
support of the consistent and unique shape of individual user's HAT responses. It is 
these unique mean biometric absorption spectra which form the HAT templates. 
6.2.6.2 Statistical Analysis of a H A T Template 
As part of HAT template analysis, statistical calculations on sets of absorption curves 
were also performed, calculating mean, median and standard-deviation at each spot-
frequency; an example of a statistical analysis plot is shown in Figure 6-31. 
27 100% 
Ulti.iP.iss .iiuilysis (MIOUTH to (E)AR 
27 100% 
27 lOO't 10u-« 
27 100% 100% 
mean 
bp mean 
e n v e l o p e st:d x 2 . 0 
o p e : s t d x 2 . 0 bp e n v e l 
spot Frequencies (Hz) 
Figure 6-31 : Statistical analysis curves for a HAT capture waveform set 
By comparison with the example, it was found that for the majority of cases, the mean 
curve (in blue) and the median curve (in green) followed almost identical paths. 
176 
Chapter 6 : Realisation of the Head Authentication Technique 
Two sets of standard deviation curves were also calculated and plotted, a complete 
capture set (in cyan), and a band-pass' (bp) processed set (in magenta), producing an 
effective user's authentication envelope. Recall that standard deviation^ (o) is 
proportional to variance (a^) and indicates how tightly a set of sample data is clustered 
around its mean, where: 
• 68% of samples lie within 1 standard-deviation of the mean (|i-a —*• ji+a); 
• 95% of samples lie within 2 standard-deviations of the mean (|i-2G —• |i+2o); 
• 99.7% of samples lie within 3 standard-deviations of the mean (ii-3a —> |i+3o). 
This operational envelope was later used to help determine system response thresholds 
to authentication sample data, discussed in HAT Stage-5 Thresholds (Section 6.2.5). 
By inspection of the plot legend in Figure 6-31, the number of samples within two 
standard-deviations of the mean is shown; as both a number (column_l) and as a 
percentage (column_2). Bandpass values are also shown in column_3 and column_4 
respectively. The higher the percentage, in each case, the tighter and more consistent the 
capture set, and the more unique the user's HAT signature. By observation, this 
example shows a very good response, with 70% of full sample sets falling within 90% 
of the defined envelope, and an even better 90% of bandpass processed samples. In 
relation to the HAT system, these figures translate into reduced false match (FMR) and 
false non-match (FNMR) error rates (Section 4.2.3) experienced by the user. 
' In this context, band-pass refers to a set of data with singular sample outliers removed. 
^ A full explanation of statistical terms and analyses is beyond the scope of this text, and is covered 
extensively in literature and on the Internet (Link: Statistics). 
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6.3 The Head Authentication Correlation Method 
The correlation method^ of head authentication is an alternative novel way o f extracting 
a unique biometric template from multiple audio data streams captured from points on a 
user's head. The technique utilises temporal (or phase) variations between discrete 
narrowband spectra within the audio data stream introduced by the propagation path. 
The process can be broken down into five distinct stages of operation, in a similar way 
to the absorption method discussed previously in Section 6.2. Although Stage-1 Capture 
now includes some pre-processing, it is Stage-3 which essentially differs: 
y. Capture multiple voice stimulated PCM audio data streams. Basic HAT^ utilises 
two external capture points: the Mouth and the Ear. Normalise Ear waveform. 
2, Filter each data stream discretely at multiple pre-selected frequencies using a high 
roll-off, narrowband FIR filter. Basic HAT utilises twenty-five spot-frequencies. 
3. Correlation calculates the temporal variation between captured waveforms at each 
spot-frequency. Basic HAT compares discrete frequency pairs of Mouth and Ear. 
4. Analysis of the RMS difference output, by feeding the resultant data array into a 
pre-trained neural-network. The training data for the HAT neural-network 
consisted of one of the data sets collected during the HAT field trials in Chapter 7. 
5. Classification of the neural-network result by comparison with a pres^ authentication 
threshold. The HAT authentication threshold was determined during network training. 
This section discusses the changes Stage-1 pre-processing and Stage-3 Correlation 
introduce into the HAT authentication methodology, drawing parallels where appropriate 
with the absorption methodology. The alternate five stages of the correlation method are 
shown schematically in Figure 6-32. 
' Not generally referred to as the 'HAT correlation method* as it was not a part of the final HAT process. 
^ 'Basic HAT' describes the minimum operational requirements of the HAT process. The technique does 
however have the potential for increasing the systems resolution; see future work in Section 8.3. 
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Stage 1 Stage 2 
Mouth Mouth 
Stage 3 
f . f 2 f . f 4 . . . f . 
stage 4 Stage 5 
X Neural-Net Threshold 
Capture Filter Correlation Analysis Classification 
Figure 6-32 : The five discrete stages of the correlation authentication process 
6.3.1 Stage-3 Correlat ion of Filtered Frequency Pairs 
To determine the amount of temporal shitt introduced into the ear-wave after propagation 
through the head, the airrelation method sequentially cross-correlates all individual samples 
from each waveform. This is achieved by effectively sliding the two waveforms past each 
other, end to end, one sample at a time, perfomiing a correlation at each stage (Figure 6-33). 
Correlator 
Mouth Waveform 
Ear Waveform 
Figure 6-33 : Cross-correlation of Mouth and I^ ar waveforms 
Recall that given a pair of related measures for a set of items, the correlation coefficient 
provides a measure of the degree to which the paired measures linearly co-vary. The 
correlation coefficient is usually a value between zero and one, where zero represents no 
detectable correlation between the two items and one represents no detectable difference. 
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By comparing the cross-correlation value of the mouth and ear waveforms at each stage, it 
is possible to determine the point at which the waveforms align, and hence determine the 
slippage (in samples) between the two waves. Examples of waveform offset can be seen 
in the correlation plots (X-Correlation) within Figure 6-38 to Figure 6-45 inclusive. By 
dividing the sample offset by the sampling rate it is possible to calculate the amount of 
slippage in actual time (Example: 50 samples = 4.5milliseconds @ 11025Hz). 
r 
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( Preset filter 
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Cross-correlate Mouth and Ear filtered 
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Increment filter spot frequency counter 
NO Is Filter 
frequency greater 
than 4000Hz 
S t a g e - 4 
HAT User 
Tenplate 
Figure 6-34 : Modified H A F Stages tlowchart - Stage-3. showing additional 
correlation method Stage-1 Normalisation and Stage 3 Correlation. 
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The modified HAT Stages Flowchart illustrated in Figure 6-34 shows Stage-3 
Correlation in place of the HAT Stage-3 Absorption process. Stage-4 Analysis is not 
affected by the change, as the neural-network does not distinguish between an 
absorption value between "0* and M ' (0 - 100%) and a correlation coetTicient between 
*0' and "T. The flowchart also includes an additional normalisation process within the 
Stage-1 Capture; this is discussed in the next section. 
6.3.1.1 Normalisation of the Ear Sample W a v e f o r m 
For HAT to effectively identify the temporal shift introduced by the audio propagation 
path between voicebox and mouth and voiccbox and ear through cross-correlation, it 
was found that the process benefited from amplitude normalisation of the ear sample to 
the mouth sample. Captured HAT ear samples naturally suffer, on average, 12dBs of 
attenuation by comparison with the mouth sample, illustrated in Figure 6-35. 
Mouth Waveform 
Ear Waveform 
Figure 6-35 : Captured H A T waveform pair (Mouth & Ear) of the number '2 ' 
Sample normalisation is considered a part of the Stage-1 Capture process and is 
performed in preparation for the latter filtering and cross-correlation stages. 
Normalisation of the ear sample is based on a peak value analysis of the mouth sample; 
the processed waveform from the previous example is illustrated in Figure 6-36. 
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Mouth Waveform 
Ear Waveform Pea^ Normalised 
Figure 6-36 : Nomialised H A T waveform pair (Mouth & Ear) of the number '2 ' 
6.3.1.2 The 400011/Cut-ofr 
It was found that the correlation analysis method also suffered the same reduction in 
performance above around 4000Hz, as the HAT absorption method discussed in Section 
6.2.6.1. In fact, not only did cross-correlation perfonnance reduce at 4000Hz, it was 
found that the correlation process failed, w ith no discemable correlation detectable. This 
is clearly illustrated in the set of compound analyses plots (presented in lOOOHz 
increments) shown in Figure 6-38 to Figure 6-45 inclusive. The plots indicate: 
Captured 
Mouth sample 
Captured 
Ear sample 
Filter response 
Spot-frequency 
Filtered 
Mouth sample 
Filtered 
Ear sample 
X-Correlatlon 
Sample offset 
Figure 6-37 : Legend of correlation Figure 6-38 to Figure 6-45 inclusive 
By inspection, mouth-to-car cross-correlation (X-Correlation) shows clear correlation at 
all fi-equencies up to 4000Hz, indicated by the clear central peak rising out of the non-
correlation noise floor (Legend: Figure 6-37). Above 4000Hz (Figure 6-42), it can be 
seen correlation is lost and the resultant plot consists entirely of uncorrclated noise. 
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6.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation template is the unique shape (pattern) contained within the ear-to-mouth 
correlation offsets (time slippage) of an individual user, and is controlled by: 
• the system spot-frequencies discussed in HAT Stage-2; 
• the shape and consistency of individual user's mouth-to-ear correlation offset 
response, as a number in samples, at each spot-frequency. 
The theory behind the approach was to utilise the principles discussed in Section 5.3,1, 
where the speed of propagating sound waves in matter are dependent on the frequency of 
the propagating waves and the ftmdamental properties of the medium. Combined with the 
unique audio spectrum of the user's voicebox, the heterogeneous bio-matter of their head 
(Figure 5-6) uniquely shapes spot-frequency timings as illustrated in Figure 6-46. 
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Figure 6-46: Compound timing variation curves of the numbers '0' to *9" -
H A T trial user 'uOI_phi' (lOOHz < bw < 8000Hz) 
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By inspection of the plots Figure 6-46 and Figure 6-47, although there was some evidence 
of capture set correlation, using the same users and numerical stimuli as previously in 
Figure 6-26 and Figure 6-28, there was less evidence of unique individual user behaviour 
when compared to the (mouth-ear) absorption method. In addition, individual curves 
exhibited less consistent behaviour (compared to absorption plot curves), resulting in 
higher standard-deviation figures and broader statistical variance. 
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Figure 6-47: Compound timing variation curves of the numbers '0' to *9' -
H A T trial user 'u02_nit* (lOOHz < bw < 8OOOH2) 
As a consequence of the negative aspects exhibited by this approach and the more 
promising results of the absorption analysis approach, correlation analysis was 
subsequendy discarded as the first choice HAT analysis technique and not pursued 
beyond comparative evaluation with the chosen absorption method. 
HAT exclusively adopts the absorption analysis method, with correlation analysis not 
considered further within the thesis beyond a mention in Section 8.3 on future work. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
Following on from the conceptual discussions defining the HAT development 
pathways, this chapter introduced and discussed in depth the methodology behind the 
final HAT authentication process, along with a complete systematic breakdown of the 
five stages that define HATs interpretation of a head authentication system: 
• Capture of biometric audio waveform pairs from a user, 
• Filter of audio waveform pairs at discrete spot-frequencies. 
• Absorption comparison of discrete waveform spectra defining a HAT template. 
• Analysis of the HAT absorption template within a neural-network. 
• Classification of the neural-network output through threshold comparison. 
The chapter identified and explained the ftindamental differences between the two main 
biometric analyses techniques borne out of the HAT development process: the 
absorption technique, and the correlation technique. After discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of both techniques, the better performing absorption technique was 
selected in preference to the correlation technique and forms one of the two novel 
aspects of the research, namely: 
• The HAT method of biometric capture. 
• The HAT absorption method of biometric analysis. 
The next chapter focuses on an extended proof of concept of the HAT absorption 
technique through a series of trials involving a diverse group of volunteers: to enable the 
trials, a HAT demonstration tool was conceived and developed. Along with a 
description and walkthrough of the HAT demonstration tool, the HAT trials results are 
presented and discussed in detail. 
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7 Evaluation of the Head Authentication 
Technique 
As there is no precedent for the novel head authentication ideas introduced in Chapter 5 
or the resuhant HAT authentication methodology presented in Chapter 6, it is an 
essential part of the research to demonstrate proof of concept. This chapter presents an 
extended proof of concept of the Head Authentication Technique through use of a HAT 
demonstration tool, enabling a set of controlled trials. 
The chapter is divided into two sections: an introduction and overview o f the custom 
designed HAT demonstration tool and its usage; and an outline of the HAT field trials 
utilising the demonstration tool, involving a discussion on the field trial results. The 
chapter concludes by introducing the research conclusions on the HAT authentication 
process, which are discussed in depth in Chapter 8. 
7.1 Introduction 
In order to prove the Head Authentication Technique outside of its artificially controlled 
and ideal research environment, a robust HAT demonstration tool was developed to 
enable a set of field trials for the technique. The HAT demonstration tool was in fact an 
evolution of an experimental research platform originally conceived to test the viability 
of a number of original ideas, many of which did not make it beyond conception. Once 
the fundamental principles of head authentication were established (Section 5.3), two 
variations on the basic technique emerged that showed consistent promise throughout 
initial testing, these were the absorption method, discussed in Sections 6.2, and the 
correlation method, discussed in Section 6.3. These two HAT Stage-3 Analysis methods 
191 
Chapter 7 : Evaluation of the Head Authentication Technique 
were developed in parallel for the majority of the research, and a preferred method only 
selected in the final stages of the demonstration tool development!. The single method 
eventually selected for the HAT demonstration tool was the absorption method, which 
was not only providing more consistent results, but also proving easier to process within 
evolving software analysis tools. 
By the time the HAT trials were performed, the demonstration tool had developed far 
beyond a highly specialised experimental research platform requiring intimate 
knowledge of the research, into a user friendly tool incorporating an audio headset 
managed by a generically styled Microsoft Windows application (Section 7.2.2.2). The 
HAT demonstration tool requires no specialised knowledge of the PhD research, and 
only minimal understanding of the authentication methodology and processing 
performed by the tool; in fact, the tool includes a simple wizard to guide users through 
the registration and authentication processes. 
The HAT trials were performed over two sessions, separated by a period of at least 24 
hours, in an attempt to acknowledge some aging o f the biometric templates. Twenty 
trial volunteers were selected to represent a diversity of: 
• sex: in Chapter 5 Figure 5-12 it is illustrated how the male and female vocal 
ranges can differ by up to I OOHz; 
• age: (ranging fi-om 24 to 64 years), in Chapter 5 Figure 5-1 it is illustrated how 
the human auditory range varies with age; 
• nationality: to demonstrate that the HAT process is language independent, 
utilising variations in sound, not comprehension, for its biometric markers. 
' Although combining the absorption and time-slip methods was considered, further experimentation into 
multimodal biometrics was considered beyond the scope of the project; see fiiture work in Section 8.3. 
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7.2 The HAT Demonstration Tool 
The HAT demonstration tool is a non-intrusive authentication platform developed to 
demonstrate and evaluate the principles of the Head Authentication Technique. The tool 
combines a specially configured hardware headset, henceforth called the HAT Headset, 
with a proprietary Microsoft Windows software application, henceforth the HAT 
Application. The tool was developed out of an experimental test-bed for the many head 
authentication ideas proposed at the beginning of the research and discussed in Chapter 5. 
The tool was later modified for general use in a series of HAT trials. 
7.2.1 The H A T Headset 
An integral part of the HAT demonstration tool is the custom designed headset which 
collects the audio waveform sample pairs for processing by the software element of the 
tool. Although similar in appearance to a standard lightweight computer headset, 
critically the HAT headset replaces the ear transducer with a suitable high quality 
lavalier' microphone, as shown in Figure 7-1. 
Replacement 
Microphone 
Figure 7-1 : The replacement ear microphone of the H A T Headset 
A lavalier (tie-clip) microphone was selected for its compact size and optimised voice characteristics. 
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As a HAT authentication template is dependent upon the calculated variance between 
mouth- and car-captured waveforms (basic HAT), it was also decided to replace the 
mouth microphone with a matching high quality voice microphone to ensure that the 
hardware itself did not contribute any variance of its own into the HAT template. 
The HAT headset replacement microphones were high quality elcctret' lavalier 
microphones (Figure 7-2), selected for their: 
• excellent frequency response; covering the full vocal range; 
• high sensitivity; for use with the low amplitude car waveform; 
• diminutive size; for use in a headset without adding additional bulk or weight. 
Lavalier 
Microphone 
Figure 7-2 : A H A T headset high-quality clectret lavalier microphone 
The technical specifications of the HAT lavalier microphones are shown in Table 7-1 
Type: Electret 
Polar response: Omni 
Frequency response: 50 to 16KHZ 
Impedance: 600 ohms 
Sensitivity: -64dB 
Lead/plug: 6m/6.35mm jack^ 
Table 7-1: Technical specifications of the H A T headset microphones 
' Electret microphones are an F E T driven vanaiion on the classic condenser microphone. 
' The microphone is powered by an LR44 power cell contained withm the jack-plug. 
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As the replacement lavalier microphones of the HAT headset are not standard computer 
peripherals, they do not naturally interface with a typical computer setup. Combining 
this issue with need for good quality amplification to match the p>erformance of the 
microphones, a small booster amplifier was purchased which could interface directly 
with the line input of a computer soundcard', illustrated in Figure 7-3. 
Laced 
microphone 
cables 
HAT Headset 
Booster 
Amplifier 3.5mm 
Jack plug 
Mouths Ear 
Figure 7-3 : The hardware composing the H A T Headset 
Although the HAT headset uses identical microphones for the capture of both the mouth 
and ear waveforms, the operational principles behind microphones and transducers are 
not fundamentally different and it is not inconceivable to imagine a development of the 
headset using a suitably modified ear transducer for capture of the ear wave, enabling 
the ear-piece to also remain active as a speaker. Although this would introduce a 
variation in the resultant mouth to ear hardware responses, and timing of authentication 
cycles would depend on fast switching of the ear transducer from transmit to receive at 
appropriate intervals, both of these issues could be compensated for in software. 
The H A T development PC utilised a high quality Creative SoundBlaster Audigy-2 soundcard. 
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7.2.2 The H A T Application 
The HAT Application is the software element of the HAT Demonstration Tool. It is a 
Microsoft Windows application developed initially as part of an experimental research 
platform to explore the potential of the various approaches to head authentication 
discussed in Chapter 5, and later modified as a part of the HAT demonstration tool to 
manage the registration and authentication of users in a HAT based authentication system. 
The HAT Application is an evolution of a number of individual HAT developmental 
software tools discussed in Section 7.2.2.1. It has the ability to demonstrate empirically 
all of the stages of the HAT process, either discretely or in sequence as part of a full 
HAT processing cycle. Underneath the user friendly graphical interface optimised for 
use in the HAT trials, discussed in Section 7.3, is a powerftil HAT research tool capable 
o f displaying graphical outputs of each individual stage of the HAT process. 
7.2.2,1 Foundations of the HAT Application 
It was realised early on in the research that although the majority of the analytical work 
could be modelled within established research tools such as Mathsoft Matlab, all o f the 
head authentication concepts under investigation required similar biometric capture 
procedures. To establish a common capture procedure and automate the capture process, 
a software tool was developed to interface with the HAT Headset, efficiently capturing 
and storing multiple biometric samples from volunteers; this first tool was called a 
'Collector'. In common with all subsequent HAT software developments, the first 
Collector was developed in Microsoft Visual Basic owing to the programming 
languages speed of development. An example of an early software collector was termed 
the 'Correlation Authentication Rig' (CoAuR): a view o f this applications main 
operational window (v.ClO) is shown in Figure 7-4. 
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Figure 7-4 : Correlation Authentication Rig - Collector 
As the basic head authentication principles were established (Section 6.1), and the two 
chosen analytical methodologies (absorption and correlation) emerged, a further 
software tool was developed to link with Matlab and automate many of the time 
consuming steps of the analysis process; this tool was called an 'Analyser'. Although 
Microsoft Visual C was considered for development of the Analyser due its improved 
execution speed (compared to Visual Basic), this advantage was unrealisable as the 
complex analytical HAT Stages were retained within Mathsoft Matlab. 
The matching CoAuR analyser (v.A8) for use with the Collector in the previous 
example is shown in Figure 7-5. By inspection of the Analyser interface, note that: 
• the analyser example is a correlation (time-slippage) analyser (Section 6.3); 
• the sampling rate is 44100Hz, later refined to 11025Hz (Section 6.2.6); 
• car-waveform normalisation is active and set to 95% (Section 6.3.1.1); 
• the experimental bandpass filter being applied to spot-fi-equencies (Section 6.2.1.3). 
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Figure 7-5 : Correlation Authenlicalion Rig - Analyser 
As the research progressed and refined the chosen head authentication technique into 
what became known as the HAT process, the software tool(s) were developed in 
parallel, eventually being merged into a single application, the HAT Application, an 
example of which (v.C13.5) is shown in Figure 7-6. 
By inspection of this revised layout, it can be seen that the tool now includes both the 
collector (renamed Train') and the analyser (renamed 'Identify*) functionality of the 
previous tools. Later development of the HAT Application focused on optimising the GUI 
for minimal technical impact in preparation for the HAT trials (Section 7.3); removing 
discrete buttons to a toolbar and internal adjustments to menu triggered child-trames. 
By comparing these developmental examples (CoAuR Collector in Figure 7-4; CoAuR 
Analyser in Figure 7-5; HAT Application in Figure 7-6) with the HAT Application 
window in Figure 7-7, the provenance of the HAT Application is clearly demonstrated. 
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Figure 7-6 : Early example of the HAT Application 
7.2.2.2 Navigating the H A T Appl icat ion Interface 
For the novice user, the HAT Application essentially performs two functions: 
• Registration of new users (Section 7.2.2.3). 
Registration involves Capture, Analysis and training of a new neural-network to 
add the to the system user base. 
• Authentication of existing users (Section 7.2.2.4). 
Authentication involves Capture, Analysis and processing within an existing 
neural-network in ordcT to verify the claimed identity of the current user. 
The annotated HAT Application window is shown in Figure 7-7, during a HAT Stage-1 
Capture cycle. In addition to the fairly self explanatory layout, the application interface 
adopts familiar Microsoft Windows conventions through use of menus, toolbars, 
progress-bars etc., taking advantage o f user's established learnt behaviour from other 
Windows applications. 
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Figure 7-7 : The HAT Application main interface during a HAT Capture cycle 
Q The live' main window toolbar provides easy access to all of HATs primary 
functions, without the need to enter the tools menus; illustrated below. 
'.<3 Hp rj X 
Identify Capture Network Review Set MDI Exit 
• Identify: Authenticate the current user. 
• Capture: Register a new user. 
• Net>\ ork: Build a new neural-network (automatic as part of Capture) 
• Stop: Stop the current process. 
• Review: Review ALL of the HAT Application settings in one screen. 
• Set M D I : Adjust the capture hardware settings (PC soundcard). 
• Exit Exit the HAT Application. 
Ihc availability of individual HAT toolbar elements is dynamically controlled by the active process. 
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© The path to the HAT working directory containing the HAT Application 
executable and additional HAT resources: HAT.ini etc. 
O The HAT activity indicator constantly reports the operational state of the tool. 
© A user can either manually enter a new user name for registration, or conveniently 
select their name from the static pull down list of included HAT trial participants. 
© A small selection of the active user's demographic data; also saved as 'user_id.txt' 
for each user. The 'language' option is the captured language not the user nationality. 
© The tools central display window is used to prompt the user with example text to 
speak during a capture cycle, or random text during an authentication cycle. 
© The HAT capture progress-bar (green) indicates the progress of a H A T Stage-1 
Capture (Section 6.2.1), working in tandem with the timing-bar © . 
© The HAT waveform validation progress-bar (yellow) indicates the progress of the 
amplitude validation cycle performed on each new waveform. 
© The HAT filter progress-bar (light-blue) indicates the timing of the HAT Stage-2 
Filter (Section 6.2.1.3), HAT Stage-3 Absorption (Section 6.2.3) processing loop, 
© The HAT analysis progress-bar (dark blue) indicates the progress of the HAT 
Stage-4 Analysis (Section 6.2.4) using the HAT neural-network (Section 6.2.4.1). 
© The timing-bar is used to prompt the user when to speak during Capture or 
Identify cycles: 'green' indicates when to speak and 'red' when to wait. 
© The current operation progress-bar indicates the progress of the complete active 
operation: for example, the five stages of an authentication cycle (Section 6.2). 
O The identity confidence-bar is used to indicate HATs confidence in the claimed 
identity of the active user in four steps: 0, 25%, 50, 75% & 100%. Each step 
increment indicates either a passed or failed authentication cycle. 
© The auxiliary progress-bar is used to indicate the progress of en-mass operations; 
for example, HAT Stage-4 Analysis of A L L the HAT trial participants 
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In addition to the visual improvements to the application interface, all of the applications 
important internal settings can be adjusted through use of the extensive tabbed Options 
screens accessed via the Tools menu. The four primary settings tabs are shown in Figure 
7-8 (a complete list is shown in the HAT manual in Appendix F) and cover: 
• Wavefile format: Channels, Sampling rate and bps (Section 6.2.1.2). 
• Wavcfile validation: Minimum and maximum capture amplitudes and tolerance. 
• Spectral analysis: Spot-frequency, filter coefficients, bandwidth (Section 6.2.2.1). 
• Neural-network: Default analysis set, target error rate, epochs (Section 6.2.4.1). 
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Figure 7-8 : HAT Application tabbed options frames 
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A complete set of help screens is also available within the HAT Application via the 
Help menu (see the example in Figure 7-9), covering the most important aspects of the 
HAT process, including full step-by-step instructions on the usage o f the HAT 
Application during each stage of the registration or authentication process. 
l i? HAT Help 
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! —[£)lrtelectual Property 
^ IJ2l HAT Setup 
\~ Q System HeqiaemenU 
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•-( i ]HAT Oevefepmert log 
Q7| Ushg HAT to... 
i U pCvture&Ana^e 
i - |]Netwcxk&Theiho)d 
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a ti3 S(4»port 
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HAT Introduction 
The HAT Application is the software element of the HAT 
demonstration toot. The tool harnesses a novel biometric 
capture and analysis process to enable the non-intrusive and 
continuous authentication of users of modern communications 
systems. 
HATs development is part of a PhD into Novel Authentication 
Systems for Next Generation Mobile Devices, in association 
with Oranoe. and the University of Plymouth. Network Research 
Qrpup 
The HAT Application GUI Is written in Microsoft Visual 
Basic v6.0 
Core functionality, including: Spectral Analysis. Neural 
Network training and Identification are perfomned via 
MathWorks Matlab 
Figure 7-9 : HAT Help menu example - HAT Introduction 
The HAT Application includes various resources files, designed to minimise the need 
for recompiling the source code every time settings are changed. The options include: 
• HAT.ini: Primary HAT start-up settings (see Appendix F). 
• HAT_Spoken.txt: Textual prompts for HAT Stage-1 Capture cycle. 
• HAT_CnFq.txt: Pre-selected filter spot-frequencies (Section 6.2.1.3). 
• Users.txt: HAT Trial participant's names (see Section 7.3). 
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7.2.2.3 Registering a New User 
In order to be authenticated by the HAT demonstration tool, a user must first register 
with the system. The registration process involves capturing a selection of phonetically 
diverse sounds which, for user convenience, are selected from the familiar set of 
alphanumeric characters'. The HAT Application then performs the H A T process 
(Section 6.2) to realise the users unique biometric template and neural-network map. 
What follows is an explanation of the HAT Application registration process for use by a 
new user, with reference to the application window in Figure 7-7: 
Step 1: Set the HAT Path 
Open the HAT Application and select the main HAT directory, containing the HAT 
executable and resources, in the drive selection window © . 
Step 2: Select the Capture Mode 
Enter the Tools>Capture Mode menu and select the type of capture mode required; the 
default setting is 'Capture and Analyse'. The default setting is also conveniently available 
via the shortcut CTRL+K, prompting 'Capture Mode - FULL' in the activity bar © . 
Step 3: Identify a New User 
To identify a new user to the system, enter a usemame within the field © and complete 
the user demography section © . If a user is recognised by the system their new capture 
data is augmented with their previous data to strengthen the existing user profile. I f a user 
is not recognised by the system a new account is setup (a new 'Output' directory created). 
Although HAT prompts users for alphanumeric characters during registration, recall that the HAT 
process is not dependent on 'what is said', but 'how it is said' and 'how it is affected* by the head. 
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Step 4: Review Settings (Optional) 
Select the Review i c o n l ^ >n the HAT Application toolbar O and conveniently review 
the complete applications settings. 
HAT Review 
Review HAT Settings r/3 
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Build Network Mode: F u l l 
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User Name: 
User Sex: 
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Naming Syntax: 
Coding Fomiat: 
Capture Channels: 
Sampling Rate: 
Bits-Per-Sample: 
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E n g l i s h 
20 - 34 
j o h _ # _ # # 
PCM 
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1 1 0 2 5 H z 
1 6 
OK 
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Review H/\T Settings 
Capture Validation 
Validation Mode: H a l f 
Validation Detection: 10 % 
Validation Amplitude: 4 0 % 
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Spectral-Analysis (Filter) 
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Polynomial Terms (n): 
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Identiy Set T y p e : 
25 
1 0 0 1 
l O O H z 
V a r i a b l e 
V a r i a b l e 
V. 
, 6 l 
OK i 
Figure 7-10 : HAT Application settings review frame (two views) 
Step 4: Try a Simulation (Optional) 
It is recommended that new users try the user simulation v^ithin the Help>Simulation 
menu option. The process will help familiarise a new user with the HAT capture 
process, minimising bodily tension due to psychological apprehension during a genuine 
capture cycle. The simulation precisely mimics a genuine capture cycle, responding 
appropriately to the relevant settings within the options screens. 
Step 5a: Check the HAT Headset Hardware 
Check that the HAT headset hardware is correctly connected (Figure 7-3) and that there 
are two good power cells' in the microphones jack-plugs. 
Each microphone jack-plug requires a single LR44 power cell. 
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StepSb: Position the HAT Headset 
Position the HAT Headset comfortably on the head ensuring that the ear microphone is 
positioned centrally over the pinna o f the outer ear (Figure 5-2), in line with the ear 
canal, and with the mouth microphone positioned vertically central and horizontally 
offset from the centre of the mouth, to minimise breathing pickup. 
Step 6: Capture 
Press the Capture* button | | on the HAT toolbar © and follow tlic comprehensive 
onscreen instructions: the HAT Application will prompt the user to speak up to twenty 
pseudo-random alphanumeric characters. Having performed a simulation (Step 4) the 
process should be familiar to the user, minimising any unnecessary body or voice tension. 
VefsionC15 2bukJ304 
Clipping Amplitude 
validation Amplitude 
Detection Amplitude 
C Valid 25 2% - Clipped 0 3% 
va l i da t i on Repor t 
M o u t h W a v e f o r m 
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va l i da t i on C o m p l e t e 
L '7f i I 
Va l ida ted S a m p l e s 
Registrat ion Progress 
PMRodwel*2004 
Figure 7-11 : HAT Application - Stage-1 Capture and validation plot 
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After each individual capture, the application wil l validate the samples according to the 
settings in the validation options tab (Figure 7-8) to guarantee their suitability for use by 
the HAT Application before entering the time-consuming HAT analysis stages. This is also 
a useful feedback mechanism, indicating to the (new) user 'when' and 'how loud' to 
speak for optimum tool performance. Upon completion of the waveform validation cycle 
the application presents the user with a graphical output similar to the one shown in 
Figure 7-11. By inspection of the figure, it can be seen that for the example shown: 
• All of the spoken samples exceed the detection value (see the breakout box). 
• 25.2% of the samples are validated within tolerance (the requirement was 4%). 
• 0.3% of the samples experienced clipped (the requirement was <1%). 
Upon completion of the HAT Stage-1 Capture process, the tool will automatically enter 
the HAT Stage-2 Filter (Section 6.2.2), HAT Stage-3 Absorption (Section 6.2.3) 
processing loop and calculate the unique HAT absorption template for the data set. 
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Figure 7-12 : HAT Application - Stage-3 Absorption plot of a user's waveform pair 
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The HAT absorption template is then briefly displayed within the HAT Application 
main window', as illustrated in Figure 7-12^. The HAT template visual was not 
designed for analytical purposes but solely as a useful real time indicator, for the user, 
that the capture and analysis hardware and software are functioning correctly (up to and 
including HAT Stage-3). 
The HAT Application will then enter Stage-4 Analysis mode © a n d feed the biometric 
absorption spectrum matrix into the HAT neural-network (Section 6.2.4.1), along with 
all of the other registered system users' templates: the new user is identified to the 
network as 'Good' and everyone else is identified as 'Bad'."* 
Finally the new user neural-network map will be used along with additional user data 
sets'* to determine the network owner's authentication threshold for use in Section 7.2.2.4. 
In an ideal scenario the authentication threshold of the neural-network would be T (one), 
whereby the network owner always realises a perfect template match and impostors 
always producing '0' (zero). The reality is somewhat different however. Recall the 
previous discussion on biometric markers in Section 4.2.2 'Factors Affecting Biometric 
Systems' and in order to minimise the FMR and FNMR (Section 4.2.3), the authentication 
threshold will actually exist somewhere in the range: 0 < Threshold 1. 
The HAT registration process takes approximately 3 minutes for the capture and another 
5 minutes for the analysis (within a user base of twenty users). 
' The visibility of the HAT template display can be set within the HAT options 'View' tab. 
^ The displayed HAT template is for illustration purposes only: each HAT template is acrually unique. 
^ HAT Stage-4 Analysis is poned to Matlab, acknowledged by the inclusion of the Matlab iconES. 
^ The HAT demonstration tool requires a minimum of two data sets (or capture runs) for authentication. 
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7.2.2.4 Authenticat ing an Existing I st r 
Once a user has been registered with the demonstration tool it is possible for HAT to 
provide a means of continuous identity verification for that user in the future. 
What follows is an explanation of the HAT Application authentication process for use 
by a registered user, with reference to the application window in Figure 7-7: 
Step 1: Set the HAT Path 
Open the HAT Application and select the working directory, containing the application 
executable and resources, in the drive selection window Q 
Step 2: identify V ourself 
The HAT demonstration tool currently operates as an authentication system (Section 
4.2.4), in contrast to an identification system. The user must therefore first provide a 
claimed identity for the demonstration tool to verify. Identifying oneself to the HAT 
Application is a straightforward case of entering the same uscmame as was originally 
used for registration, within the field ® and completing the user demography section © . 
Reviev* Set MDI Ext 
J _ J X J 
pill ^ 
Aung 
Bogdan 
Cela 
Donna 
Fenuj 
Ibrahim 
Nathan 
1 • 
Figure 7-13 : HAT Application - Registered HAT trial user s pull-down list 
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I f the registered user was part of the trials to be discussed in Section 7.3, then their 
name wil l already be contained within the convenient pull down list contained under the 
down-arrow in the usemame field ® , illustrated in Figure 7-13. 
Step 3: Review Settings (Optional) 
Select the Review icon in the HAT Application toolbar Q and conveniently review 
the complete applications settings as illustrated in the example in Figure 7-10. 
Step 4: Try a Simulation (Optional) 
New users may wish to try the authentication simulation under the Help>Simulation 
menu option. In a similar way to the capture simulation, the identify' simulation 
precisely mimics a genuine authentication cycle, responding appropriately to the 
relevant settings within the options screens. 
Step 5a: Check the HAT Headset Hardware 
Check that the HAT headset hardware is correctly connected (Figure 7-3) and that there 
are two good power cells^ in the microphones jack-plugs. 
StepSb: Position the HAT Headset 
Position the HAT Headset comfortably on the head ensuring that the ear microphone is 
positioned centrally over the pinna of the outer ear (Figure 5-2), in line with the ear 
canal, and with the mouth microphone positioned vertically central and horizontally 
offset from the centre of the mouth; to minimise breathing pickup. 
' The naming of the authentication process 'identify* does not imply the process is identification. The 
identify process remains strictly identity verification; the authentication of a claimed identity. 
^ Each microphone jack-plug requires a single LR44 power cell. 
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Step 6: Identify 
Press the 'Capture' button on the HAT toolbar Q and follow the comprehensive 
onscreen instructions: the HAT Application will prompt the user to speak up a random 
alphanumeric character. Having already registered with the system (and performed a 
simulation) the process will be familiar to the user. 
After each individual capture, the application will validate the samples according to the 
settings in the validation options tab (Figure 7-8), following the same process that is 
used for registration, producing a similar output to the one illustrated in Figure 7-11. 
The application will then cycle through the HAT Stage-2 Filter (Section 6.2.2), Stage-3 
Absorption (Section 6.2.3) process loop generating the HAT template (Figure 7-12). 
^ HAT Demonstra t ion Tool - Phil 
RIe Took Help 
Wofkng Dveciory 
3 d: IMyDoajmentsj j j 
• J M y Documents 
_JUoP 
HeadAuthenhca 
Captue VB Process; ML 
Veis iona5 2buid304 
• 
Stop i £, 1 ^ 
Matiob Neurd Analysis 
n 74H 
I 
Usei Name 
3 
r 
Best Match 
Green: Authenticated 
Red: Impostor 
All HAT processing 
stages complete 
Identtfy 
r 
Tiain | — 
•100 
O r 
• l U U 
• 75 
•50 
• 25 
• 0 • 0 
PM Rodwel«>2004 
Figure 7-14 : HAT Application - Stage-4 (neural-network) Analysis plot 
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The HAT template is presented to the stored neural-network of the claimed user and the 
output compared with the authentication threshold associated with their private network, 
producing the graphical output shown in Figure 7-14. Tlie plot shows the result of feeding 
the current user's template into each registered user's neural-network (from the HAT 
trials); the tallest bar indicating the best match. In this example, the tallest bar is coloured 
green, indicating that the current user was also the best match and passed threshold 
authentication (with the value indicated). As authentication was successfijl, the HAT 
* Identify' confidence-bar O is incremented by 25%. I f the value had been less than the 
authentication threshold, then the identify confidence-bar would have decreased by 25%. 
7.2.2.4a The H A T 'Identify' Confidence-bar 
The identify' Q confidence-bar, illustrated in Figure 7-15, was included into the HAT 
Application as a soft authentication response mechanism. It is acknowledged that when 
performing biometric authentication, there is always an element of inherent uncertainty 
associated with every biometric sample; the confidence-bar was implemented to reduce 
the efTects on the system FMR and FNMR. In essence, a single authentication failure 
within a continuous authentication system is of minor consequence and the confidence-
bar reflects this, bufTering such singular errors. As the confidence-bar is initialised at 
50%, or mildly confident, it would take two initial authentication failures for the system to 
flag a warning, as would be expected when in practice authentication successes of a 
correctly configured system should outnumber authentication failures. 
100 
75 
•100 
Confidence (S) 50% 
PM RadMel*20O4 
Figure 7-15 : H A T Application - Identity confidence-bar 
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7.3 The H A T Trials 
The development of the HAT process, including the initial proof-of-concept and early 
experimental work evaluating the absorption and correlation analysis methods, were 
based on various biometric templates captured from a small sample group of five 
volunteers. Once the viability of HAT had been established within this control group, a 
set of trials were proposed involving a set of twenty volunteers (four times the original 
sample group) to investigate the techniques potential within a wider population; these 
were called the HAT trials. 
The HAT trials can be broken down into four distinct stages of operation, which are 
identified below and discussed in the following sub-sections: 
• Preparation: Preparation for the trials, including establishing the trials format 
and readying the HAT demonstration tool for general use. 
• Selection: Selection of the trial volunteers. 
• Conduct: Conduct the trials. 
• Analysis: Analysis of the HAT trials results. 
7.3.1 Preparation for the Trials 
Preparation for the trials involved first establishing their format. It was decided to select 
a sample group of twenty volunteers: a number large enough to pose a suitable 
challenge to the HAT process and realise a usefiil set of qualitative results beyond the 
small developmental control group, and yet not too large as to require a long period of 
time or overload the design of the current HAT demonstration tool (including practical 
issues such as the robustness of the only modified HAT Headset and the inherent 
technical capacity of the HAT Application' not originally designed for large scale use). 
' The H A T Application (v. 15) compares A L L registered users during H A T Siage-4 Analysis. Although 
this is acceptable for twenty users, it would eventually become impractical as the user base increased. 
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Modifications to the HAT demonstration tool included both the hardware headset and the 
software application. The headset required strengthening for extended use, including 
lacing of microphone cables and the purchase of robust signal cables and plugs for the 
40+ trial sessions without fear of compromising the trial process due to faulty hardware. 
The HAT Application is covered in depth in the previous section (Section 7.2.2), 
including the extensive redesign and modifications the HAT Application underwent for 
use in the trials; accounting for around 3 months additional development time on top of 
the applications 6 month development cycle. 
7.3.2 Selection of the Trial Volunteers 
The HAT trial group was selected to represent as diverse a group o f people as could 
realistically be represented by twenty volunteers, and included diversity of: 
• Sex: in Chapter 5 Figure 5-12 it is illustrated how the male and female vocal 
ranges can differ by up to lOOHz. 
• Age: ranging from 24 to 64 years; in Chapter 5 Figure 5-1 it is illustrated how 
the human auditory range varies with age. 
• Nationality: predominantly English speakers, though including some foreign 
nationals to demonstrate how the HAT process is language independent, 
utilising variations in sound, not comprehension, for its biometric markers. 
The volunteers were pooled from a variety of disciplines from within the hosting 
University (including students and lecturers), and external to the University (including: 
professional and non-professional workers) to represent a fair cross section of society. 
Al l non-English trial participants spoke English as a second language, and for 
consistency all participant registration was conducted in English for the two primary 
sessions; and in a native tongue for a third session. For a complete list of participant and 
trial session statistics, see the HAT trials timetable in Appendix G. 
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7.3.3 Conducting the Trials 
The trials were conducted over two sessions: the first session being used to register the 
user's HAT Stage-4 neural-networks, and the second session to test the neural-networks 
and calculate the HAT Stage-5 (authentication) Thresholds. The sessions were separated 
by a period of at least 24 hours, to accommodate any short term aging of the biometric 
template. Like all biometric authentication systems HAT is susceptible to the 
variability's of the host's daily life: their age, mood, diet etc. can all have an effect on 
the composition of the bio-matter in the user's head (Section 4.2.2)'. 
The individual trial sessions were passively supervised within a controlled environment, 
where participants were insulated from excessive extraneous noise (Section 6.2.1.3) and 
unwarranted interruptions. After a brief introduction to the HAT Headset and 
Application, including a simulated registration run (Section 7.2,2.3: Step-4), participants 
commenced the user-managed HAT registration process, taking approximately 3 
minutes to complete. As the HAT Applications default Stage-4 Analysis is configured 
to use all twenty trial participant's biometric templates to construct the individual user's 
neural-networks, the trial sessions were conducted with the application in Capture Only^ 
mode: HAT Stage-4 Analysis was performed en-mass^ upon completion o f trial session 
1, and Stage-5 Thresholds calculated en-mass upon completion of trial session 2. 
7.3.4 H A T Trials Results 
A selection of the trial results are presented graphically in the following sub-sections, from 
two distinct stages of the HAT process: Stage-3 Absorption (Section 6.2.3) producing the 
HAT template(s); Stage-4 Analysis (Section 6.2.4) producing the neural-network(s). 
' The long term management of the H A T templates is the responsibiUty of a biometric security framework. 
^ H A T demonstration tool: Tools>Capture Mode>Capture Only. 
^ H A T demonstration tool *Mass Operations' fiinction, see Appendix F . 
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7.3.4.1 H A T Stage-3 Absorption templates 
The HAT Stage-3 Absorption template is the product of the mean calculation of ten 
audio waveforms (the numbers 0 to 9), captured during registration, at the twenty-five 
discrete HAT Stage-2 Filter spot-fi-equencies (Section 6.2.1.3). 
From the volunteer group of twenty participants, a selection o f six HAT templates are 
shown in Figure 7-16 to Figure 7-21 inclusive; captured directly fi-om the embedded 
'Absorption Curve Analysis' tool within the HAT Application'. With reference to the 
thesis section covering the composition of the HAT template (Section 6.2.6), it can be 
seen that the trial participants' individual response curves showed a clear collective 
pattern match or correlation with each other; Figure 7-17 is a good example of this 
exhibiting very little variance between curves. Even when observing a relatively poor 
example by comparison (Figure 7-20), the consistent shape of the participant's curves 
are still cleariy visible; it is only the variance which has changed, not the unique 
collective shape. By ftirther comparing the graphs between individual trial participants, 
it can be seen that each user's collective set of curves follows a unique shape, 
emphasized indicated by the mean curve (the HAT template) shown in red^. 
In comparison to a generic authentication model, the graphs in Figure 7-16 to Figure 7-21 
demonstrate HATs ability to f i i l f i l the following fundamental authentication principles: 
• Biometric samples captured fi-om an individual user are consistent in nature; 
o HAT Absorption patterns of curves ft^om the same user follow a common shape. 
• Biometric samples captured fi-om multiple users are inconsistent in nature; 
o HAT Absorption patterns of curves between users follow a different shape. 
' The ^Absorption Curve Analysis' tool is activated by entering a registered user into the 'User name* 
field or selecting a trial participant from the 'User name* pull down menu, and pressing the blue cog O . 
^ Standard deviation curves option has been omitted from the graphs to emphasize the H A T template. 
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7.3.4.2 H A T Stage-4 (Neural-network) Analysis 
To evaluate HATs performance as an authentication system, a user's neural-network 
was chosen from the trial participants' user base, and subjected to interrogation by a 
random selection of HAT templates from four other participants of the trials. The 
neural-networks under investigation were generated using Session 1 data sets, with the 
data set owner being identified as 'good' and A L L other trial participant's data sets 
(x20) as 'bad'. The HAT templates used to interrogate the chosen neural-network were 
generated using Session 2 data from the trials. 
The authentication tests were performed in Matlab, using the proprietary neural-
network toolbox, and the graphical results are presented as stem plots in Figure 7-23 to 
Figure 7-32 inclusive. The plots are presented in vertical pairs, where: 
• The upper plot is the neural-network response to feeding the original network 
Session 1 training data back into the network it was used to train. This gives an 
indication as to the training performance and authentication potential o f the 
network. This plot wants to be as close to the ideal response, shown in Figure 
7-22, as possible. Any significant deviation from the ideal response indicates 
inadequate training, and conversely could be improved with additional training 
data. In relation to a biometrics system, biometric templates are normally refined 
over time and not usually dependent on just one sample set; The HAT trials can 
therefore be considered as representative of a worse case scenario. 
• The lower plot represents the neural-network response to interrogation by a 
random selection of HAT templates from four other participants of the HAT 
trials. This plot also wants to be as near to the ideal response as possible (in 
reality, as near to the training response as possible). 
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Figure 7-22 : Neural-network testing: Ideal response 
Figure 7-22 shows the ideal analysis response plot, composed of the responses of four 
simulated masquerading users" HAT templates' (Users: 2, 3, 4, 5) of the network under 
test', enclosing the responses of the templates' of the network owner (User 1) positioned 
centrally. In the ideal scenario illustrated, the network owner receives 100% recognition 
of their templates (y-axis = 1), and all other users receive 0% recognition (y-axis = 0). 
The five trial participant's neural-network examples under analysis were specifically 
selected to represent a cross-section of threshold performance, ranging fi-om excellent 
(users with highly distinctive HAT templates exhibiting low FMR and FNMR error 
rates) to below average (users with less distinctive templates and potentially 
unacceptable FMR and FNMR error rates). The final example includes two sets of data 
ft-om trial session 3 (non-English participant native language), in Arabic and Malay. 
' Generated using H A T trials Session 2 data sets, for the numbers 1 through 10. 
' Generated using H A T Uials Session 1 data sets, for the numbers 1 through 10. 
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7.3.4.2a Example 1: User ul8_And (Threshold > 0.9) 
The example in Figure 7-23 and Figure 7-24 are for HAT trial user 'u l8_And ' . By 
inspection of the training data responses in Figure 7-23, the example initially appears to 
require further training. However, the HAT Identify plot shown in Figure 7-24 produces 
an excellent response, offering an authentication threshold well in excess of 0.9 for 
100% (FNMR=0%) of the owners challenge samples, with none of the opposition users' 
HAT templates approaching this figure (FMR=0%). 
7.3.4.2b Example 2: User u09_Stv (Threshold > 0.7) 
The example in Figure 7-25 and Figure 7-24 are for HAT trial user 'u09_Stv'. 
Although in the training responses in Figure 7-25, one training sample notably drops 
to a value of 0.8, the remaining training samples maintain an average in excess of 0.9. 
The HAT identify plot shown in Figure 7-24 produces a result with 90% of the 
owners challenge samples offering an authentication threshold in excess of 0.7 
(FNMR=10%), with only one sample form user 'ulO_Pau' presenting a potential 
problem for the network (FMR = 0.025%). 
7.3.4.2c Example 3: User ulO_Pau (Threshold = 0.4) 
The example in Figure 7-27 and Figure 7-27 are for HAT trial user 'ulO_Pau'. User 
'UIO_Pau's neural-network presented one of the best sets of training response data, 
with all training samples well in excess of 0.8 and an average of 0.9. However, this 
performance was not maintained during HAT Identification, where 90% o f the owners 
challenge samples offered an authentication threshold of only 0.4 (FNMR=10%). In the 
systems defence however, even at this reduced threshold only one of the opposition trial 
users' HAT templates, from user 'u08_Adr', challenged this threshold (FMR=0.025%). 
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Figure 7-23 ; Ncural-nclwork testing of user: u l8 And (Training Session 1) 
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Chapter 7 : Evaluation of the Head Authentication Technique 
0 6 
0 4 
0 2 
Nem.il i ierwoik ti . i ined foi iisei: I I 0 9 _ S T V 
o 
I • • • . 1 . • . • 1 . > . . t . . . . t . • . ' ' > ' • ' 1 ' • • » * 
u03_Viv I u10_Pau | u09_Stv | u01_Phi | ij04_Aun | 
Figure 7-25 : Neural-network testing of user: u09 Stv (Training Session 1) 
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Figure 7-26 : Neural-network testing of user: u09 Stv (Identify Session 2) 
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Figure 7-27 : Neural-network testing of user: ulO Pau (Training Session I ) 
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Figure 7-28 : Neural-network testing of user: u 10 Pau (Identify Session 2) 
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7,3.4.2d Example 4: User u01_Phi (Threshold ^ 0.2) 
The example in Figure 7-29 and Figure 7-30 are for HAT trial user 'u01_Phi'. User 
'u01_Phi' appeared at first inspection to offer a potentially robust neural-network, with 
all training samples exceeding a value of 0.8, illustrated in Figure 7-29. However, 
during HAT Identify testing, the network produced a below average performance, 
offering an authentication threshold of only 0.2 for 90% of the network owners 
challenge samples (FNMR=10%, FMR=0.075%). With only 60% of the owners 
challenge samples exceeding a threshold value of 0.7 (FNMR=40%, FMR=0%), this 
network presents a clear case for retraining (Figure 7-30) as neither of these scenarios is 
acceptable in the long term. 
7.3.4.2e Example 5: User ul7_Pet (Foreign Language, Threshold 0.5) 
The example in Figure 7-31 and Figure 7-32 are for HAT trial user 'ul7_Pet'. In this 
example it was decided to introduce some foreign language data into the tests to 
demonstrate the HAT processes transparency to language; the HAT process is not 
dependent on 'what you say', but 'how you say it ' . In the examples, user 'u l l_Abd' 
presented his training and challenge data in Arabic, and user 'u04_Aun' in Malay: two 
languages which sound distinctively different to English. The plot showing the results of 
neural-network training is shown in Figure 7-31, illustrating a good training session with 
100% of the training samples exceeding a threshold value of 0.8. The HAT Identify 
challenge plot, shown in Figure 7-32, shows a good response to both the owners and the 
opposition users' HAT templates, with 80% of the network owners challenge data 
exceeding a direshold of 0.7 and 90% exceeding 0.5 (FNMR=10%): none of the 
opposition users' challenge samples present any threat to the owners network (FiVrR=0%), 
and this example offers the second best authentication response from the tests. 
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Figure 7-29 : Neural-network testing of user: uOl Phi (Training Session 1) 
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Figure 7-30 : Neural-network testing of user: uOl Phi (Identity Session 2) 
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Figure 7-31 : Neural-network testing of user: ul7 Pet (Training Session 1 - Foreign) 
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Figure 7-32 : Neural-network testing of user: ul7 Pet (Identify Session 2 - Foreign] 
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7.3.4.3 System Authentication Thresholds and Error Rates 
Owing to HATs potential for continuous non-intrusive authentication, individual 
authentication successes and failures within a HAT protected system are less important 
than in traditional PoE security systems. It is a user's authentication history or trend 
which wil l now be used to determine an appropriate system response to deviations in the 
approved authentication response profile. 
By combining the error rates generated in the examples 7.3.4.2a to7.3.4.2e, it is possible 
to produce preliminary error rates for the current HAT system as a whole o f FNMR = 6% 
and FMR = 0.025%, where preliminary draws attention to the following key points: 
• The error rates are for the current demonstration tool NOT for the H A T process. 
• The user's neural-network was trained using only ONE registration data set. 
• The user's authentication threshold was calculated using only ONE set of user 
registration challenge data. 
• The HAT Application does not intelligently manage its thresholds. 
The HAT demonstration tool (vl5.2) calculates its HAT Stage-5 Thresholds based on a 
preset FNMR of 10% (1 in 10 samples); when trial user's session-2 data is fed into their 
session-l network. The HAT Application has NOT been programmed to intelligently 
manage or dynamically refine its user thresholds, as would be expected in a commercial 
system. Although a basic thresholds calculation algorithm was required within the HAT 
Application to facilitate authentication, this task would traditionally fall under the 
jurisdiction of an overall security management framework. 
System thresholds management is included in the section on Future work (Section 8.3). 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Having defined the five discrete stages of the HAT authentication process in Chapter 6, 
it was necessary to evaluate the technique in a broader context. To realise this goal, a set 
of HAT trials were conceived involving volunteers including: both sexes, a cross 
section of age groups, and multiple nationalities. To enable the trials, the HAT 
demonstration tool was developed out of the research test bed used to prove the original 
concepts of head authentication in Chapter 5. 
Through a series of examples, the individuality of trial participants' biometric 
template(s) generated at Stage-3 of the HAT process was proven, where: 
• HAT Absorption patterns of curves from the same user follow a common shape. 
• HAT Absorption patterns of curves between users follow a different shape. 
Through a series of further examples, a selection of the user templates," generated in 
HAT Stage-3, were fed into a selection of five HAT Stage-4 authentication networks 
realising a series of stem plots giving an indication as to the systems authentication 
capabilities. The results were presented in order of performance from excellent to poor, 
realising error rates (for the examples shown) of FNMR = 6% and FMR = 0.025%. 
These error rates are highly dependent on the authentication thresholds set in HAT 
Stage-5, and it is expected that a biometric network management framework would 
ultimately manage these values in order to maintain optimum system performance: the 
development of such a framework was beyond the scope of this research. 
The next chapter discusses the conclusions of the research into non-intrusive 
authentication in greater detail, addressing the key areas of research limitation and 
future work for the novel HAT process. 
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8 Conclusion 
It was established in Chapter 2 that security provisions within the current mobile tele-
communications networks, are primarily aimed at secure communications through data 
encryption and terminal authentication via use of a SIM card. It was discussed how the 
advanced services enabled by post 2"^ generation wideband mobile networks have 
developed services far in advance of the security systems originally conceived to protect 
their forebears. There now exists a requirement for a more secure subscriber-basGd 
authentication system enabling protection commensurate with the risks and consequences 
associated with the more sensitive information that these new service networks access. 
Having clearly identified the problem the research was conceived to address, a survey was 
conducted to assess public opinion on current mobile security and their awareness of the 
security issues raised by the advanced data services of wideband mobile networks. The 
survey was divided into two sections covering present and future mobile authentication 
respectively. Chapter 3 covered the first part of this survey and proposed the hypothesis: 
The majority of mobile subscribers either do not understand or are lacking 
well founded opinion on mobile security issues. They are also generally 
ignorant of the security implications of the advanced sen'ices being offered 
through the next generation of wideband networks known as 3G. 
The survey results presented a contradiction. Although the majority of survey users are 
happily willing to signup for the advanced services on offer by the wideband network 
operators, with 85% claiming to be aware of the security risks involved, 70% are still 
unwilling or unable to activate the most rudimentary security setting on their current 
mobile devices; the PIN. The survey concluded broadly in support of the hypothesis, but 
with the added finding that it is not the principals of authentication which users are 
rejecting, but the current application o f those principals; the authentication mechanism(s). 
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One of the requirements of the research was for an authentication mechanism, either 
novel or adapted, which could be realised non-intrusively within a mobile context: the 
discipline of biometrics naturally lent itself to this requirement. A full review of current 
biometric authentication techniques was conducted in Chapter 4, including the second 
part of the consumer survey addressing users' attitudes towards f\iture authentication 
issues; including biometrics. The survey found that 96% of respondents had no 
objection to their biometric markers being used as part of a mobile authentication 
system; this is an excellent result when compared to the 70% of respondents who are 
essentially unhappy with using the PIN, suggesting users would use a suitable system i f 
it existed. When asked about their views on continuous authentication, 83% of 
respondents had no objection to the idea. The groundwork was essentially laid for the 
development of a continuous, non-intrusive, biometric authentication system. 
Through a novel process of reinvention of selected existing biometric techniques 
combined with principles drawn from the discipline of Audio Evoked Responses, 
Chapter 5 discusses the conception o f the Head Authentication Technique. The chapter 
includes a series o f trials performed by the ENT department o f the local hospital 
designed to experience AER (specifically otoacoustic emission) analysis techniques in 
their native environment as an intellectual grounding for the techniques development. 
HAT is a novel, inherently multi-modal, biometric authentication technique where the 
natural symbiotic relationship of the 'behavioural characteristics' of the human voice 
stimulate the 'physiological anatomy' of the head. The HAT research process discussed 
in Chapter 6 realised two subtly different versions of the head authentication principles: 
the absorption method and the correlation method. Af^er extensive testing on and 
between the two methods, the absorption method was selected as the more appropriate 
method for final development due to its consistently better performance and simpler 
analysis stages, requiring less processing time. 
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The HAT authentication process was rationalised into a five stage operation, defined as: 
• Capture of biometric audio waveform pairs from a user. 
• Filter of audio waveform pairs at discrete spot-frequencies. 
• Absorption comparison o f discrete waveform spectra defining a H A T template. 
• Analysis of the HAT absorption template within a neural-network. 
• Classification of the neural-network output through threshold comparison. 
Having established the principles and stages of the HAT process, the tool was evaluated 
through a series of trials, discussed in Chapter 7, involving a group of twenty volunteers 
representing a cross section of sexes, ages and nationalities. To enable the trials, a 
comprehensive HAT demonstration tool was developed to manage system registration 
and authentication for the novice user. Analysis of the trials results using a series of 
group examples realised system error rates of FNMR = 6% and FMR = 0.025%, and 
confirmed the individuality of HAT templates generated by the HAT process, where: 
• HAT Absorption patterns of curves from the same user follow a common shape. 
• HAT Absorpfion patterns of curves between users follow a different shape. 
The research has met all o f the objectives originally outlined in Chapter 1 and has 
resulted in the design and development of an advanced authentication technique capable 
o f continuous non-intrusive application in a vocalised services environment. A number 
o f papers relating to the research have been presented at national and international 
conferences, and the research has realised an international patent, in association with 
Orange PCS, in the area of 'determining identity of a user' on an electronic 
communication system (#GB2375205, 2001). The novel aspects of the patent include: 
• The head authentication method(s) of biometric capture. 
• The head authentication method(s) of biometric analysis. 
Copies of these materials are included in the appendices. 
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8.1 Achievements of the Research 
This section provides a list o f the key research achievements made during the course of 
the PhD, culminating in the Head Authentication Technique. In order the research has: 
1. Performed a review of mobile network technologies, from the 1^ generation analogue 
telephony systems to the latest 3"* generation wideband digital networks, identifying 
user authentication security issues relating to post 2G developments. 
2. Assessed mobile subscriber's awareness of the risks of masquerade attack on current 
mobile devices, specifically relating to the effectiveness of the PoE FIN, and their 
receptiveness to a range of possible alternative advanced authentication principles. 
3. Performed an analysis of current biometric principles and techniques, identifying 
those techniques which could be applied in a mobile context. 
4. Conceived a number of novel non-intrusive biometric authentication approaches 
applicable to the mobile environment, leading to the selection of a single approach 
and its realisation in a proof-of-concept prototype. The chosen approach was named 
the Head Authentication Technique (HAT). 
5. Developed the HAT authentication biometric into a five stage process and realised the 
registration and authentication aspects of the technique within a user accessible 
demonstration tool. The composite prototype tool included construction of a hardware 
biometric collector and programming in Win32 of a software management application. 
6. Evaluated HAT in a series of trials using a representative user community, providing 
proof of viability of the technique in practice. The trials demonstrated the unique 
nature of the biometric templates produced by the HAT process: how biometric 
templates from the same user exhibit a common pattern, yet templates between users 
exhibit a different pattern. The trials were also used to demonstrate the authentication 
performance of the process through a series of masquerade challenge examples: basic 
enror rates for the HAT demonstration tool were: FNMR = 6% and FMR = 0.025%. 
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8.2 Limitations of the Research 
Although all of the original objectives for the research set out in Chapter I have been 
met, time constraints and the operational envelope of the HAT demonstration tool 
imposed certain limitations upon the work, which are summarised below: 
• HAT authentication can only be performed when a user is verbally interacting with 
their mobile device. As such, HAT would most usefully form part o f an arsenal o f 
authentication techniques, covering the full range of mobile interaction scenarios. 
• During the development of the HAT process, a small core group of five 
volunteers was used to develop the initial proof o f concept up to peer approval 
for the HAT trials. The trials were conceived to extend the proof o f concept to a 
wider audience; however, owing to the completely novel aspect of the technique 
the trial group was deliberately restricted to twenty volunteers. It is accepted that 
this number is representative of only a restricted cross-section of society. 
• Although the HAT process was primarily developed for mobile use, it has not 
been installed or demonstrated within a mobile device. The HAT demonstration 
tool is however capable of operation within a laptop computer. 
• Development of the HAT process included two methods of template analysis, 
absorption and correlation: due to time constraints only the absorption method 
was developed to proof of concept and incorporated into the HAT process (and 
subsequent demonstration tool). Further development of the correlation analysis 
method could yield additional multi-modal system performance benefits. 
• Although not a limitation of the HAT process, the HAT demonstration tool was 
developed for use in trial groups o f twenty users (the HAT trials); larger trials 
would require receding of certain aspects of the tool: e.g. HAT Stage-4 Analysis. 
Despite these limitations, the research programme has made valid contributions to 
knowledge and provided sufficient proof of concept for the ideas proposed. 
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8.3 Future Research Work 
The HAT research has introduced a novel hybrid multimodal biometric to the field of 
electronic user authentication. Although the technique was originally developed for use 
within the field of mobile communications, future work could extend the techniques 
scope to include many additional electronic communications devices, such as the PC. 
During the development of the HAT process, certain decisions had to be made to ensure 
that the research reached completion within a reasonable time. A number of these 
decisions lef^ areas for fliture work, which are summarised below: 
• Basic HAT Stage-1 Capture collects audio samples from two points on the 
user's head. Once the HAT technique was proven, the possibility existed of 
raising the number of capture points to three; including both ears. 
• The resolution of the HAT Stage-3 Absorption template (dependent on the 
number o f Stage-2 spot-fi-equencies), was partly based on the available 
processing resources available during HAT development. Integration within a 
custom designed chipset would allow for optimised code and the potential for 
higher resolution templates without impacting upon authentication cycle times. 
• HAT Stage-3 currently only utilises the absoq)tion method to realise the HAT 
template. The correlation method of difference analysis was not f l i l ly developed 
owing to the existence of a working alternative; they both could exist in unison. 
• HAT Stage-5 Thresholds algorithm used during the HAT trials was passive, and 
based on the network owners' samples simple numerical advantage over 
impostors. Future work could dynamically set the threshold level, based on a more 
precise statistical analysis of authentication successes and failures over time. 
• A second round of HAT trials involving a more comprehensive assessment of 
the technique, involving a larger sample group (50 to 100 users), more 
registration session data (>2), a more natural 'noisy' mobile environment. 
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8.4 Authentication in Next Generation Mobile Systems 
The last ten years have bared witness to a revolution in communications technology not 
seen since Antonio Meucci original invention o f the 'teietrofono' (telephone) in 1849 
(Link: Meucci), and the first live trans-Atlantic television transmission in 1962. Up until 
the mid 1980s, mobile communications for the majority of the general population was a 
large static box at the side of the road containing a coin operated bakelite telephone. With 
the introduction of the first analogue mobile handsets in 1983, users' perceptions of 
mobile communications changed forever. Running parallel with similar growth in the 
computer market, the introduction of 2™* generation digital technology in 1992 saw the 
boundaries between mobile handsets and mobile computers merge, with handsets offering 
traditional computer facilities, and computers becoming ever more mobile. The 3"* 
generation of mobile communications technology, introduced in 2004, has brought a 
wealth of new service possibilities to network operators and their subscribers, including: 
rich-internet, online-banking and m-commerce: to offer these latest personal services, 
network operators must be able to safely handle the highly sensitive and personal data on 
which these services depend. Unfortunately, the security in place to protect this personal 
data fi-om masquerade attack has remained essentially unchanged since the introduction of 
the first mobile handsets in 1983, in essence 3"* generation data (banking details, medical 
details) under the protection of a 1^ generation authentication system designed to prevent 
somebody making a voice call on your analogue handset. 
The successful deployment of next generation mobile networks and their services will 
become increasingly dependent on the basic authentication assurance o f the networks 
subscribers. HAT was conceived and developed to address this need offering a viable 
authentication solution capable of continuously and non-intrusively verifying the identity 
of any user accessing your data at any time. A biometric solution dependent on 'who you 
are', not on 'what you know' (or have overheard), or *vvhat you have' (or have stolen). 
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Internet Links 
3GPP 
Name: Third Generation Partnership Project. 
Function: Catalyst of telecommunications Standards Bodies. 
Web: http://www. 3 gpp.org 
A4Vision 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
A4Vision. 
Provider of 'Vis ion, Access, Enrolment and Identification' systems. 
http://www.a4vision.com 
APWG 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Anti-Phishing Working Group. 
Committed to wiping out Internet scams and fraud. 
http://www.antiphishing.org 
BBC Mobile Services 
Name: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Mobile services. 
Function: The BBC on your mobile. 
Web: http://www.bbc.co.ulc/mobile 
Biomark 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Biomark. 
Specialists in electronic animal identification (tagging). 
http://www.biomark.com 
Biometric Consortium 
Name: The Biometric Consortium. 
Function: R&D, evaluation and application of biometric identification technology 
Web: http://www.biometrics.org 
BioPassword 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
BioPassword Inc. (Issaquah, Washington). 
Biometric password enforcement software. 
http://www.biopassword.com 
Bluetooth 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Bluetooth 
The official Bluetooth website. 
http://www.bluetooth.com 
CCCN 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Centre for Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience, Department of 
Computing and Mathematics, University of Stirling. 
Overview of neural-networks. 
http://nevis.stir.ac.uk 
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CompTlA 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Disney 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Computing Technology Industry Association. 
Dedicated to advancing the growth of the IT industry. 
http://www.comptia.org 
The Walt Disney Company. 
Entertainment specialists in studios, parks and media, since 1923, 
http://www.disney.com 
DuPont Authentication Systems 
Name: Dupont Authentication Systems. 
Function: Provider of authentication security solutions: IZON^'^ technology. 
Web: http://www.dupontauthentication.com 
ETSI 
Name: The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (France). 
Function: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) standards in Europe. 
Web: http://www.etsi.org 
GSM Association 
Name: GSM Association. 
Function: Annual Reports 
Web: http://www.gsmworld,com 
Home Office (Identity Fraud) 
Name: The Home Office. 
Function: Home Office Identity Fraud Steering Committee. 
Web: http://www.identity-theft.org.uk 
iAfB/ICSA 
Name: 
IBG 
Function: 
Web: 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
International Association for Biometrics ( iAfB) 
International Computer Security Association (ICSA). 
Glossary of Biometric Terms (1999). 
http://www.iaft5.org.uk/docs/glossary.htm 
International Biometrics Group. 
Biometrics leading consulting and technology services, since 1996. 
http://www.biometricgroup.com 
ISIS(a) 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Image Speech and Intelligent Systems Research Group. 
Automatic Gait Recognition @ University of Southampton. 
http://www.gait.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
ISIS(b) 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Image, Speech and Intelligent Systems Research Group. 
Automatic Ear Recognition @ University of Southampton. 
http://www.isis.ecs.soton.ac.uk 
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ISO 
Name: International Organization for Standardization. 
Function: Network of the national standards institutes of 151 countries. 
Web: http://www.iso.org 
ITU 
Name: International Telecommunications Union. 
Function: Telecommunications standards and harmonisation union, since 1865. 
Web: http://www.itu.int 
Juniper Research 
Name: Juniper Research. 
Function: Providers of analytical reports and consultancy to the telecoms industry. 
Web: http://www.juniperresearch.com 
Lavater (German) 
Name: Johann Casper Lavater 
Function: 19^ Century theologian and physiognomist. 
Web: http.7/www.kunsthaus.ch/ausstellungen/2001/lavater 
Meucci 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
MDA 
Antonio Meucci 
19**" Century inventor. 
http://www.italianhistorical.org/MeucciStory.htm 
Name: Mobile Data Association 
Function: Global association for vendors and users of mobile data. 
Web: http://www.mda-mobiIedata.org/mda 
National Statistics 
Name; National Statistics and the Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
Function: Home of official UK statistics. 
Web: http://www.statistics,gov.uk 
NTC 
Name: National Training Centre for Scientific Support to Crime Investigation 
Function: British police force crime scene investigation unit. 
Web: NTC - http://www.forensic-training.police.uk 
NTCSSI - http://centrex.police.uk/forensic-training/scientific.html 
Nuance Communications Inc. 
Name: Nuance Communications Inc. 
Function: Providers of voice automation technology, since 1994. 
Web: http://www.nuance.com 
Orange 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Orange^M PCS Ltd. 
The principle UK mobile network operator (2003)(Section 3.3.1), 
http://www.orange.co.uk 
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Otoacoustics Emissions 
Name: The Otoacoustic Emissions (OAE) Portal Zone. 
Function: Information, News and Forum on OAEs. 
Web: http://www.otoemissions.org 
Persay Inc. 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Persay Inc. (Woodbridge NJ), a subsidiary of Converse Technology. 
Providers of voice verification technology: FreeSpeech™. 
http://persay.com 
Recognition Systems Inc. 
Name: Recognition Systems Inc. (Ingersoll-Rand Inc.) 
Function: Principal supplier of hand geometry products: HandPunch/Handkey®. 
Web: http://www.recogsys.com / http://www.handreader.com 
Sagan, C. 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
The Cari Sagan Foundation. 
Dedicated to the "planet-wide campaign of public science". 
http://www.carlsagan.com 
Statistics 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Statistics Glossary 
Explanation of statistical analyses terms. 
http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary 
VeriVoice Inc. 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
VeriVoice Inc. (Princeton NJ) 
Providers of biometric voice verification solutions. 
http://www.verivoice.com 
Veid Ltd. 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Veid Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) 
Hand Vascular Pattem Person Identification system: the VP-II. 
http://www.veid.net 
Vocalist 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Vocalist 
Dedicated to the world of singers, vocalists and students o f the voice. 
http://www.vocalist.org.uk 
W2F 
Name: Wireless World Forum 
Function: Online community of 4000 senior professionals in the wireless industry. 
Web: http://www.w2forum.com 
Wikipedia 
Name: 
Function: 
Web: 
Wikipedia 
Web-based free-content reference encyclopaedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia 
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Appendix A 
Anatomy of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
The anatomy of a typical mobile SIM card (Section 2.3.1) 
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Appendix A Anatomy of the Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) 
The micro controller on a SIM is effectively a complete, albeit very small, computer on 
a single potted chip (Figure A-1), containing all the basic integrated hardware features 
normally found in a larger desktop or laptop system. It is this fully integrated package 
that gives a SIM its inherent security. 
A SIMs' features include: 
• An operating system which can respond to external or internal commands. 
• Data storage that can be accessed via the operating system. 
• Applications called to perform simple or complex tasks when requested. 
^ 1 L 
CPU 
Secure 
Access 
RAM 
ROM (SIM OS) 
EEPROM 
(Application data: IMSI, Ki,...) 
Figure A - l : Block diagram of a typical SIM 
C P U (Typically 8-Bit) - The Central Processing Unit (CPU) is the processing heart of 
the SIM. Similar to the CPU found in a typical desktop computer, a SIM's CPU 
performs all required software and data processing. In stark contrast to a desktop 
computer system however, the CPU is typically only an 8-Bit', low performance, low 
power drain device. 
Desktop computer CPUs circa 2004/5 were predominantly 32-bit, with 64-bit available for power users. 
Appendix A : Anatomy of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
RAM (Typically 256Bytes) - Unlike a conventional computer, the RAM is extremely 
limited in a smart card, usually amounting to only a few hundred bytes. This memory is 
used for functions, such as program variables, stack values and pointers, and in 
particular, the input/output buffer memory. 
ROM (Typically 16IC) - The ROM section contains the SIM card operating system. 
This is Masked ROM, which unlike conventional ROM that is programmed electrically 
with the operating system, is programmed during the wafer manufacture. This means 
that the code is processed into the silicon forming an integral part o f the device itself. 
This mask process means that the code can never be altered, erased or replaced. 
E E P R O M (Typically 4-16IC) - The EEPROM stores data on the card which needs to be 
permanent, it is analogous to the hard disk on a computer, except considerably smaller. 
InputyOutput function - The I/O is the system by which the SIM communicates with 
the ME, The operating system uses a serial simplex protocol called T=0, which is an 
international standard specified by ISO. 
Control Logic - The control logic implements of functions associated with the low 
layer systems, such as memory management and security. Some of the SlM's security 
measures are hardware implemented, such as clock and voltage tamper detectors. 
These stop an attack on the device by shutting down the SIM i f monitored values stray 
outside tolerances i.e. additional CPU clock cycle detection due to unexpected coding 
instructions or additional battery loading due to hardware modification. 
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Data Stored on the SIM 
The data stored on the SIM is stored in 'elementary files', which are arranged in 
'directory files' much like the DOS file system found on a standard PC. The operating 
system can select an elementary file, and then perform commands upon that file. For 
each individual file, access conditions can be set when the card is personalised. These 
access conditions determine i f an action can be performed. 
GSM Data 
The GSM data stored on the SIM card is used by the network operator to check the 
identity o f the subscriber and where they within the network. The SIM contains; an 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSl); a Temporary Mobile Subscriber 
Identifier (TMSI), used to identify the subscriber to the system; secret keys for 
authentication and encryption. The IMSl & TMSI are completely independent to the 
IMEI. Using these keys, the network can authenticate who you are, or at least who the 
SIM is registered to. I f authentication fails, then the subscriber is denied access to the 
network (Section 2.3,4). For security, the SIM also stores the current mobile cell 
identifier each time it is activated. 
User Data 
The SIM is able to store information for the user, such as phonebook data, short 
message data (SMS). In fact, the bulk of the EEPROM is used to store datafields 
required for user data. The network operator does however have some control over the 
size of the available user data. With flexible partitioning it is possible, for example, to 
limit the available phonebook to 100 entries in order to utilise some of the SIMs 
memory space to add operator specific customisation. 
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Appendix B 
A Breakdown of the IMEI Code 
A breakdown of the mobile handset IMEI code (Section 2.3.2) 
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Appendix B A Breakdown of the IMEI Code 
The IMEI has undergone some evolutionary changes since its introduction in 1992; the 
three figures below represent the three possible variations of the IMEI, dependant on the 
manufacturing date of the mobile handset (Figure A-2). 
Prior to 01.01.2003 (phase 1) 
xxxxxx XX xxxxxx 0 
SP: Spare 
SNR: Serial Number 
F A C : Final Assembly Code 
TAG: Type Approval Code 
Between 01.01.2003 and 01.04.2004 (Phase 2) 
xxxxxx 00 xxxxxx X 
CD: Check Digit 
SNR: Serial Number 
F A C : Final Assembly Code 
TAG: Type Approval Code 
After 01.04.2004 (Phase 2+) 
XXXXXXXX XXXXXX X 
CD: Check Digit 
SNR: Serial Number 
TAG: Type Allocation Code 
Figure A-2: The code variations of ihe IMEI 
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• T A C - Type Approval/Allocation Code 
The first two-digits (all phases) identify the IMEI reporting body and the 
remaining digits, are the Type Identifier defined by the reporting body 
• F A C - Final Assembly Code 
Up until 31.12.2002, the FAC identified the manufacturing facility where the 
handset was assembled, as shown in Table A - 1 . 
07, 40 Motorola 
10. 20 Nokia 
30 Ericsson 
40, 41, 44 Siemens 
50 Bosch 
51 Sony Ericsson 
60 Alcatel 
70 Sagem 
80 Philips 
85 Panasonic 
Table A-1 : IMEI Final Assembly Codes (FAC) 
• SNR - Serial Number 
A unique product serial number 
• SP-Spare 
The SP is an additional spare digit, usually set to zero. 
• CD - Check Digit 
The CD is a single digit dependent on the value o f the preceding 14 digits. 
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Appendix C 
Mobile Phone Security Survey 
A copy of the questions asked as part of the security survey covered in Chapter 3 
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Appendix C Mobile Phone Security Survey 
Section 1 of 4 - About You! 
Q 1 . What Gender are you? 
Male • 
Female • 
Q 2 . T o which age group do you belong? 
Under 16 • 
1 7 - 2 4 • 
2 5 - 3 4 • 
3 5 - 4 4 • 
4 5 - 5 4 • 
55 - 64 • 
Over 65 • 
Q 3 . Are you an employee/student at the university of Plynnouth? 
Yes • 
No • 
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Section 2 of 4 - Services 
Q 1 . To which network provider do you subscr ibe? 
0^(BT Cellnet) • 
Orange • 
T-Mobile (One2one) • 
Virgin • 
Vodafone • 
Other • 
Q 2 . How do you pay for your phone ca l ls? 
Contract • 
Pre-pay • 
Q 3 . Who is the manufacturer of your cunrent mobile phone? 
Bosche • 
Ericsson • 
Motorola • 
Nokia • 
Samsung • 
Siemens • 
Sony • 
Q4. When choosing your network operator, please rank the considerations 
below in order of importance to you. 
Low Medium High 
Choice of handset • • • 
Network coverage • • • 
Operator loyalty • • • 
Prices, deals etc. • • • 
Reliability • • • 
Security features • • • 
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Q 5 . When selecting your handset, p lease rank the considerations below in 
order of importance to you. 
Low Medium High 
Accessories • • • 
Battery life • n • 
Brand loyalty • • • 
Games • • • 
Connectivity • • • 
Security features • • • 
Swappable facias • • • 
Q6. Approximately, how many hours a day is your phone switched o n ? 
< 1 • 
2 - 5 • 
6 - 1 0 • 
> 10 • 
Q7. Approximately, how many times in a typical day is your phone u s e d ? 
0 -1 2 - 5 6 - 1 0 > 10 
Voice calls • • • • 
Data services (SMS, etc) • • • • 
Features (Games, etc.) • • n • 
Q8. P lease indicate which services you use on your mobile phone. 
Yes No Not Available 
Voice • • • 
Text messages (SMS) • • • 
Information services • • • 
WAP • • • 
Email • • • 
International roaming • • • 
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Q9. P lease indicate any additional services you would like to s e e on a mobile 
phone in the future. 
Yes No 
Video conferencing • • 
Ecommerce • • 
Personal organiser • • 
Music download • • 
Video on demand • • 
Multimedia message (MMS) • • 
G P S location services • • 
Other 
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Section 3 of 4 - Security 
Q 1 . P lease indicate v^hich of these following statements applies to y o u ? 
Note: The use of the term 'calls' in the following question includes all fonms of 
communications; voice, text. W A P etc. 
My mobile phone has: Yes No 
- been borrowed and tampered with. • • 
- been borrowed and calls made. • • 
- been stolen and NO calls made. • • 
- never been stolen or abused. • • 
Q 2 . Are you aware of the existence of the international mobile equipment 
identifier (IMEI) of your handset? 
Yes • 
No • 
Q3. Do you use any of the personal identification number (PIN) authentication 
facilities on your mobile phone? 
Yes • 
No • 
What is a PIN • 
If yes , please indicate which facilities you use. 
Yes No Not Available 
Not 
Applicable 
PIN @ switch-on • • • • 
PIN keypad lock • • • • 
Other PIN options • • • • 
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Q4. How often do you change A N Y of your mobile phone P IN 's? 
Not applicable • 
Never • 
Initially at purchase • 
Monthly • 
Yearly • 
Q 5 . How do you consider PIN authentication? 
Convenient • 
Inconvenient • 
Q6. How do you feel generally about the protection the PIN provides against 
mobile phone misuse? 
Very confident • 
Confident • 
Adequate • 
Inadequate n 
Indifferent • 
Q7. Have you ever had to use the pin unlock code ( P U K ) on your mobile 
phone, because you have forgot your P IN? 
Yes • 
No • 
Q8, Do you use the s a m e PIN for multiple services, such a s your mobile 
phone, bank cards, P C A c c e s s etc? 
Yes • 
No • 
Q9, Do you think, in principle, additional mobile phone security is: 
A good idea • 
A bad idea • 
Indifferent • 
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Note: Biometrics is the measurement of unique personal characteristics (e.g. 
Fingerprints, Voice Recognition & Hand Geometry) 
Q10. How do you feel about biometric authentication in general? 
A good idea • 
A bad idea • 
Indifferent • 
Q11. P lease indicate in the table below which of the following methods of 
security authentication are you aware of & which you would consider using 
on a mobile phone? 
Security Technique 
Aware of? Would use? 
Yes No Yes No 
Finger Print • • • • 
Voice Print • • • • 
Hand Geometry • • • • 
Facial Recognition • • • • 
Iris Scanning • • • • 
Typing Style • • • • 
Q12. How would you feel about your mobile phone continuously and 
transparently authenticating who is using it? 
A good idea • 
A bad idea • 
Indifferent • 
Q13. For any authentication technique to work, a security profile or signature 
about you has to exist somewhere; where would you prefer this security 
profile to reside? 
A good idea • 
A bad idea • 
Indifferent • 
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Section 4 of 4 - General Knowledge 
Q1. Which of the following is NOT a UK Network Operator? 
Don't know • 
Nokia • 
T-Mobile • 
Orange • 
Vodafone • 
Q2. Which of the following is NOT a mobile phone buzzword? 
Don't know • 
3G • 
ADSL • 
WAP • 
Q3. What is the data rate of a standard G S M connection? 
Don't know • 
9.6 Kbps • 
14.4 Kbps • 
56 Kbps • 
64 Kbps • 
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Appendix D 
The Resource Interchange File Format (RIFF) 
An explanation of the structure and usage of the WAV and RIFF file formats (Section 7.2) 
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Appendix D The Resource Interchange File Format 
(RIFF) 
The WAVE file format is a subset of the Microsoft RIFF file specification, which can 
include many different types of data. Although it was originally intended for multimedia 
files, the specification is open enough to allow almost any form of data to be stored 
within the file format, and used or ignored as required by programs that can read the 
format correctly. 
R I F F Format 
RIFF is a file format for storing many kinds of data, primarily multimedia data like 
audio and video. It is based on chunks and sub-chunks. Each chunk has a type, 
represented by a four-character tag. This chunk type comes first in the file, followed by 
the size of the chunk, then the contents of the chunk. 
The entire RIFF file is a big chunk that contains all the other chunks. The first thing in 
the contents of the RIFF chunk is the "form type," which describes the overall type of 
the file's contents. So the structure of a RIFF file looks like this: 
Offset Length Contents Note 
0000 4 b y t e s 'R' 'F' *F' 
0004 4 b y t e s < f i l e length> 3 2 - b i t unsigned i n t e g e r ^ 
0008 4 b y t e s Form type 4 c h a r a c t e r s 
OOOC 4 by t e s 
0010 4 b y t e s 
0014 
chunk type 
chunk l e n g t h 
chunk data 
4 c h a r a c t e r s 
3 2 - b i t unsigned i n t e g e r ^ 
' All integers are stored in the Intel low-high byte ordering (referred to as "little-endian"). 
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A more detailed description of the RIFF format can be found in the Microsoft Win32 
Multimedia API documentation, which is supplied as a Windows Help fi le with many 
Windows programming tools such as C-H- compilers. 
W A V E (wav) File Format 
The WAVE file format is a subset of RIFF used for storing digital audio. Its form type 
is "WAVE", and it requires two kinds of chunks: 
• the fmt chunk, which describes the sample rate, sample width, etc., and 
• the data chunk, which contains the actual samples. 
WAVE can also contain any other chunk type allowed by RIFF, including LIST chunks, 
which are used to contain optional kinds of data such as the copyright date, author's 
name, etc. Chunks can appear in any order. 
The WAVE specification supports a number of different compression algorithms. The 
format tag entry in the fmt chunk indicates the type of compression used. A value of 1 
indicates Pulse Code Modulation (PCM), which is a "straight," or uncompressed 
encoding of the samples. Values other than 1 indicate some form of compression. 
The WAVE format starts with the RIFF header: 
Offset Length Contents 
0000 4 b y t e s R^' ^F' ^ F' 
0004 4 b y t e s < f i l e length> 
0008 4 bytes A^' ^E' 
Note 
R I F F f i l e i d e n t i f i e r 
Wave f i l e i d e n t i f i e r 
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The fmt chunk describes the sample format: 
Offset Length Contents Note 
0012 4 b y t e s ^m' ^t ' 
0016 4 b y t e s 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 L e n g t h o f fmt d a t a 
0020 2 b y t e s 0 x 0 0 0 1 F o r m a t t a g : 1 = PCM 
0022 2 b y t e s < c h a n n e l s > 1 = mono, 2 = s t e r e o 
0024 4 b y t e s < s a i n p l e r a t e > S a m p l e s p e r s e c o n d 
0028 4 b y t e s < b y t e s / s e c o n d > s a m p l e _ r a t e * b l o c k _ a l i g n 
0032 2 b y t e s < b l o c k a l i g n > c h a n n e l * b i t s _ p e r _ s a m p l e / 8 
0034 2 b y t e s < b i t s / s a i n p l e > 8 - b i t o r 1 6 - b i t 
Finally, the data chunk contains the sample data: 
Offset Length Contents Note 
0036 4 b y t e s ' d ' ' a ' ' t ' ' a ' d a t a c h u n k 
0040 4 b y t e s < l e n g t h o f d a t a b l o c k > 
0044 ? b y t e s < s a m p l e d a t a > 
Additional Notes 
• Sample data must end on an even byte boundary. 
• A l l numeric data fields are in the Intel format o f low-high byte ordering. 
• 8-bit samples are stored as unsigned bytes (0 to 255). 
• 16-bit samples are stored as 2's-complement signed integers (-32768 to 32767). 
• For multi-channel data, samples are interleaved between channels, l ike this: 
sample 0 - c h a n n e l 0 ( L e f t ) 
sample 0 - c h a n n e l 1 ( R i g h t ) 
sample 1 - c h a n n e l 0 ( L e f t ) 
sample 1 - c h a n n e l 1 ( R i g h t ) 
Source: The Canonical W A V E File Format (www.timothyweber.org) 
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Appendix E 
An Introduction to Neural Networks 
Neural-networks are an integral part o f the H A T process discussed in Section 6.2.4 
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Appendix E An Introduction to Neural Networks 
Neural-networks are based on the parallel architecture o f animal brains and represent a 
different paradigm to traditional linear computing. They are particularly suited to the 
task o f pattern recognition wi thin large sets o f data, and are therefore particularly suited 
to analysing the sets o f biometric markers produced by H A T . They consist of : 
• mult iple simple processing elements referred to as neurons'. 
• a high degree o f interconnection between neurons. 
• adaptive interaction between neurons. 
• simple scalar messaging. 
Although biological neurons in real brains can have as many as 10,000 inputs, computer-
based neural-networks traditionally have many orders o f magnitude less than this. The 
structure for a simple neural-network is shown in the example in Figure A - 3 , showing a 
single layer five neuron-network design. H A T utilises a single layer twenty-five input 
neuron arrangement (Figure 6-15), one neuron for each o f the spot-ft-equencies. 
Hidden Layer Output 
Figure A-3: A single layer five neuron neural-nelwork 
Single Input Neuron 
The neuron is the basic bui lding block o f a neural-network, and it is in mutual quantity 
and arrangement that neural-networks gain their processing power. A representation o f a 
single input neuron (aka perceptron, Rosenblatt 1958) is shown in Figure A-4 . 
The simple processing elements within a neural-network arc named after their biological counterparts. 
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f 
Figure A-4: A single input neuron 
In reference to Figure A-4 , the scalar input p is mult ipl ied by the scalar weight w to 
form ivp ; the first input to the summer. The second input, 1 , is mult ipl ied by a bias^ b , 
forming the second input to the summer. The two input values are summed and 
outputted as the net input n , and passed into the transfer fuction^ ( ; which produces 
the scalar neuron output a. In summary, the neuron output is defined by the equation: 
a = f ( p + b ) 
Transfer Function(s) 
The transfer function ( / in Figure A-4) is used to shape the operational envelope o f a 
neurons output and can be either linear (a = n) or non-linear (a = / ( n ) ) depending on the 
specific requirements of the neural-network. The three most common transfer fijnctions 
and their input/output relationships are defined in Table A-2 (non-symmetrical format). 
Hard Limit 
a = 0 n <0 
n 0 J: 
Siaturating Linear 
a = 0 n <0 
a= n 0 n l 
a = + l n > i 
Log-Slgmoid a = 
Table A-2 : Table of common neural-network transfer function 
' The input 'bias' is also sometimes known as the input 'offset'. 
^ The ^ transfer ftinction' is also sometimes known as the 'activation function' 
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Appendix F 
The HAT Demonstration Tool Manual 
A complete list o f the H A T help files is included as part o f the H A T demonstration tool 
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Appendix F The HAT Demonstration Tool Manual 
r j jn HAT Introduction 
The HAT Application Is the software element of the HAT demonstration tool. The tool 
harnesses a novel biometric capture and analysis process to enable the non-intrusive 
and continuous authentication of users of modern communications systenns. 
HATs development is part of a PhD into Novel Authentication Systems for Next 
Generation Mobile Devices, in association with Grange, and the University of 
Plymouth, Network Research Group 
• The Head Authentication Tool GUI is written in Microsoft Visual Basic 
• Core functionality, including: Spectral Analysis, Neural Network training and 
Identification are performed via MathWorks Matlab 
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rj j( i The HAT Application Window 
21 HAT Demor^^tr^lion Tool - Adiioii 
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O The live main window toolbar provides easy access to all of HATs primary functions; 
without the need to enter the menus. 
O The path to the HAT working directory containing the HAT Application executable 
and additional HAT resources: HAT.ini etc. 
O T h e HAT activity indicator constantly reports the operational state of the tool. 
(!) A user can either manually enter a new user name for registration, or conveniently 
select their name from the static pull down list of included HAT trial participants. 
© A small selection of the active user's demographic data; also saved as 'userjd.txt for 
each user. The language' option is the captured language not the user nationality. 
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© The tools central display window is used to prompt the user with example text to 
speak during a capture cycle, or random text during an authentication cycle. 
@ The HAT capture progress-bar (green) Indicates the progress of a HAT Stage-1 
Capture, working in tandem with the timing-bar © . 
O The HAT wavefonn validation progress-bar (yellow) indicates the progress of the 
amplitude validation cycle perfomned on each new waveform. 
Q The HAT filter progress-bar (light-blue) indicates the timing of the HAT Stage-2 
Filter, HAT Stage-3 Absorption processing loop, 
© T h e HAT analysis progress-bar (dark blue) indicates the progress of the HAT Stage-
4 Analysis using the HAT neural-network. 
© T h e timing-bar Is used to prompt the user when to speak during Capture or Identify 
cycles: 'green' Indicates when to speak and 'red' when to wait. 
G The current operation progress-bar indicates the progress of the complete active 
operation: for example, the five stages of an authentication cycle. 
O The Identity confidence-bar Is used to Indicate HATs confidence in the claimed 
identity of the active user In four steps: 0. 25%, 50. 75% & 100%, Each step 
increment Indicates either a passed or failed authentication cycle. 
© T h e auxiliary progress-bar Is used to indicate the progress of en-mass operations; 
for example, HAT Stage-4 Analysis of ALL the HAT trial participants 
© T h e current HAT Application software build Information. 
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The HAT Processes 
Note: For HAT data processing to be performed Matlab must be Installed on the 
system, else an en-or will occur. 
Capture 
Capture a new set of wavefiles for an existing user, or a new user. 
• The captured wavefiles are based on the contents of the Spoken-text file, in the 
HAT*lnput' directory. 
• HAT will automatically name the wavefiles based on their contents and repetition. 
• A completed user directory will contain the following files: 
Filename Purpose 
HAT_Spoken.txt A copy of the spoken-text file used at 
time of capture 
???Jd.txt User Id data & wavefile specifications 
at time of capture 
• ? ? ? are the first 3 characters 
taken from the users name 
???_C_##.wav Captured wavefiles 
• ? ? ? are the first 3 characters 
taken from the users name 
• C is the individual spoken 
character 
• ## is the spoken character 
repetition count 
MEa_7.txt Analysis results 
• ? is either F'ixed or Variable 
data 
MEa_?.mat Neural-networks (Matlab) 
• ? is either F'ixed or Variable 
data 
Threshold.txt Neural-network thresholds results 
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Analysis 
Analyse the captured wavefiles according to the HAT rule-set and produce the 
appropriate MEa analysis data files. 
• The analysed wavefiles MEa results are dependent on the frequencies defined 
in the frequencies resource file, within the HAT 'Input' directory. 
Network 
Build and Train a NeuraUnetwork based on the MEa analysis data files. 
• The selected user MEa analysis data is presented to the neural-network as 
Good data, and all other users MEa analysis data is presented as Bad data. 
Threshold 
Calculate the Authentication Threshold, by feeding a second data set Into the Neural-
network. 
• A second data set is presented to the neural-network created using the first 
data set, and the relevant threshold calculated. 
Identify 
Authenticate a user against their profile. 
• Authentication is based on a result exceeding their own network threshold. 
• It may be possible for users to occasionally exceed thresholds other than their 
own. However, statistically their own threshold will sustain the best results In the 
long term. The confidence-bar attempts to iron out these anomalies. 
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rjj^i HAT Patent 
The Head Authentication Tool core functionality is protected under UK Patent 
Patent No. GB2375205, 2001 "Determining identity of a user" 
First Author 
Philip Rodwell 
Network Research Group 
Universitv of Plymouth UK. 
Second Author 
Paul Reynolds 
Orange PCS 
Bristol. UK. 
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f j j n System Requirements 
Before installing the Head Authentication Tool, please ensure you have the following: 
Hardware 
• x86 processor clocking at least: 
o 500MHz for wavefile Capture only 
o IGH2 for Analysis and Networking, including Authentication 
• 64 MB of system RAM or more 
• Free hard-disk space: 
o 1Mb for HAT application and resources 
o 1.4MB for each registered user set 
• A soundcard with line-in facility, via 3.5mm jack plug 
• The HAT headset (2xLR44 batteries). Pre-amp and 9v Power transformer 
Software 
• Microsoft Windows 98/Me/NT 4.0/2K/XP 
• Mathsoft Matlab v6.1 or later 
• Latest version of HAT 
Resource files (contained in either the HAT directory or Windows SYSTEM directory) 
. MSVBVM60.DLL 
- Microsoft Visual Basic generic controls 
. MSCOMCTL.OCX 
- Microsoft Visual Basic custom controls (Toolbar, Tabbed options window) 
. RICHTX32.0CX 
- Microsoft Visual Basic Rich-Text Control (Review window) 
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HAT.ini File 
The HAT initialisation file is used to set HATs user definable options at startup. 
If the file exists In the HAT application directory, It Is loaded at run-time by default, else 
Internal settings will be assumed. 
• The file is in fact a plain-text file and can be edited as such. 
• HAT.ini is NOT automatically updated with changes made between sessions. 
File Syntax 
[Working DIr] 
worklng_dlr_path = filepath (filepath = 'HAT Application' directory) 
[Operational Modes] 
capture_mode = capture_only | capture_analyse | analyse_only 
network_mode = network_only | network jhreshold | threshold_only 
[User] 
user_name = name (4 chars name 15 chars) 
user_sex = female | male 
user janguage = engllsh | other 
user_age = age (0 < age 120) 
[Waveflle Format] 
wavefile_samplingrate = 11025 | 22050 | 44100 
wavefile_bitspersample = 8 116 
[Waveflle Validation] 
valldation_mode = full | half | off 
validation_amplitude = ampWude (0 amplitude 100) 
val idationjolerance = ?o/erance (0 tolerance 100) 
cllpplng_amplitude = ampWude (0 amplitude 100) 
cl lppingjolerance = to/erance (0 tolerance 100) 
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[Spectral Analysis] 
filter_ncount = coun/ (101 count(odd) 5001) 
filler_bandwidth = Jbancfw/tf//? (50 bandwidth 1000) 
[Neural-Network] 
network_perfgoal = goa/ (0.001 goal 1) 
network_epochs = epochs (1 epochs 10000) 
[View Output] 
view_waveform = yes | no 
view_waveform_axis = yes | no 
view_signature = yes | no 
vlew_signature_axis = yes | no 
view_bargraph = yes | no 
view_bargraph_axis = yes | no 
[Advanced Settings] 
onscreen_prompts = on | off 
process_pauses = short | normal | long 
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r j i n Options 
P C M Wavefi le Format 
The Wavefi le' tab Is used to the set the HAT Stage-1 Capture wavefile parameters. 
• Channels: Number of capture channels (basic HAT locked on 2) 
• Sampling rate: Wavefile sampling rate 
• Bits-per-sample: Bit-size of each capture sample 
4. HAT Options 
^NeuiaLNelwork | View Advanced 
W a v g e ^ ^ ^ Vaiidati tion Spectral Analysis ] 
PCM W a v e f i l e F o r m a t mi 
-Channels-
Q IRHortoJ © 2 (Stereo) 
• fp Sampling Rate (Hz)^  
© 11025 Q 22050 ©44100 
rrBits Per Sample-
O 8-bit ® 16-bit 
Default OK Cancel 
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r . 
Wavefi le Validation 
The 'Validation' tab is used to the set the HAT Stage-1 Capture wavefile validation 
parameters. 
Validation: Number of samples to validate (All | Half | OfQ (default = Half) 
Detection: Minimum validation detection amplitude (0 —• 100%) 
Valid Amplitude: Minimum validation amplitude (Detection —• Clip Amplitude) 
Valid Tolerance: Minimum validation samples (0 —» 100%) 
Clip Amplitude: Maximum validation amplitude (Valid Amplitude —> 100%) 
Clip Tolerance: Maximum validation samples (0 —• 100%) 
HAT options 
Neuial Network j, View, 
Wavefile I \"'"Vaiidation' 
Advanced 
Spectral Analysis 
W a v e f i l e Va l ida t ion 
rValidation- 1 F 
! O An 
; ® Half 
Off 
f Detection-
1 1 10 
1 -
Thresholds 
Valid Amplitude 5i 401 
ir^ i in 
Valid Tolerance % 1 4| m n ¥\ 
Clip Amplitude % 
Clipping Tolerance % 1 111 
FfTI l>\ 
Default OK Cancel 
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Spect ra l A n a l y s i s 
The 'Spectral Analysis' tab is used to the set the HAT Stage-2 Filter parameters. 
• Spot Frequencies: Preset spot-frequency values in Hertz 
• Polynomial Coefficients: Coefficient count of the filter polynomial (1 10001) 
• Filter Bandwidth: Bandwidth of the filter in Hertz ( 1 0 — 1000)Hz 
• Show Signatures: Select the default capture set format (fixed | variable) 
i^ .HAT O p t i o n s 
Neufa! Nelwoik View 
J Advanced 1 
Wavefile 1| Validation [ _lPfE!l:?!?^^!^Zj 
[Qui 
Spect ro l /Analysis 
liU 
p-Spot Frequencies- i 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
900 
1000 
I!-
m 
m 
r^Po\ynom\a\ Co-eflicienls-
N = 110011 Terms 
r Filter Bandwidth-
I 100| Hz 
Show Signatures ^ 
O Fixed ® Variable 
Default I 1; 0 ^ I IT Cancel 
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" 1 " 
Neural-Network 
The 'Neural-Network' tab is primarily used to set the HAT Stage-4 Analysis neural-
network training parameters. 
• Identify-Set: Default data set to be used for HAT authentication 
• Train-Set: Default data set to be used for neural network training 
• Set Type: There are two different captures (Fixed | Variable) 
• Training-Perf. Goal: Target error-rate whilst training (0.1 0.0001) 
• Training-Epochs: Maximum number of training epochs (1 - * 10000) 
• i . HAT Options ' X 
W_avefile |i Validation ) Spectral Analysis 1 
Advanced | Neural Network View 
Neura l -Network 
r-Identify: Set=^ -Tra in: Set — — 
j S e t | 1| 1 S e t | T"| Q A I I 
Identify: Set T y p e = 
Q Fixed ® Variable Both, 
Training-
Perf. Goal | 0.0011 Epochs | 5000| 
Default OK Cancel 
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View Outputs 
The View* tab is used to set the visibility state of mid-process graphical outputs. 
• Waveform Stereo Capture: Time-domain plot of the captured waveforms 
(upon completion of HAT Stage-1 capture) 
• Absorption Spectral Analysis: HAT absorption template view 
(upon completion of HAT Stage-2 Filtering / Stage-3 Absorption loop) 
• Neural Network Analysis: Threshold comparison with all trial participants 
(upon completion of HAT Stage-4 Analysis) 
i « . H A T O p t i o n s 
WaveRie ]^ Validation |^ Spectrat Analysis ] 
Advanced | Neural Netwoik View 
View Outputs 
-Wavefo im Stereo Capture-
gj Show Giaphfsl % ...show axes 
^Absorption Spectral A n a l y s i s = 
[ g | Show Graph F j! ...show axes 
p-Bar-Graph: Neural-Network Analysis 
Show Bai-Giaph I", ...show aKes 
Default OK Cancel 
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rj ici HAT Development Log (Extracts) 
HAT_C15.2 (12.12.2005) 
Minor cosmetic changes to reflect the renaming of the tool from the 'Head Authentication Tool' 
to the 'HAT demonstration tool', including renaming of HAT frames headers: Splash frame, 
About frame, Patent frame, HAT Properties description 
Rename Options > Spectral Analysis - 'Frequency nodes' to 'Spot-frequencies' 
Updated, extended and completed HAT Help. 
Corrected some minor bugs 
HAT_C15.1 (26.10.2004) 
Change user-name text box to a combo-box containing HAT registered users names in a pull 
down list 
- entering a registered users name will update the users recorded demography settings from the 
users ? ? ? J d file 
Add function headers to all functions 
Reverse Development.log layout, with latest updates first 
Convert a selection of in-program Help to HTML Help. Initial conversions include: 
- HAT.ini Help link 
- Capture & Analysis form 
- Development Log 
- Patent form 
(27.10.2004) 
Compile the HAT help file using VisualCHM 
Add 'Contents...' to the Help menu 
Add VB Help API, and implement HTML Help (CHM) for the first time 
- Remove form: frmHAT_TrainHeIp 
- Remove form; frmHATJdentifyHelp 
- Remove HAT.ini reference from the Help menu and from the code 
Remove all Toolbar references to the removed toolbar Help link 
Add 'Index...' to the Help menu 
(29.10.2004) 
Correct inaccurate error reporting in frmHAT_Analysis for error 'File not found' & 'Path not found' 
Add crude legend (coloured underlining) to Mean and Standard-Deviation display option 
Edit help files, adding: Identify, Network & Threshold. Contacts topics 
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(01.11.2004) 
Block illegal Mode selections when performing en mass operations 
Correct visibility timing issue of Network button to match Identify button 
Add HAT Process sheet to Help file 
(08.11.2004) 
VisualCHM v4.3 (currently latest) is proving too unstable and bug ridden, so switching CHM 
creation to Microsoft HTML Help 
Modify capture simulation to mirror current Capture operational Modes 
Modify capture simulation output curve to better simulate a real HAT analysis curve, via a 
simple smoothing algorithm 
Code the captured waveform time-domain output graph, set via Tools>Options>View, as part of 
the wavefile Validation cycle 
Change colour allocation to indirect method; ie set operational colours in the header file and not 
directly in the code 
(10.11.2004) 
Recode Cmb_UserName_LostFocus to trap empty username field 
Delete Cmb_UserName_DbtClick function (no longer required), single click auto-selection 
Add function: Cmb_UserName_Click, to catch username list selection 
HAT_C15.0 (19.10.2004-25.10.2004) 
Change tool from identification to authentication at the request of the PhD Director of Studies 
Changes include massive reworking of tool, hence new major version number: 
- split capture function into four separate functions: Capture. Analyse, Network & Threshold 
(-30 hours) 
- the last user capture set is now performed by a separate function. fnLastSet 
- remove Help button from toolbar...will ultimately write separate HTML Help resource 
- remove Pause option and all related links...added unecessary complication to the tool whilst 
offering non-essential functionality 
- Add Tools>Build Networks Mode to menus with associated code; works in a similar way to 
Tools>Capture Mode 
- Add operational modes to Review panel 
- Add 'ALL' codewords to Review panel 
- Add [Operational Modes] to ini file 
- Reorder visibility objects in fnSetEnable; create associated Excel spreadsheet to aid development 
(26.10.2004) 
rework Identify function to work with the NEW thresholds file; for authentication (~6 hours) 
- add dblThreshold variable to contain threshold file values (fixed and variable) 
rework fnTrainSuttonOK to handle user name entry for identification in addition to capture entry, 
button enable status 
- and rename fnTrainSuttonOK to fnldentifyCaptureEnable, to reflect its NEW dual purpose 
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HAT_C14.8 (09.10.2004) 
Planning on making a number of major changes. (4 pages of A4) after a long paper brain 
storming session one evening 
Changes focus on, speeding up the processing time of the tool and further rationalising the forms 
- Half validation: Place an option in Tools>Options>Validation to only validate half the samples. 
As validations sole purpose is to ensure reliable captures, it is acceptable, that validation 
analysis does not have to be performed on every single sample 
- Add Spectral-Analysis filter Tab to Tools>Options, displaying signature nodes, and editable n-
count and bandwidth 
- Change HAT_Config file to HAT.ini and relocate from C:\ to the application directory, adjust 
code accordingly 
- Change all 'on-screen message' references to 'screen prompt' 
- Change the Tools>\/alidalion Tab from text input to text+scroll-bars, and add DetectAmp option 
(11.10.08) 
Modify main HAT window title bar to include user name when valid, add kHAT constant to header 
Add Review form option to Tools menu 
Change setup icon to volume icon, to better reflect MDI call 
Update HAT.ini handling to include all editable HAT options, extension of (09.10.2004)(4) above 
Rebuild the vbMEla.m Matlab module, with some code optimisation 
Run some tests on VB, C & Matlab to determine the speed ratings: C is 4x faster than VB which 
is 6x faster than Matlab 
Experiment with building the routine into C with 'mcc -m vbMEta', but resultant code was bloated 
and NO faster 
(12.10.2004) 
Change centre frequencies file to minimise filler overlaps: though retaining 25 frequency points 
Change n-count default to 1001 from 1301. as reducing the sampling rate (ages ago) reduced 
the need for the higher figure 
Debug...run...debug...run...HAT 
(14.10.2004) 
Add facility to display the absorption signatures set of the identified user, by clicking the Train icon 
Adjust validation so that it only validates the mouth samples, as these are the loudest 
Correct a validation bug, where half validation was not stepping correctly through the samples 
(18.10.2004) 
Add frmHAT_Analysis form, as the displayed analysis data was too small to be of any use 
Add point data to display near cursor, when cursor passes over relevent points 
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r j j n How to: Identify 
Note: For HAT authentication to be performed, Matlab must be installed on the system, 
else an error will occur and the Identify process will exit. 
Step 1: Select the HAT directory 
Locate and select the 'Head Authentication Tool' directory. 
• When capturing a new data-set, a temporary sub-directory will automatically be 
created within the HAT 'Output' directory. 
Step 2: Provide training data 
In order to be authenticated by the Head Authentication Tool, you must first register 
yourself with the system. 
• Full Capture and Analysis instructions can be found here. 
• The more training data you provide, over time, the more accurate the results will 
become. 
Step 3a: Identify yourself 
Input a user name. 
• User names of at least 4 characters, and no more than 15 characters are 
allowed. 
• The directory name will take the form of the entered user name, and the 
appropriate set number. 
• If the selected user is already registered with the system, HAT will acknowledge 
this and assign a new data-set number for the existing user. 
• If the selected user is a new user, the data-set number will default to 1. 
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Step 4: Try a simulation 
The sinnulate option within the Help menu precisely mimics a nomrial Authentication 
run, and will familiarise you with the Authentication process. 
• The simulation will respond appropriately to the relevant Options settings of 
HAT. Eg. No OnScreen prompts, show signatures etc. 
Step 5: The HAT headset 
Position the HAT headset correctly on your head 
• Ensure there are batteries in the headset plugs: LR44. 
• The headset should be positioned with: the ear-piece sitting comfortably over 
the centre of the ear. and the mouth microphone should be central to the open 
mouth, though not too close to pick up breathing. 
Step 6: When ready, press 'Identify' 
Press Identify, and in a normal speaking voice, recite some text during the capture 
stage of the process. 
• Try to time your responses to correspond with the green portion of the timing-
bar, below the display. 
• Each response will automatically be validated in real-time. Yellow indicators will 
appear in the timing-bar indicating the main spoken part of the capture. 
• HAT will determine the appropriate authentication response and notify the user 
accordingly. 
• Identification requires a complete set of Neural-Network & Threshold data files 
to be present. 
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How to: Capture & Analysis 
Note: For HAT data Analysis to be performed, Matlab must be installed on the system, 
else an error will occur. 
Step 1: Select the HAT directory 
Locate and select the 'Head Authentication Tool' directory. 
• When capturing a new data-set, a unique user sub-directory will automatically 
be created within the HAT 'Output* directory. 
Step 2: Select the Capture & Analysis Mode of operation 
Via the Tools>Capture Mode menu, select the Capture & Analysis, mode of operation 
desired. 
Step 3a: Identify yourself 
Input a user name. 
• User names of at least 4 characters, and no more than 15 characters are 
allowed. 
• The directory name will take the form of the entered user name, and the 
appropriate set number. 
• If the selected user is already registered with the system, HAT will acknowledge 
this and assign a new data-set number for the existing user. 
• If the selected user is a new user, the data-set number will default to 1. 
Step 3b: User demography 
Select the appropriate demographic options, i.e. Sex, Nationality, Age. 
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Step 4: Try a simulation 
The simulate option within the Help menu precisely mimics a nonnal Capture & 
Analyse run, and will familiarise you with the Capture & Analyse process. 
o The simulation will respond appropriately to the relevant Options settings of 
HAT. Eg. No OnScreen prompts, show signatures, etc. 
Step 5: The HAT headset 
Position the HAT headset correctly on your head 
o Ensure there are batteries in the headset plugs: LR44. 
o The headset should be positioned with: the ear-piece sitting comfortably over 
the centre of the ear, and the mouth microphone should be central to the open 
mouth, though not too close to pick up breathing. 
Step 6: When ready, press 'Capture' 
Press Capture, and in a normal speaking voice, recite each character which appears in 
the *text-to-speak' central display. 
o Try to time your responses to correspond with the green portion of the timing-
bar, below the display. 
• characters will appear in the order they are presented in the spoken-text file. 
• Each response will automatically be validated in real-time. Yellow indicators will 
appear in the timing-bar indicating the main spoken part of the capture. 
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r j jc i How to: Network Analysis & Thresholds 
Note: For HAT Network and/or Threshold to be performed, Matlab must be installed on 
the system, else an error will occur. 
Step 1: Select the HAT directory 
Locate and select the 'Head Authentication Tool' directory. 
• When networking a data-set, the source files are located within the HAT 
'Output' directory. 
Step 2: Provide Capture & Analysis data 
In order to build neural-networks, captured data must first have been analysed, and the 
MEa data files created. 
• Full Capture and Analysis instructions can be found here. 
Step 3: Select the Network Mode of operation 
Via the Tools>Network Mode menu, select the Networking, mode of operation desired. 
• For authentication to be performed Network & Threshold are both required, else 
an error will occur. 
Step 4: When ready, press 'Network' 
Press Network, and the tool will attempt to build the selected users Neural-network 
and/or Threshold resources. 
• Neural-network creation requires a complete registered users set of Capture & 
Analysis MEa data files to be present. 
• Threshold creation requires a least two complete data sets to be present, one 
being fed Into the other. 
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How to: En-Mass Operations 
HAT has been enabled with the facility to perform the primary Analysis and Networking 
operations en mass. 
En mass processing: 
• will perform the requested operation on ALL registered used autonomously. 
• triggers minimal internal delays, reducing individual user processing time by as 
much as 40%. 
• is triggered by entering a case-sensitive codeword as the usernanne before 
activating the required process. 
• will automatically set the valid Mode of operation, blocking any changes until 
the codeword is removed. 
• must be performed in the order shown, as each stage depends on the previous 
stages results. 
Codeword Function 
ANALYSE 
Analyse ALL captured 
users wavefiles 
NETWORK Build Neural-Networks 
for ALL users 
T H R E S H O L D Calculate Thresholds 
for ALL users 
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f j jci Contacts 
All comments should first be directed to the projects author: 
• Mr. Philip Rodwell 
Network Research Group 
University of Plymouth UK. 
The authors PhD Director of Studies and Head of the Network Research Group is: 
• Dr. Steven Furnell 
Network Research Group 
Universitv of Plymouth UK. 
The projects industrial supervisor is: 
• Prof. Paul Reynolds 
Orange PCS 
Bristol. UK. 
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Appendix G 
HAT Trials Timetable 
A table documenting HAT trials participant's demography and session data (Section 7.3) 
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g; 
n 
> 
X 
— 
o' 
•o" 
o 
a. 
Usei Usei Alios' Sex NoTioiiality- Session 1 Session 2 Elapsed Notes' 
1 u01„Phi M Enqlish 09.09.2004 14:30 15.09.2004 21:00 6 Mild cold session 2 
2 u02_Nit F Mauritian 13.09.2004 20:00 15.09.2004 12:00 2 Session 3 - Creole 
3 u03_Viv F English 11.09.2004 21:00 16.09.2004 20:30 5 
4 u04_Aun M Burmese 09.09.2004 17:00 16.09.2004 14:00 7 Session 3 - Burmese 
5 U05_VQS M Gre^k 09.09.2004 15:00 14.09.2004 14:45 5 Session 3 - Greek 
6 u06„Zak M Indian 09.09.2004 16:30 22.09.2004 15:00 13 Session 3 - Hindi 
7 u07_Don F English 10.09.2004 12:00 14.09.2004 17:00 4 
8 u08_Adr M Roman ian 09.09.2004 16:15 22.09.2004 15:30 13 
9 u09_5tv M English 09.09.2004 17:15 22.09.2004 16:00 13 
10 ulO_Paiu M English 10.09.2004 17:00 14.09.2004 16:45 4 
1 1 uU^Abd M Arabic 09.09.2004 14:45 16.09.2004 12:30 7 Session 3 - Arobic 
1 2 ul2_NQt M English 09.09.2004 16:00 14.09.2004 14:00 5 
13 ul3_Bog M Roman ian 09.09.2004 16:45 22.09.2004 ' 17:15 13 
14 ul4_Shu M Malaysian 09.09.2004 14:45 14.09.2004 14:15 5 Session 3 - Malay 
15 u l5_ Ibr M Turkish 14.09.2004 10:00 14.09.2004 15:00 0.5 Session 3 - Turkish 
16 ul6_Fen F Greek 22.09.2004 17:00 23.09.2004 16:30 1 
17 ul7_Pet M English 15.09.2004 20:00 22.09.2004 ^ 21:30 7 
1 8 ul8_And M English 22.09.2004 16:30 23.09.2004 14:00 1 
1 9 ulPjSim F English 16.09.2004 16:00 24.09.2004 14:30 8 
20 u20 j ; ja M Indonesian 23.09.2004 14:00 24.09.2004 14:00 1 
> 
n s a 
O 
^ The HAT Application allocates user aliases according to the entered user name to preserve trial participant's anorymity. 
• AH sessions were recorded in English unless otherwise staled. 
' Non-English sessions (session 3) were performed immediately after session 2. 
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"Non-intrusive Security in 3G — UMTS, Subscriber Authentication " 
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Non-intrusive security requirements for 3*^ ^ generation mobile systems 
P.M.Rodwell^ S.M.Fumell^ and P.L.ReynoIds^ 
^ Centre for Communications, Networks and Information Systems, Department of 
Communication & Electronic Engineering, University of Plymouth, United Kingdom 
* Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd, St James Court, Great Park Road, Bradley 
Stoke, Bristol, United Kingdom 
Abstract 
The next few years will witness the emergence of third generation mobile technologies, 
such as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The increased 
bandwidth available will enable the support of significantly wider application scenarios than 
the voice telephony and basic data services of current networks. This expansion of services 
will also demand a corresponding increase in the level of protection provided by the devices 
and network operators. This paper considers the security requirements o f UMTS, with 
particular focus upon subscriber authentication techniques, comparing them against the 
more basic measures that have been considered satisfactory within second-generation 
systems such as GSM. 
Introduction 
The world wide market for mobile telephone technologies has experienced dramatic growth 
in recent years. Statistics from October 1999 indicated that there were 376.5 million 
subscribers (with a growth of 52.5% having been experienced in the previous twelve 
months) and the forecast market by 2003 will exceed one billion (Intekom, 1999). The 
mobile technologies themselves have already evolved from the voice-only analogue 
systems of the mid to late 1980s, to the current second generation (2G) systems, introduced 
in the early 1990s. These systems, based upon digital technology, have enabled mobile data 
links, albeit at rather limited rates (e.g. 9.6 Kbit/s). Second generation networks are 
currently being enhanced with a range of data-oriented developments, designed to increase 
both the capacity of the air interface (e.g. the General Packet Radio Service, GPRS) and the 
range of mobile data services (e.g. the Wireless Application Protocol, WAP). However, by 
2001, it is expected that these technologies will begin to be superseded by third generation 
(3G) systems such as UMTS, the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS 
Forum, 1998). 
UMTS aims to provide a complete, global system and offer a broadband service of up to 2 
Mbit/s. This increased capacity will facilitate a fundamental improvement in mobile 
services, offering the potential for true multimedia capabilities. As such, UMTS is seen as 
the natural evolutionary path for both subscribers and operators, and a competitive market 
can already be seen to exist. At the time of writing, the auction of five UMTS licenses in the 
UK have all attracted bids in excess of £3.5 billion from the network operators (Rushe and 
Oldfield, 2000). 
As service opportunities advance, so to do the requirements to protect subscribers and 
network operators from the possible effects of fraud and unauthorised use. This paper 
considers the security requirements for 3G systems, comparing them to the established 
security practices utilised within 2G networks. Specific requirements are considered from 
the subscriber perspective, leading to the identification of a requirement for non-intrusive 
methods that do not impede legitimate activity. 
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Security in second generation (2G) systems 
The most widespread 2G system is the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
(Mouly and Pautet, 1992), which, by September 1999, accounted for 344 operational 
networks across 127 countries (GSM Association, 1999). Security provision in GSM 
networks is largely geared towards secure communication (i.e. radio interface encryption) and 
terminal-based authentication. The latter is achieved via the combination of the Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM) and the Intemational Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI). The SIM 
holds the subscriber's personal information, such as contact numbers and text messages that 
have been sent and received. The SIM also contains the Intemational Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI), enabling the subscriber to be uniquely identified, irrespective of the handset 
into which their SIM may be placed. The terminal itself can be uniquely identified via the 
IMEI number. This can be used in conjunction with the operator's Equipment Identity 
Register (EIR) database to determine the status of a device. This status will indicate that the 
temiinal is either white-listed (i.e. allowed to access the network), grey-listed (i.e. under 
observation for possible problems) or black-listed (i.e. not permitted to connect to the network 
as it has been reported as stolen or is not of an approved type). This provides a good level of 
access control between the tenninal devices themselves and the network. 
Relatively little attention is paid to the authentication of the person using the handset or 
their access to services. Authentication of the subscriber to the terminal is normally 
achieved via a Personal Identification Number (PIN), which is also held in the SIM. This is 
a facility that the subscriber must enable on the handset before any protection is provided 
and, assuming they have done this, the level of protection can still vary between devices. 
On some systems, the PIN will only be invoked when the handset is first switched on, 
whereas on others the subscriber also has the option to put the device into a Mocked' state 
whilst it is still in standby mode (requiring PIN entry before further actions are possible). 
Having said this, PIN protection can generally be considered commensurate with the level 
of risk associated with unauthorised use. Unless the terminal is lost/stolen (in which case 
the subscriber would be expected to report it and access would be denied by the operator), 
the window of opportunity for unauthorised use by an impostor who has breached the PIN 
would be relatively brief, with relatively contained potential consequences. 
Requirements for security in third generation (3G) devices 
The proposed services of UMTS (Cox, 1997) demand a more secure subscriber-based 
authentication system in order to protect personal information in the event of masquerade 
attacks. On a typical second-generation handset, the consequences from theft or impostor 
access can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
o financial loss, as a result of the thief making calls at the legitimate subscriber's 
expense (depending upon the policy of the operator, these losses may not be passed 
on to the subscriber once the handset is reported as stolen), 
o breach of personal privacy, as a result of the names of the subscribers' contacts and 
their telephone numbers being held within the SIM card. However, it is 
acknowledged that this is a fairly limited amount of information, the disclosure of 
which would not normally be considered highly sensitive. Stored text messages may 
potentially have more significance, but would not generally represent a significant 
body of infonmation. 
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When considering the nature of a 3G device, however, the potential consequences become 
more severe. The reason for this is that we are likely to witness convergence with Personal 
Digital Assistant (PDA) type devices and an expansion in the range of possible services that 
can be accessed. As such, a device might also store: 
• fmancial details to enable mobile commerce payments; 
• electronic certificates for digital signatures; 
• full contact details of friends and associates; 
• miscellaneous information of a commercially sensitive or private nature (e.g. 
entered into scheduler or notepad applications). 
The need for security within UMTS has already been recognised and relevant standards 
work is progressing in a number of areas, including (3GPP, 2000): 
• definition of a U^4TS security archilecUire and specification of underlying 
elements; 
• detailing of security requirements for UMTS service provision (e.g. user access, 
billing fraud control) and physical network elements (e.g. user identity module, core 
network and interfaces to non-UMTS networks); 
• requirements specification of cryptographic algorithms; 
• development of security guidelines. 
Aspects such as these will inform the implementation of UMTS networks and services by 
the international community. 
One significant consideration is whether security monitoring should reside within the 
subscriber's terminal or within the network. Compared to GSM, UMTS does not share the 
concept of a home network - the 'universal' aspect suggested in the name is based upon 
roaming between operators to suit the service required. This indicates a need for security to 
be focused within the handset, as to rely on it within the network will only be as strong as 
the weakest link (in terms of operators). However, a counter-argument is that UMTS also 
supports personal mobility, where a subscriber may register with any terminal (fixed or 
mobile) in order to access services. In this scenario, the subscriber's profile would need to 
be accessed from the network in order to determine valid services. A terminal-based 
approach has the advantages that the confidentiality of security details is in the hands of the 
subscriber, as opposed to being held by the network operator, hi addition, authentication 
and supervision may be performed without imposing any network traffic overhead and 
independently of link/bandwidth availability. With network-centric monitoring, details 
would need to be collected on the terminal and then transmitted for remote analysis. A 
hybrid approach is likely to represent the most appropriate solution. 
In addition to terminal and network security, certain services, such as e-commerce, may also 
incorporate their own security safeguards in addition to the standard facilities within the 
network and the terminal. This can already be seen to be the case with current e-commerce 
web sites, which typically require supplementary identification and authentication via their 
own usemames and passwords before the user is permitted to make purchases. 
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Non-intrusive security options 
Even in 2G systems, PIN codes do not represent an ideal form of subscriber authentication. 
Their use can be criticised in a similar manner to traditional passwords in desktop IT 
systems, in that subscribers may introduce vulnerabilities by sharing them with other people 
or writing them down (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989), In addition, PINs can be considered 
to be intrusive, as they require specific actions from the subscriber in order to authenticate 
themselves. Where a subscriber wishes to make a quick call or mobile-based transaction, 
the need to firstly enter a PIN can be a hindrance. As a consequence, many subscribers do 
not make use of the facility to lock their handsets between transactions (leaving them in a 
vulnerable state i f lost or stolen). Ideally, there is a requirement for non-intrusive or 
transparent protection measures, such that the provision of security does not unduly 
interrupt or inconvenience the legitimate subscriber. 
One of the slated requirements for secure UMTS service provision is that it should be 
possible for service providers to "authenticate users at the start of, and during, service 
delivery" (3GPP, 1999). Authentication during service delivery represents a departure from 
the standard approach of 2G systems and again implies the need for some form of 
transparent measure to avoid disrupting a subscriber's legitimate activity. Options for 
achieving this may be related to periodic/continuous supervision of activity, utilising 
profiling techniques or biometrics. 
There is already a significant emphasis upon subscriber profiling in order to counter fraud, 
with operators applying data analysis techniques to network data in order to identify and 
flag potentially fraudulent transactions (Modisette, 1999). The same principles could be 
extended to address user authentication (i.e. to prevent masquerade attacks) and anomaly 
detection. Profiling could encompass factors such as the types of services typically accessed 
and the times/durations of access in order to construct a model of the subscriber's normal 
behaviour. Such techniques have been the focus of work in general IT for some time and 
have been incorporated into network-based intrusion detection systems (Porras and 
Neumann, 1997). 
The features of 3G terminals that wil l enable more advanced subscriber services will also 
offer the potential to facilitate more advanced security options. For example, a number of 
biometric approaches (Cope, 1990) could conceivably be integrated in a non-intrusive 
manner, depending upon the nature of the mobile device and the service being accessed. 
Suitable options include: 
• voice verification, for use in traditional voice-telephony scenarios; 
• facial-recognition, for videophone applications; 
• fingerprint recognition, to detect that the correct person is holding the handset (such 
a technique already exists the Sagem MC 959 ID handset- see www.sagem.com); 
• keystroke analysis, enabling authentication via key interactions (Fumell et al, 1996); 
• handwriting recognition, in scenarios where the user may interact via a pen and 
touch-screen combination. 
Such information could be gathered to facilitate real-time identity verification, leading to 
progressive withdrawal of accessible services (e.g. e-commerce transactions, international 
call capability) as more potential problems are identified. Anomaly detection could also be 
based upon current activity, matching overall rules that have been pre-determined to suggest 
anomalous conditions. Significant departure from a subscriber profile could trigger further 
levels of response, such as locking the terminal or authentication via a human intermediary 
(an operator), who could then take the necessary steps to verify the users legitimacy. 
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It is considered that information such as that listed above could be most usefully handled 
within a flexible security framework, which is able to intelligently monitor the available 
characteristics based upon the current activity of the subscriber. For example, voice 
verification could be utilised during a voice call, but during an e-commerce transaction it 
could be replaced by other characteristics that are more appropriate to the context, such as 
keystroke analysis. The monitoring system would determine which characteristics, from 
those available on the terminal, should be assessed at any given time and then pass on the 
relevant data for analysis. The analysis itself could be network or terminal-based. However, 
to avoid traffic overhead (as previously mentioned), the latter approach may be preferable. 
The terminal could then securely send the results to a network-based monitoring agent for 
access decisions (the involvement of the network level ensures that the network operator / 
service provider is kept aware of potential compromise). In this scenario, the network 
ultimately remains in control of the security and could request re-sampling by the terminal 
i f the authentication results were inconclusive. Such an arrangement is illustrated in figure I 
below. The approach would be non-intrusive in the sense that the terminal user would be 
unaware of the security system unless compromise is suspected. 
Network 
External notifications 
(e.g. stolen handset) 
Monitoring 
Agent 
Analysis 
results 
A c c e s s 
decisions/ 
re-authenticatio 
requests 
Terminal 
Analysis 
Data 
Collection 
Profile 
Conrtparison 
Profile 
Poteiiti.ll 
chiiiacteiistics 
Ot^:^ Sewice 
I .1 utilisation 
Face 
Voice 
Keystrokes 
Figure 1: Potential subscriber monitoring scenario 
In this scenario, PIN or password-based methods could still be utilised, but would represent 
a baseline approach, invoked only when other monitoring methods are not able to provide 
sufficient data for conclusive analysis. The authors are currently in the eariy stages o f a 
research project addressing these issues. 
Conclusions 
The capabilities of 3G mobile systems will open up a range of new service opportunities 
and, as a consequence, will impose new security requirements. This paper has identified the 
requirement for non-intrusive methods of subscriber authentication and supervision. Further 
work is required to establish an appropriate monitoring framework and the monitoring 
methods best suited to mobile application. While biometric systems have been evaluated in 
the context of desktop IT systems, little work has been conducted to assess their 
effectiveness in the mobile environment. As such, fiirther research is required to determine 
whether existing methods can be tailored or, indeed, whether new approaches identified. 
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K E Y W O R D S 
UMTS, Authentication, Security, RM-ODP. 
A B S T R A C T 
This paper discusses a conceptual framework addressing 
the issue of continuous subscriber authentication for 3"* 
generation mobile networks, based upon the International 
Telecommunications Union Reference Model for Open 
Distributed Processing (RM-ODP). Security provisions 
within current 2"^  generauon mobile networks such as 
GSM, are primarily aimed at secure communications 
through data encryption and terminal authentication via 
use of a smart card (SIM). Proposed services of the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
demand a more secure subscriber based authentication 
system, in order to protect personal information in the 
event of masquerade attack. Any authentication 
technique will be an integral pari of an overall real-time 
security framework in order to offer continuous 
protection. In exercising the first three viewpoints of the 
RM-ODP, a summation of key security issues and a 
conceptual framework presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not difHcuIt to see that we are currently in the 
middle of a mobile communications revolution. From 
the appearance of mobile communication devices in 
school playgrounds, to more abstract applications of 
the technology, such as GSM equipped clothing 
(Philips, 1999). Owing to its circuit switched nature 
and a limited bandwidth of only 9.6kbit/s, it is 
recognised that the current GSM air interface is only 
practically suitable for voice telephony, text 
messaging and rudimentary data services. However, 
the next few years will witness the evolution of GSM 
technologies into a wireless Internet of advanced 
packet switched data services exhibited by the General 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced Data 
rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE) standards; 
culminating sometime in the next few years in 3"* 
Generation (3G) networks. Proposed by the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
initiative, IMT-2000, 3G mobile communications for 
Europe will come under the banner of UMTS (UMTS 
Forum, 2000). The proposed increases in bandwidth 
available will enable service providers to support 
significantly wider application scenarios than voice 
and the rojdimeniary data services of current cellular 
networks. This expansion of services, especially data 
services and the subsequent increase in personal and 
private data, will demand a parallel and corresponding 
increase in the level of protection provided by the 
terminal devices and the associated network operators. 
This paper will introduce and justifying one of the 
most important of these security requirements; 
enhanced subscriber authentication; proceeding to 
discuss key issues pertaining to a conceptual security 
framework capable of supporting alternative advanced 
authentication techniques, in addition to the principle 
of non-intrusive and continuous monitoring. Although 
this paper does not discuss any specific continuous 
authentication mechanisms, the bias is towards 
biomeuics, owing to its inherent suitability to non-
intrusive application. (Biometrics Consortium, 2000). 
The framework discussed in this paper takes a top-
down approach to the problem, introducing and 
discussing relevant issues through the use of the ITU 
Reference Model for Open Distributed Processing. 
E N H A N C E D A U T H E N T I C A T I O N - A 3"*'* 
G E N E R A T I O N R E Q U I R E M E N T 
When considering the proposed services of UMTS 
(Cox, 1997), and the nature of future 3G devices, we 
realise that a more secure subscriber-based authentic-
ation system is essential in order to protect personal 
information in the event of masquerade attack (3GPP, 
1999). A primary reason for this is the hastening 
convergence of mobile devices with Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA) type devices, and the subsequent 
expansion in the range of possible services enabled as 
a consequence. In spite of the impoverished Man-
Machine Interface (MMI), inherent to these devices 
(Nielsen, 1999), there is siill a growing trend towards 
Internet style services through developments like the 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), Europe and I-
Mode, Asia. The potential consequences, therefore, of 
masquerade attacks are far more severe owing to the 
additional and more personal information that these 
mobile/PDA devices are now storing and exchanging: 
• financial details facilitating m-commerce 
• electronic certificates for digital signatures 
• frill contact details of family and associates 
• commercially sensitive miscellaneous 
information (e.g. scheduler/notepad files) 
A key aspect of any proposed security framework is 
the balance of storage and distribution of the sensitive 
subscriber signature data within the communications 
device (handset) and across the network. 
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Compared to GSM, UMTS does not share the concept 
of a home network - the 'universaP aspect suggested 
in the name is based upon roaming between operators 
to suit the service required. In order to support true 
personal mobility, where a subscriber may register 
with any terminal interface (fixed or mobile) in order 
to access services, profiles need to be distributable 
throughout the network. The subscriber's profile could 
theoretically be accessed fi-om any point within any 
compliant network in order to authenticate access to 
valid subscribed services. In such a network-centric 
solution, security details would be collected on the 
terminal and then securely transmitted and securely 
stored within the network for remote analysis. 
R E F E R E N C E M O D E L O F O P E N 
D I S T R I B U T E D P R O C E S S I N G 
The Reference Model of Open Distributed Processing 
(RM-ODP, 1994) was a joint effort by the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) and the 
ITU-T to develop a coordinating framework for the 
standardisation of open distributed processing (ODP), 
supporting heterogeneous interworking between 
systems. The model describes an architecture, 
integrated into which are distribution, interworking, 
interoperability and portability. The RM-ODP 
framework takes a top-down approach, defining five 
abstract system viewpoints: Enterprise, Information, 
Computation, Engineering and Technology. The 
different viewpoints enable one to move progressively 
away fi-om the conceptual world of user interfaces and 
enter into the tangible worid of the supporting 
technologies and hardware infrastructures. 
View-points 
The prescriptive framework, RM-ODP Part3, proposes 
five viewpoints decomposing the specification of the 
ODP system, focusing on the separate concerns. Using 
the conceptual structures rules and functions, a 
fundamental framework is generated specifying and 
bounding the proposed ODP system. 
The five viewpoints of the RM-ODP are briefly 
categorised as follows: 
• Enterprise: Purpose, Scope & Policy analysis. 
Organisational policies, per formative actions. 
• Information: Semantics and Information 
Processing. Required information through the 
use of Schemas. 
• Computational: Functional Decomposition. 
Functionality of ODP application, object 
handling. 
• Engineering: Infrastructure to support the 
distribution. 
• Technology: Technology for implementation. 
Using this top-down approach, a large and complex 
system specification can be broken down into smaller, 
separate and manageable pieces, each focusing on the 
relevant issues to a particular working group. 
C O N C E P T U A L F R A M E W O R K T O SUPPORT 
CONTINUOUS M O B I L E A U T H E N T I C A T I O N 
This section addresses conceptual issues when 
considering techniques for discrete real-time 
authentication over a mobile communications network. 
The discussion covers the first three viewpoints of the 
Requirements Analysis and Functional Specifications 
sections of the RM-ODP schematic. Figure 1. 
Enterprise 
InTonnation 
- A X 
/ c 
Computniional 
7 ^ 
Requirements Analysis 
Functional Specification 
Engineering Design 
Technology Implementation 
Figure I : R M - O D P Viewpoints 
Low level engineering and hardware infrastructure 
issues have not been considered at this stage. 
Enterprise (business) Viewpoint 
The enterprise viewpoint, addresses the performative 
actions governing the proposed framework. This is 
achieved through the use of active and passive objects, 
where an object is any unique entity within the 
framework; groups of objects or object communities^ 
purposeftilly grouped to achieve a larger goal; and 
object permissions/prohibitions or roles of objects. 
Top Le\'el Objects 
Under normal operation, there is only one active 
object within the security framework: 
• the subscriber. 
In the extreme case that the system is unable to 
resolve a security issue autonomously, a human 
operator could intervene in the decision making 
process, but essentially and for the majority of the 
time, the subscriber will be under network control. 
The passive objects forming the top of the framework: 
die mobile network (community) 
the network interface handset (community) 
the subscriber account 
the archived subscriber reference profile 
the handset generated subscriber profile 
subscriber data packets 
subscriber payments (money) 
Treating the network and handset as single 
entities/object communities, negates the need to break 
them down into their hardware infrastructures. Separate 
payment objects recognise those subscribers who prefer 
to pay in advance, rather than via contractual schemes. 
As these objects are not authentication issues, they are 
omitted fix>m subsequent discussions. 
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Communities 
The primary top-level object communities consist of 
'the network, the subscriber account, the subscriber 
profile' and 'the interface handset, the subscriber 
authentication profile'; both objects share the data and 
subscriber objects. 
Network (Croup) 
Subscriber Account 
Subscriber Security 
Profile 
Data packets 
Handset (Group) 
Subscriber Aulhenlicalion 
Profile 
Subscriber 
Figure 2: Enterprise Object Communities 
Roles of Objects 
Identifying the rules bounding the objects within the 
conceptual framework through; 
• Permissions - What CAN be done 
• Obligations - What MUST be done 
• Prohibitions - What MUST-NOT be done. 
Permissions: 
A subscriber can choose lo: 
• access their network account at any time; 
• change their network interface handset; 
• terminate their account at any lime. 
The network can choose to: 
• issue an authentication challenge at any time; 
• maintain more than one profile for each 
subscriber. 
Obligations: 
A user: 
• must have a valid network account; 
• must continuously satisfy authentication; 
• must sufficiently fund their network access. 
The network: 
• must act on authentication failure; 
• must provide suitable protection of subscriber 
profiles; under legislation like the E U Data 
Protection Directive (Lloyd, 1996). 
Prohibitions: 
A subscriber 
• can only access their account; 
• cannot initiate authentication profile changes; 
• caiuiot bypass authentication; 
• authentication profile cannot be artificially 
generated by any casual means. 
Information viewpoint 
This viewpoint presents the schemas involved with 
handling the state and structure of the pre-defined data 
object schemas at particular times: 
• Static - state of an object at a particular time. 
• Invariant - restricts state/structure at all times. 
• Dynamic - defines permitted state changes. 
Static schemas 
• At Point-Of-Entry, a user is unauthenticated. 
• At fixed or variable network defined intervals 
authentication is transparently requested. 
Invariant schemas 
• Continuous authentication is always active. 
• The network handset must be authenticated 
to access the network. 
Dynamic schemas 
A subscriber: 
• state change - authenticated to unauthenticated. 
• profile is permitted to change over time; e.g. 
with age, health, behaviour etc. 
• is permitted to change their handset(s) over 
time without affecting archived profiles. 
Computational viewpoint 
This view specifies the ftinclional interactions 
between system objects at a low level. From this 
viewpoint, it can be argued that authentication may 
exist at several levels, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
SubscritHir 
Auttionticalion 
Tcrmiruil 
tnterfBce 
Mobile 
Notwoili 
PF) SIM 
D«vle«-c«ntjfc 
- * UMf Sup«rv1«k>n 
T«rmlrul 
Supervision 
N.tvw>rtM;«ntrtc U w SupwvUlon 
Figure 3: Mobility Authentication 
It is considered that a suitable framework for achieving 
this is not dissimilar to previous security work carried 
out in the area of real-time network monitoring; i.e. The 
Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS), (Fumell, S.M., 
Dowland, P., 2000). Building on this work, it can be 
demonstrated that with suitable modifications, the IMS 
can be remodelled to meet the requirements of a 
continuous authentication system for mobile 
applications, where a detected anomaly is represented 
by a failed subscriber authentication. Considering the 
architecture in a purely authentication-based role (i.e. 
where misfeasor abuse is not considered), a suitable 
conceptual structure is shown in Figure 4. 
In this revised structure, the client is represented by 
the subscriber handset and several of the modules 
have been renamed from the original IMS to reOect 
the more restricted authentication-only role (on the 
network side, the Archiver function has been removed 
altogether, reflecting the fact that the system is 
looking to perform real-time authentication, rather 
than ongoing activity monitoring). 
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Subscriber Handsot Host NQtworli 
Figure 4: Enhanced Mobile Authentication System 
The authentication function need not reside completely 
within the network. Point of Entry (PoE) authentication 
in particular could reside in the subscriber terminal, 
using an appropriate technique as the basis (e.g. the 
baseline method could still be a PIN, but more 
advanced methods like fingerprint recognition could 
also be used if a handset was suitably equipped). 
However, rather than being an isolated function within 
the tenninal, it could be linked into the wider network-
based monitoring system. For example, the network 
could be notified of any handset login failures, which 
would enable its alert status to proceed from an initially 
higher starting point than it would have otherwise done 
in the case of a completely successful login at the first 
attempt. More advanced, ongoing supervision would be 
network-based and, in this sense, the role of the handset 
becomes that of collecting relevant authentication data, 
upon request from the host network, and then 
responding as instructed when the data has been 
remotely analysed. It can be seen that the decision 
making process is retained within the network under the 
control of the network operator 'Authenticator' module. 
This is a basic security issue, offering advantages to 
both the operator and the subscriber For the operator, it 
removes control and possibility of casual authentication 
tampering fix)m the subscriber handset, for the 
subscriber, it offers the service of subscriber mobility. 
There can be a number of mechanisms in place lo 
trigger the authentication challenge request process: 
• a simple chronological time-out. 
• significant change of destination tolling. 
• change from normal usage profile, i.e. 
departure from normal calling pattern, etc. 
• mobile cell handover, a point of potential 
system weakness to a system abuser. 
• e-commerce transaction. 
Any combination of the above should transparently 
trigger re-authentication. In addition, there are other 
qualiiy-of-service considerations to be addressed: 
• network loading issues. 
• reception conditions. 
• available network bandwidth when roaming. 
• remaining life-cycle of GSM handsets. 
It can be argued that a brick wall lock out is not 
necessarily the best solution to authentication failure. 
As mentioned previously, quality of service is critical, 
and a low False Rejection Rate is fundamental to any 
continuous authentication scenario. It is advisable to 
exercise a form of phased service lockout, ranging 
from logging of user activity to a complete system bar. 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
This paper introduced and justified the need for 
improved subscriber authentication within the next 
generation of mobile communication devices. 
Through the approach of the ITU RM-ODP, the rules 
for a conceptual discrete real-time authentication 
framework have been generally defined and, through 
on going work on the IMS at the University of 
Plymouth, a suitable core architecture proposed. 
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Introduction 
The worldwide market for mobile telephone technologies has experienced dramatic growth in 
recent years and it is not difficult to see that we are currently in the middle of a mobile 
communications revolution. Recent figures indicate that the number of cellular subscribers 
today is nearly 479.5 million worldwide, with forecasts for the end of 2003 estimating the 
number to be around 1.073 billion [1]. 
The mobile technologies themselves have already evolved from the voice-only analogue 
systems of the mid 1980s, to the ciurent second generation (2G) digital systems, first introduced 
in the early 1990s. Owing to its circuit switched nature and a limited bandwidth of only 
9.6kbil/s, it is recognised that the current G S M air interface is only realistically suitable for 
voice telephony, text messaging and rudimentary data services. However, the next few years 
will witness the evolution of current G S M technologies into a wireless Internet of advanced 
packet switched data services exhibited by the General Packet Radio Service ( G P R S ) and 
Enhanced Data rates for G S M Evolution ( E D G E ) standards; culminating sometime in the near 
future in 3"" Generation (3G) networks. Proposed by the International Telecommunications 
Union initiative, IMT-2000, 3G mobile communications for Europe will come under the banner 
of U M T S (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) [2]. As an indication of the 
commitment UK. mobile operators have already made lo U M T S , the auction of the five U K 
licenses in April 2000 raised an incredible £22 .47 billion [3], The proposed increases in 
bandwidth available under U M T S will enable service providers to support significantly wider 
application scenarios than the rudimentary voice and data services of current cellular networks. 
This expansion of services, especially data services and subsequent increase in private data, will 
demand a corresponding increase in the levels of protection provided by the network hardware. 
Security in the current second generation GSM system 
The most widespread second generation mobile system in use in the world today is the Global 
System for Mobile Communications ( G S M ) [4], which, by September 1999, accounted for 344 
operational networks in 127 countries, 63% of the worlds total cellular market today (Inlekom, 
2001). Security provision within G S M are largely geared towards secure communication (i.e. 
radio interface encryption) and terminal-based authentication. The latter being achieved via the 
combination of the familiar SIM smart card (Subscriber Identity Module) and the less familiar 
IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identifier). The SIM holds all the subscriber's personal 
details, such as contact numbers, text messages, in addition lo network operator registration 
details like the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identifier). Mobile hardware is uniquely 
identified via an I M E I , which is used in conjunction with an operators E I R (Equipment Identity 
Register) to determine a devices security status, e.g. has it been reported stolen. 
Relatively little attention is attributed to the authentication of the actual subscriber. 
Authentication of the subscriber to the terminal S I M is achieved through use o f an impersonal 
and optional PIN (Personal Identification Number); stored in the SIM. This facility must be 
enabled by the subscriber before any level of protection is provided. Assuming this is done, the 
level of protection can still vary between devices depending on the handsel manufactiu-es 
implementation. Having said this, PIN protection can generally be considered commensurate 
with the level of risk of unauthorised use within a G S M environment. 
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Requirements for security in tliird generation Networks 
When considering the proposed services of U M T S [5], and the nature of fxiture 3G devices, we 
realise that a inore secure subscriber-based authentication system is essential in order to protect 
personal information in the event of masquerade attack [6]. The primary reason ifor this is the 
hastening convergence of mobile devices with Personal Digital Assistant ( P D A ) type devices, 
and the subsequent expansion in the range of possible services enabled as a direct result. The 
potential consequences, therefore, of a masquerade attack will therefore become far more severe 
owing to the additional and more private information that these hybrid devices are now storing: 
• financial details enabling mobile electronic commerce transactions 
• electronic certificates for digital signatures 
• full contact details of family and associates 
• commercially sensitive miscellaneous information (e.g. scheduler/notepad files) 
• medical records as a result of telemedicine or teleconsultations. 
Attitudes to security provision within mobile networks 
Within the University of Plymouth, a survey was conducted into the attitudes o f mobile users to 
the current security provision within their mobile telephones and possible areas of improvement 
should they feel them inadequate for present and future systems. The survey was distributed 
locally to a broad range of mobile telephone users, in both hard copy and as an on-line 
questionnaire. There were a total of 161 responses completed both on paper and on-line. 
Opinions on current security 
As discussed previously, the primary method of personal security within a mobile handset is the 
PrN. Although 89% of respondents knew about the PIN facility, only 56% of them actually used 
it. The survey shows that 76% of respondents had phones with only a single level of security (at 
power on). O f those users that did have access to keypad PIN lockout in standby, only 46% of 
them used this facility on a regulariy basis. 41% of respondents felt that entering a PIN number 
was inconvenient, with the same percentage also feeling unconfident in the level of protection 
the PIN provided. Although the results are not conclusive for or against the effectiveness of the 
PIN, there are a number of points that can be drawn from the data: 
• 11% of respondents did not even know about the PIN facility. Scaled up this could 
represent up to 52.8 million subscribers worldwide. 
• O f the 44% of respondents who did not use the PIN facility, 65% gave the reason as 
being its inconvenience; that is it's intrusive nature. 
• Actually providing additional levels of security does not necessarily mean that a 
subscriber will actually use them. A significant 64% of respondents did not even use the 
more convenient PIN facility of keypad lockout whilst in stand-by (where available). 
• A large number of respondents, 41%, have little confidence in the protection offered by 
the PIN facility, believing their handset is still at risk even with the facility active. 
Opinions on having additional security 
With telephone technology progressing rapidly to provide users with additional data services, 
this survey already identifies users accessing 2G data services and willing to continue to do so 
into the 30 technology. It is an encouraging sign that these users also recognise the need for 
security, with 81% believing it would be either good or very good to have increased security. 
Only 2 respondents thought it a bad idea. Although not proposing any specific scheme for 
improved authentication, the bias is towards biometrics, owing to its inherent suitability to non-
intrusive application. [7]. 
Contributor's responses to the implementation of additional security show a strong preference 
towards fingerprint analysis; over 70%. Voiceprint and iris scanning also achieved good 
responses. Analysing the results does however indicate that respondents have possibly reacted 
more positively to those authentication mechanisms that they are already aware of. 
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Fingerprints have for a long time, primarily through Police use, been known to provide a 
reliable means of identification. In fact finger print recognition is already being used by 
Sagem in a mobile handsets for advanced e-commerce authentication purposes [8]. Voice 
print analysis has also attracted much attention recently through computer software and also 
in the telephone industry as a means of dialling numbers. Techniques such as ear geometry 
and typing style (keystroke analysis) are more recent, as such, less research exists on them. 
Ear G»oiT..try r . c « l R-togn.bon Wn S c . n f i ^ g 
Positive responses to six main authentication techniques 
The survey not only found users wanting more security for their handsets but 63% of 
respondents, who were not indifferent, also felt a non-intrusive continuous authentication 
method during a session to be a good idea. Obviously some authentication techniques lend 
themselves to this technique much better than others, for instance voiceprint, as the user would 
probably already be talking on the telephone. 
Conclusions 
Up until now, PIN protection has generally been regarded as providing enough access protection, 
since the information contained on handsets has been relatively benign in nature, telephone 
numbers, simple text messages, etc. and thus of little value to a thief More recently, with the 
advent of WAP enabled 2G handsets, there is a movement towards the storage o f more sensitive 
material. This will culminate in the near future with the merger of PDA's and mobile telephones 
into 3G devices carrying all the associated data both these devices may contain. This does beg the 
question, how far can we rely on numerical passwords, how secure are they and how secure do 
users believe them to be? The fmdings of the survey have demostrated a perceived weakness in 
the current PIN technique in the eyes of it's users. They have however, responded positively 
towards alternative authentication techniques, principally fingerprint and speaker verification. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Recent years have witnessed substantial and well-
documented growth within the mobile 
communications sector, with global mobile 
subscribers forecast to rise from 768m in 2001 to 
1,848m by 2004 [I] . However, in parallel with this 
rise in ownership there has been a rise in mobile 
related abuse, suggesting the need for greater 
security measures to prevent unauthorised use. 
Mobile handsets are already recognised as being 
prime targets for thef^  and research findings 
published by the U K Home Office has estimated 
that over 700,000 handsets were stolen from 
subscribers during 2001 [2]. It can be conjectured 
that the more advanced capabilities of third 
generation (3G) handsets will make them even more 
desirable targets in this respect. Additionally, the 
increased bandwidth available in 3G will enable 
service providers to support significantly wider 
application scenarios than the rudimentary voice 
and data services of current cellular networks. This 
expansion of services and subsequent increase in 
private data will demand a corresponding increase 
in the level of protection provided by the terminal 
and network hardware. 
This paper presents consideration of the security 
requirements for 3G, considering specifically the 
issue of subscriber authentication. The discussion 
includes the results of a survey of current mobile 
subscribers, to determine their attitudes towards 
existing security measures, leading into architectural 
considerations and initial experimental results in 
relation to future techniques. 
suBScareER S E C U R I T Y R E Q U I R E M E N T S 
F O R 3 G S Y S T E M S 
Secixrity provisions within 2G networks such as 
GSM are largely geared towards secure 
communication (i.e. radio interface encryption) and 
terminal-based authentication. The latter is achieved 
via the combination of the SIM (Subscriber Identity 
Module) and the IMEI (International Mobile 
Equipment Identifier), and enables the legitimacy of 
the terminal to be determined before allowing it to 
utilise the network. By contrast, relatively little 
attention is devoted to ensuring the legitimacy of the 
current user, and subscriber authentication 
provisions in the vast majority of devices rely upon 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) based 
methods. This facility must be enabled by the 
subscriber before any level of protection is 
provided. Even assuming this is done, the level of 
protection can still vary between devices depending 
on the handset manufacturer's implementation. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the level of 
security delivered by the PIN is commensurate with 
the requirements of the devices, as the potential 
consequences from theft or impostor access can be 
broadly categorised as financial loss (which the 
legitimate user can limit by reporting the theft of the 
phone and getting it blocked by the operator) and 
breach of personal privacy, due to the impostor 
gaining access to contact details and text messages 
held on the device. However, it is acknowledged 
that this is a fairly limited amount of information, 
the disclosure of which would not normally be 
considered highly sensitive. Stored text messages 
may potentially have more significance, but would 
not generally represent a significant body of 
information. By conU^t, the proposed services 3G 
networks demand a more secure subscriber-based 
authentication system in order to protect personal 
information in the event of masquerade attacks. The 
primary reason for this is the hastening convergence 
of mobile devices with Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) devices, and the subsequent expansion in the 
range of possible services enabled as a result. The 
potential consequences of a masquerade will, 
therefore, become far more severe owing to the 
additional and more private information that these 
hybrid devices will store: 
• financial details enabling mobile electronic 
commerce transactions; 
• electronic certificates for digital signatures; 
• frill contact details of family and associates; 
• commercially sensitive miscellaneous 
information (e.g. scheduler/notepad files); 
• medical records as a result of telemedicine or 
teleconsultations. 
A T T I T U D E S T O S E C U R I T Y PROVISION 
WITHIN M O B I L E N E T W O R K S 
A survey was conducted to determine current mobile 
subscribers' attitudes towards the security provisions 
within their devices, and possible areas of 
improvement The survey was distributed to a broad 
range of mobile phone users, in both printed and 
335 
Appendix H ; Published Works 
online formats, yielding a total of 161 responses. Full 
details of the results can be found in [3]. but relevant 
summary information is presented below. 
As discussed previously, the primary method of 
personal security within a mobile phone is the PIN. 
Although 89% of respondents knew about this 
facility, only 56% actually used it. The sur\ey 
showed that 76% of respondents had phones with 
only a single level of security (at power on). Of 
those users that had the facility to PIN protect the 
phone in standby mode, only 36% used it. Other key 
findings included: 
• 11% of respondents did not even know about 
the PIN facility. Scaled up this could represent 
up to 84.5 million subscribers worldwide. 
• Of the 44% of respondents who did not use the 
PIN facility, 65% gave the reason as being its 
inconvenience. 
• Providing additional levels of security does not 
necessarily mean that a subscriber will actually 
use them, as evidenced by those users who did 
not use the PIN to lock phones in standby. 
• A large number of respondents, 41%, have 
little confidence in the protection offered by 
the PIN facility, believing their phone is still 
at risk even with the facility active. 
Given these results, even in a 2G context, the 
prognosis for the successfiil application of the 
same methods in 3G is not encouraging. At the 
same time, the survey also revealed that 88% of 
users wanted to be able to access additional data 
services, such as m-commerce. video conferencing 
and web browsing, from their devices -
highlighting the need for better authentication in 
future devices. 
Despite their reluctance to use the existing PIN-
based methods, the survey results revealed thai 
respondents recognised the need for security, with 
81% believing it would be either good or very good 
io have increased protection. Only 2 respondents 
thought it a bad idea. 
Responses to the implementation of additional 
security showed a strong preference towards 
fingerprint analysis; over 70%. Voiceprinl and ins 
scanning also achieved good responses. Analysing 
the results does however indicate that respondents 
have possibly reacted more positively to those 
authentication mechanisms that they are already 
aware of Fingerprints have, for a long time, been 
known to provide a reliable means of identification. 
In fact fingerprint recognition has already being 
demonstrated by Sagem for advanced e-commerce 
authentication purposes in mobile phones [4]. Voice 
print analysis has also attracted much attention 
recently through computer software and also in the 
phone indu-stry as a means of dialling numbers. 
Techniques such as ear geometry and typing style 
(keystroke analysis) are more recent and, as such, 
less research has been done on them. Preliminary 
results in relation to keystroke analysis on mobile 
phones will be considered later in the paper. 
Figure 1: Positive responses to six main authentication 
techniques 
Of the respondents who indicated that they would 
like more security, 63% also felt that a continuous 
technique during normal phone use would be a good 
idea. This apparent acceptance of continuous 
authentication is compatible with one of the stated 
requirements for secure 3G service provision; 
namely that it should be possible for service 
providers to "authenticate users at the start of, and 
during, service delivery" [5]. Authentication during 
.service delivery represents a departure from the 
approach in 2G systems, and again implies the need 
for some form of transparent measure to avoid 
disrupting subscnbcr's legitimate activity. Options 
for achieving this may be related to periodic or 
ci^ ntinuous supervision, adopting profiling techniques 
or biometric monitoring. Some authentication 
methods clearly lend themselves to this better than 
others, and it is impcmant trom the user acceptance 
jxrrspective to ensure that chosen method(s) could be 
applied in a non-intrusive manner. 
\N \ K C HI r F ( 11 R \ l FK W I E W O R K FOR 
\ l I I I E N T I C A T I O N 
.Authentication could most usefully be handled 
within a flexible security framework, which is able 
to intelligendy monitor the available characteristics 
based upon the current activity of the subscriber. 
For example, voice verification could be utilised 
during a voice call, but during an e-commerce 
transaction it could be replaced by other 
characteristics that are more appropriate to the 
context such as keystroke analysis (see later 
discussion). The monitoring system would 
determine which characteristics, from those 
available on the terminal, .should be assessed at any 
given time and then pass on the relevant data for 
analysis. 
336 
Appendix H : Published Works 
The concept of such an arrangement is illustrated in 
Figure 2. The approach would be non-intrusive in the 
sense that the tenninal user would be unaware of the 
security system unless compromise was suspected. 
Figure 2: Potential Subscriber Monitoring Scenario 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that elements of the 
functionality are split between the network and the 
terminal. However, the approach depicted in the 
diagram is by no means the definitive solution, and 
a fundamental issue is whether the security 
monitoring should be decentralised within the 
subscriber handset (and SIM), or centralised within 
the mobile network. Compared to GSM, UMTS 
does not share the concept of a home network - the 
'universal' aspect suggested in the name is based 
upon roaming between operators to suit the service 
required. This raises a number of important issues, 
not least of which being that any security system 
needs to transcend the technology infrastructures 
of both software and hardware, raised by the 
different operator networks. 
Terminal Issues 
A terminal-based approach, where the subscriber's 
biometric profile is held within the handset, or 
more likely within the SIM card, places 
responsibility for the security of the profile, and 
consequently security of the network portal, in the 
hands of the subscriber. From an operator's 
perspective, this negates the need for additional 
government confidentiality legislation or network 
server security; there is also less need for a legal 
pathway of non-repudiation. As biometric 
authentication and supervision would be 
performed within the handset, it can be achieved 
without imposing additional network traffic 
overhead and enabling authentication to be 
performed independent of link availability. 
There are also hardware issues relevant to the 
terminal-centric solution. For example, any 
additional processing within the handset would 
consume valuable CPU cycles and potentially 
reduce the performance for other tasks. It would 
also have an associated impact upon battery life 
and subsequent recharge interval, especially if the 
technique were to be applied continuously. 
Network issues 
There are some very strong arguments for 
introducing a centralised network based security 
system. It can be argued that placing security into 
the handset, and effectively into the hands of the 
subscriber, is inherendy insecure to begin with. It 
could, for example render the profile more 
vulnerable to misuse or compromise if the terminal 
is stolen. From the operator's perspective, holding 
the profile, and performing any analysis, within the 
network may represent a more trusted solution. 
Another potential advantage offered by the network 
centric system is that of increased personal mobility, 
where a subscriber may register with any network 
terminal in order to access their network operators' 
services under their personal subscription. Although 
GSM was originally designed to offer personal 
mobility via the SIM, the reality is that hardware, 
software, and operator network incompatibilities, as 
well as network locking agreements, have often 
restricted mobility to within a subscriber's own 
network. Additionally, the modem plug-in SIM 
generally resides behind the battery and is 
inherently too small and inconvenient to be of 
practical use as a token of true personal mobility. 
By replacing the token with a biometric, and 
centralising the authentication system, true personal 
mobility can potentially become a reality. 
There are however some consequences to the 
p)ersonal mobility scenario, two primary drawbacks 
being increased data traffic over the wireless link 
and subscriber signature confidentiality. Taking the 
first point, the increased bandwidth of proposed 
next generation networks should have little trouble 
handling the extra handshaking required by any 
biometric and potentially continuously monitoring 
security system, especially compared to the 
bandwidth of a video signal. The second point of 
subscriber signature confidentiality reverses the 
trust issue mentioned earlier. Now the onus on data 
confidentiality is in the hands of the network 
operators, with subscribers trusting their sensitive 
and personal biometric data to not necessarily their 
network operator but perhaps even a third party 
associate. 
In reality, the network-centric solution is more 
elegant, enabling network operators to better protect 
themselves against rogue users, and ultimately 
offering the more secure option for both of the 
legitimate parties. 
In either scenario, the approach requires suitable 
biometrics to be available to monitor fi-om the 
handset. Some experimental findings in relation to 
one such technique are presented in the next section. 
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M O B I L E S U B S C R I B E R AUTHENTICATION 
VIA K E Y S T R O K E DYNAMICS 
Keystroke Dynamics is the term given to a 
bioraetric authentication technique that is able to 
classify, authenticate or identify a person according 
to their typing pattern. The use of keystroke 
dynamics as an authentication technique for mobile 
phones has two distinct advantages over other 
biometric techniques, in that it requires no 
additional hardware and can be implemented in a 
completely mmsparent environment 
The principal typing feature that is used to 
characterise behaviour in keystroke dynamics is 
the inter-keystroke latency. Many smdies have 
taken place over the years, dating back to the 
1980's, such as Joyce and Gupta [6], Leggett and 
Williams [7], Napier et al [8], which have all 
demonstrated that characteristic patterns can be 
discerned from an individual's typing style, which 
in many cases can be used to distinguish that 
individual from a would-be impostor. However, 
these studies have all centred upon the verification 
or identification of a user typing on a full computer 
keyboard. One previous study investigated 
authenticating users from a numerical input 
entered on a standard numerical keypad [9]. 
Although not identical to a mobile phone keypad, 
due to tactile qualities and typing context, the 
study concluded successfully, suggesting the 
potential for further experimental evaluation in a 
telephony context. 
Experimental investigations 
From the foundation provided by previous studies, 
a series of investigations were designed to examine 
the feasibility of using keystroke dynamics on a 
mobile handset. Three experiments were 
conducted, each involving a total of 16 
participants: 
1. the entry of a four digit number, analogous to 
the PINs used on current devices; 
2. the entry of a series of varying telephone 
numbers; 
3. the entry of a fixed telephone number. 
The first and third investigations required the 
participants to enter the numeric keystroke sample 
thirty times, with twenty samples then being used 
to create a reference profile, and the remaining ten 
for subsequent testing. The second investigation 
required a larger number of samples due to the 
changing nature of the input string, and thus the 
need to train the authentication system more 
accurately. ?i(iy samples were taken, with thirty 
for training and twenty for testing. 
Previous studies have shown neural networks to 
provide an effective foundation for keystroke 
analysis [9,10], and they have consequently been 
used in these investigations. The neural network 
structure is constructed on the feed-forward back-
propagation network [ I I ] ; best exemplified for 
pattern recognition techniques. 
Results 
Brief analysis of the input data has identified two 
types of variance that enable or inhibit the 
classification process. The inter-user variance, 
which is essentially a measure of similarity 
between users and ideally would be as large as 
possible, and the inter-sample variance, which is a 
measure of similarity between individual samples 
of a particular user, and would ideally be zero. 
Neither of these variances are near their respective 
ideals, giving rise to the following results, as 
indicated in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 3. 
Each investigation gives rise to a characteristic 
curve with two competing error rates. The False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR), the rate at which 
impostors are accepted by the system, and the 
False Rejection Rate (FRR), the rate at which the 
authorised user is rejected by the system. As can 
be seen from the figure it is possible to reduce one 
of the error rates only at the expensive of 
increasing the other. Therefore a decision has to be 
made between high security and low user 
acceptance (due to inconvenience), or low security 
and high user acceptance. Table 1 illustrates a 
threshold level chosen to have a compromise 
between error rates. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is 
also given as this can ofien be used as a 
performance measure when comparing biometric 
systems [12]. The figures in the table are, of 
course, averages across all of the test subjects 
involved. It is relevant to note, however, that some 
individual networks performed as well as 0% FRR 
and 1.3% FAR - showing that in some cases the 
technique has a much more significant potential 
than the average results would seem to imply. 
A C r ^ ID tfM ffM T R R M F A R 
Figure 3: Perfomiance Curves for the PIN Investigation 
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Investigation FAR FRR EER 
P I N Code 18.1 12.5 15 
Varying Telq)hone 36.3 24.3 32 
Fixed Telq>hone 16 IS 15 
Table 1: Keystroke Dynamics Investigation Results 
The results demonstrate the potential to distinguish 
authorised users from impostors, although arguably 
not to any great accuracy. However, the 
experimental procedure used in this study was 
performed under controlled conditions; with users 
all entering the same input data - a condition that is 
unlikely in the real worid. Additionally, the design, 
and implementation of the neural network used for 
classifrcation was primitive and un-optimised. 
Continuation of the smdy beyond this feasibility 
stage requires variables such as pre-processing, 
generalisation, network sensitivity and network 
configuration to be considered and analysed. 
Further development of the technique will also 
consider other forms of user interaction with mobile 
handsets, in order to attempt to profile behaviour in 
different contexts. For instance, the way in which 
someone types when entering an SMS message is 
likely to be different to the way in which they enter 
a telephone number. Some users will use certain 
applications or functionality on the phone more 
often than others; will dial certain number more 
than others; and equally as important will not use or 
dial certain people or services. All of these factors 
could potentially be used as discriminating 
characteristics, leading to a stronger overall 
verification technique. 
CONCLUSION 
The capabilities of 3G mobile systems will open up 
a range of new service opportunities and, as a 
consequence, will impose new requirements for 
security. The survey fmdings indicated a weakness 
of the current provisions, in that the authentication 
technology is optional and, therefore, of\en unused. 
However, subscribers have shown the desire for 
additional security, and have responded positively 
towards a number of alternative techniques. Given 
that many respondents do not use the current 
security techniques that are available to them, it can 
be assumed that a non-intrusive method of 
authentication may prove to be most acceptable and 
widely utilised by end users. Viable architectural 
frameworks can be specified to support this, and 
appropriate biometric measures can be identified to 
provide the underlying authentication methods. 
Keystroke dynamics can only be considered to be a 
transparent technique when the user is interacting 
with the keypad. If the user begins a voice or video 
conference call, the approach becomes an intrusive 
and impractical method for continuous 
authentication. In order to overcome this, the use of 
two or more biometric techniques could be used in a 
hybrid non-intrusive manner, i.e. keystroke 
dynamics for typing authentication, voice 
recognition whilst speaking, and facial recognition 
for video conferencing. The effective and intelligent 
management of these biometrics would provide the 
necessary security required in a 3G environment. 
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Acceptance of subscriber authentication methods for mobile telephony 
devices 
Abstract 
Mobile phones are now an accepted part of everyday life, with users becoming more 
reliant on the services that they can provide. In the vast majority of systems, the only 
security to prevent unauthorised use of the handset is a four digit Personal Identification 
Number (PIN). This paper presents the findings o f a survey into the opinions o f 
subscribers regarding the need for security in mobile devices, their use of current 
methods, and their attitudes towards alternative approaches that could be employed in 
the ftiture. It is concluded that, although the need for security is understood and 
appreciated, the current PfN-based approach is under-utilised and can, therefore, be 
considered to provide inadequate protection in many cases. Surveyed users responded 
positively towards alternative methods of authentication, such as fingerprint scanning 
and voice verification. Based upon these findings, the paper concludes that a non-
intrusive, and possibly hybrid, method of authentication (using a combination of 
techniques) would best satisfy the needs of fijture subscribers. 
Key>vords 
Authentication, Mobile, GSM, UMTS, Biometrics. 
Introduction 
The mobile phone market has witnessed phenomenal growth in recent years, such that 
the phone itself is now regarded as an essential everyday item by millions of people. 
Indeed, cellular subscribers currently total around 479.5 million woridwide, a 56.87% 
growth on the previous year, with forecasts for the end of 2003 estimating that the 
number of subscribers wil l be in the region of 1.073 billion [ I ] . 
In addition to increasing subscribers, the capabilities of the phones themselves will also 
improve. With the introduction of third generation mobile devices, part o f the ITU IMT-
2000 initiative [2], a broadband service of up to 2 Mbps wil l be on offer, providing the 
potential for true multimedia services [3]. As the technology advances, the range of 
potential services also expands. Whereas the first generation analogue phones of the 
1980s were purely aimed at the provision of voice telephony services, the arrival of 
second generation (digital) phones in the early 1990s ushered in basic data services such 
as SMS (Short Message Service) text messaging. In more recent years, devices 
supporting the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) have facilitated limited Internet 
access, and the emergence of faster access technologies, such as GPRS (General Packet 
Radio Service) and UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System), will hasten 
the convergence of the mobile phone with Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) devices. 
This, in tum, will significantly increase the range of in-built and network-based 
applications of the device, thus also increasing the range o f potentially sensitive and 
private information that the devices will hold. 
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As the sensitivity o f information stored on a mobile device increases, the need for 
effective security also increases. The 3"* Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), who 
provide the technical specifications and regulations for UMTS, have recognised the 
need for secure data communications and produced appropriate standards [4], However, 
security over the air interface is only one aspect o f the problem, and it is also important 
to ensure appropriate protection o f the device against unauthorised access. Current 
mobile handsets do incorporate some level o f protection in this respect, but it is fairly 
rudimentary, and as the need for security increases there is the potential to incorporate 
more advanced methods. At this stage, however, questions remain about the security 
measures that customers would expect, and tolerate, to protect their personal 
information. This paper considers the need for security on mobile handsets, end-user 
attitudes towards current authentication measures, and their views in relation to future 
service opportunities and the consequent security requirements that these w i l l impose. 
Subscriber authentication in mobile systems 
At the time of writing, the dominant mobile network standard is GSM (Global System 
for Mobile communications), which accounts for 63% of the global cellular market [1]. 
The authentication security that the GSM networks currendy provide is focused 
between the terminal devices and the network, as shown in Figure I , with a number o f 
checks being made to ensure that the handset is permitted to use the network, has not 
been reported stolen etc. By contrast, the security between the terminal and the 
subscriber is currently quite rudimentary, with subscriber authentication based upon the 
use of a Personal Identification Number (PFN). 
User Terminal Network 
PIN Code 
IMEl Code 
IMSI Code 
TMSI Code 
< > 
PIN - Personal Identification Number 
IMEl - International Mobile Equipment Identifier 
IMSI - International Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
TMSI - Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
Figure 1 : User - Terminal - Network Security Processes 
For the majority of mobile phones, the PIN is the only form of authentication required 
in order for a user to be able to access the device. The authentication process wil l 
typically only allow the user to enter the number incorrectly a finite number of times 
(typically three) before the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) within the phone becomes 
locked and requires a special unlock password (PUK) from the network service 
provider. In this way, brute force attacks on the PIN code (where every combination is 
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systematically tried) are avoided. However, the security here assumes two things: 
firstly, that the PIN facility is activated, and secondly, that the user has not 
compromised its protection (e.g. by not changing it from the factory default, by writing 
it down, or by telling someone else) in the many that frequently occurs with other 
knowledge-based authentication approaches, such as passwords [5]. 
I f the PIN facility is enabled, it may (depending on the make/model of phone) provide 
two levels o f authentication. Al l phones can be configured to request the PIN when 
they are switched on (normally only allowing emergency calls in its absence). Some 
models also allow locking of the keypad when switched on, requiring PIN re-entry 
before each use. As such, the PIN is capable of providing protection, and to date it has 
generally been regarded as providing sufficient security, given that the information 
held on the devices is relatively limited (e.g. telephone numbers, simple text 
messages, etc.), and thus of little value to a thief Therefore the main threat comes 
through unauthorised usage of the phone, which only exists in a finite window before 
the phone is reported stolen and subsequently disabled by the network operator. 
Recently, with the advent of WAP-enabled second-generation phones, there has been 
a movement towards the storage of more sensitive material. For example, some 
handsets contain a credit card reader that is able to make transactions over WAP-
enabled web sites. Although this still requires a PIN identification before use, it does 
pose the question of how far we can rely on PIN codes, how secure they are, and how 
secure users believe them to be. 
Whereas PIN-based authentication relies on something the user knows, an alternative 
method is authentication via something the user is, a domain more commonly referred 
to as biometrics. There are two categories o f biometric authentication [6 ] : 
• Physiological biometrics, based upon bodily characteristics (e.g. fingerprint 
analysis, facial recognition, iris scanning and ear geometry). 
• Behavioural biometrics, based upon the way people do things (e.g. voice print, 
typing style). 
Much research has gone into developing these techniques into practical systems, and 
they are already employed as alternative authentication methods in desktop PC 
environments - for example, 9% of the respondents to the 2001 CSI/FBI Computer 
Crime and Security Survey claimed to use biometric security technologies [7]. In 
addition, there is already evidence of their application within the mobile domain. The 
Sagem MC959 handset, for example, incorporates a fingerprint recognition system 
into the back panel [8]. When considering the application o f biometrics, in the context 
of mobile handsets, appropriate thought needs to be given to the practicality of the 
technique. It is noticeable, for example, that physiological techniques generally 
require additional hardware, such as the fingerprint scanner, to be added, whereas 
behavioural techniques do not. Implementation of behavioural techniques can be 
achieved through software only. Clearly, for mass-market devices, component cost is 
a major consideration, and handset prices are already subsided by network operators 
in many countries in order to keep the cost down for the consumer. However another 
major consideration to take into account is how the subscribers actually feel about 
security. Customers in today's worid dictate the success or failure o f a product, so 
their attitudes and opinions are important factors to take into consideration. 
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A survey of subscriber attitudes towards mobile security 
A survey was conducted to assess the attitudes and opinions o f current mobile 
subscribers towards authentication on their phones. To this end, a questionnaire was 
devised that assessed the fo l lowing aspects: 
• how the phone is used (e.g. voice communications, text messages etc.) and how 
subscribers would like to use their phones in the future. This gauges the level to 
which additional security is necessary - i f the phone is used purely for voice 
communications then the need for increasing security is questionable; 
• users opinions about the current form o f authentication, the PIN; 
• whether users believe there is a need for increasing security, and i f so how 
would they like to see a solution implemented. 
The survey was distributed as hard copies to a wide range o f people, w i th one proviso -
in order to be able to offer a valid opinion, the respondents had to be current or past 
users o f mobile phones. A total o f 138 paper-based copies where returned. A n on-line 
version was also created, achieving another 23 responses. Thus, a final total o f 161 
responses were obtained, and the results are analysed in the sections that f o l l o w . 
General 
The survey was not aimed at any specific age group or gender, the hope being to obtain 
a good cross section o f users. As shown in Figure 2 below, 53.5% o f respondents were 
in the 17-24 age group. Although at first glance this figure does not suggest a 
particularly represcnlati\c sample, it is actually a fair rctlcctioii o f mobile phone 
ownership in the U K , where the survey was focused. Recent market research studies 
have illustrated that teenagers now account for a significant proportion o f phone 
purchases, particular in relation to pre-pay phone options [9] . Wi th this in mind, the 
predominance o f younger respondents in this study is less surprising, and serves to 
make the results a more accurate reflection o f typical subscriber aUitudes. 
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Figure 2 : Gender and age split in the respondent group 
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The desire to remain contactable is apparent from how long respondents leave their 
handsets switched on. 57% of those questioned said they kept their phone switched on 
for greater than ten hours a day, with 19% claiming between six and ten hours, and the 
percentage descending in order to 11% for less than one hour a day. These findings have 
a couple of implications: 
• The need to leave the phone on comes in part from the need to stay in touch. So 
is the mobile phone the users principle means of doing this? Those switching on 
for less than one hour are likely to be users who only switch on when they wish 
to use the phone themselves. Thus either do not wish to be kept in contact with 
or have another principle means of communication, for instance a landline 
phone. Those leaving their phones on for a long period of time are likely to 
consider their phones to be there major means of contact, showing a possible 
long-term commitment towards the use of mobile phones. 
• With the large number of respondents leaving their phone on, this could have 
implications for security, especially those who do not have or do not use a PIN 
facility to lock their keypad on standby. 
Different phone manufacturer's, although providing a range of different phones, often 
keep the same software ftjnctionality, i.e. Nokia and its proprietary menu system. Nokia 
and Motorola's use of the PIN is no different in principle. However, whereas Motorola 
provides the facility to lock the keypad whilst on standby, Nokia however does not. In 
this particular sample, 57% of respondents are Nokia owners, of whom 96% leave their 
phone on for more than one hour a day, and 87% leave it on for more than six hours a 
day. This results in a significant number of unlocked phones on stand-by mode for long 
periods o f time every day, leaving them with effectively no defence from un-authorised 
use i f lost or accidentally left unattended. 
Mobile phone usage - present and future 
Unsurprisingly, results indicate that the vast majority use their mobile phone for talking. 
More interestingly, however, 90% of respondents regularly use text messages as a 
means of communication. Figure 3 illustrates these findings, in addition to responses for 
a range of other current services. The other services are newer, and from the responses 
have not been adopted as widely at present. A possible discrepancy in the data exists 
surrounding the use of the email service. Although this service is currently available on 
only a small proportion of handsets, 64%> responded 'yes' or 'no' to the question of 
whether they used the facility. It is considered likely that many respondents who 
answered 'no' were doing so because their phone does not offer them the option (and, 
therefore, they should ideally have selected the 'not available' option on the 
questionnaire). This hypothesis also applies to the use of WAP services. However, it is 
valid to note the proportion of users that do use their phone for WAP and email services 
stands at 6% and 9% respectively, indicating an emerging acceptance and use o f 
advanced data services. 
Respondents were also asked whether they would consider using a small range o f other 
services that are likely to be offered by ftiture mobile handsets. 
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Figure 3 : Services used by respondents 
The questionnaire specifically suggested the options "video conferencing*, "online 
shopping', "Worid Wide Web' , "Downloading music' and Tersonal Organiser', as well 
as offer ing respondents the option to suggest other ideas that would interest them. The 
results strongly suggested that the adoption o f advanced mobile service is l ikely to 
continue, wi th 40% looking to use video conferencing, 43% interested in online 
shopping, 58% desiring mobile web access, 53% wishing to download music, and 73% 
wanting an integrated personal organiser. Although the latter would not necessarily 
involve communication between phones and the network, the data stored in personal 
organisers could well contain sensitive information such as bank account details etc. 
The additional services that were suggested by respondents included "digital money', 
"radio\ and "global positioning system' - all o f which are very l ikely to emerge in 
combination with telephony handsets. Overall, it is also worth noticing that 88% o f 
respondents did want to use some form o f additional service. 
Usefulness of current securit\ 
As previously discussed, the primary method o f user authentication for mobile phones is 
the PIN, which is able to provide up to two levels o f security. Although 89% o f 
respondents knew about the PIN faci l i ty , only 56% o f them use it in either form. The 
survey shows that 76% o f respondents had phones wi th only one level o f security (at 
power on). O f those users that did have both levels o f security, only 46% o f them used 
the second level on a regularly basis. Asking whether the respondents feel entering a 
PIN number is inconvenient, 4 1 % responded 'yes' wi th the same percentage also 
expressing doubts about the level o f protection the PIN can provide. Although the 
results are not conclusive enough to put an argument for or against the usefulness o f the 
PIN facili ty, there are a number o f significant points that can be drawn from the data: 
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• 11% of respondents did not know about the PIN facility. On the face of it, this is 
a relatively small percentage, but on a worldwide scale that accounts for 52.8 
million subscribers who do not even know that security is available. 
• Of the 44% of respondents who do not use the PIN facility, 65% of them 
considered it to be inconvenient, thus suggesting a good reason why they do not 
use it. 
• Providing additional levels of security does not necessarily provide the user with 
additional protection i f s/he does not use it through inconvenience. 64% of 
respondents for whom the ability to PIN-protect the phone between calls is 
available, still do not use the facility because they find entering the PIN 
inconvenient. 
• A significant proportion of respondents, 41% do not have confidence in the 
protection the PIN facility provides, indicating users believe their phone is sfiU 
at risk from misuse even i f the PIN facility is in use. 
• 52% of female respondents do not use the PIN facility compared to 39% of 
males. 
The survey also asked respondents to comment about issues relating to the compromise 
of security. When asked to consider compromise by another party, only 11% of users 
believed that their phone had been used without their permission. The real percentage is 
likely to be higher, ft-om misuse that has gone undetected. For instance people who may 
use the phone briefly without the owner's knowledge. Those respondents who answered 
positively to this question are likely to have had their phone stolen, and thus detected 
the misuse. The questions also considei-ed compromise of protection arising from the 
subscribers' own actions. There are several ways in which subscribers may invalidate 
the PIN security, such as revealing the number to someone else, forgetting it, or writing 
it down. Table 2 presents a summary of the findings here. 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Forgotten It 17 83 
Told Someone Else 26 74 
Taken a Written Note Of It 6 94 
Table 2 : Respondents who invalidate their PIN protection 
Attitudes towards future authentication options 
With mobile handset manufacturers and network operators both aiming to provide users 
with additional services, the need for security is likely to increase. This survey has 
identified that users are already using data services, and are will ing to use fiiture 
services as and when they become available. It is an encouraging sign that the 
respondents also recognise the need for security, with 81% believing it would be either 
good or very good to have more security. Only Uvo respondents thought it would be bad 
idea. This recognition shows that users are aware of the need for security, and are also 
possibly worried about their current level of protection. Interestingly, however, the 
desire for more security shows a downward trend as the respondents' age increases, as 
shown in Table 3. 
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Age Group Responded positively (%). 
Under 16 100 
17-24 89 
25-34 72 
35-44 66 
45-54 68 
55 or older 42 
Table 3 : Respondents opinions on having additional security 
Having established that respondents were generally accepting o f additional authentication 
measures, the survey proceeded to assess their preferences for the forms that it could take. 
Having dctcnnined that PIN-bascd protection is problematic, it is considered that other 
authentication methods based upon something the user knows (e.g. passwords) would be 
equally under-utilised or inconvenient. The implication o f this is that the most sensible 
route for improving authentication is to base the approach upon a biometric technique (the 
other option for authentication, basing it upon something the user has, is likely to offer 
little advantage, as the phone itself is something the user has, and any supplementary 
authentication token would be likely to be kept with the device). With this in mind, the 
survey respondents were presented with a range o f biometric authentication options and 
asked to indicate which o f them would be preferable to the PIN. The biometrics otTered as 
options were as follows: fingerprint recognition, voice print recognition, ear geometry, 
facial recognition, iris scanning, and typing style A l l o f these techniques have been the 
focus o f previous research, and some are already widely recognised as commercial 
products in the domains o f physical access control and desktop computing [10]. The 
respondents" opinions in relation to the techniques are illustrated in I igiire 4. 
100 ; 
90 H 
50 
26 
28 
Finger Port Vex* Pnrt Ear Geometry Faaal Recognition Iris Scanning Typing Sty4e 
Figure 4 : Positive responses to biometric authentication techniques 
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Techniques such as ear geometry (in which the subscriber would be identified by the 
physical shape of their ear) and typing style (in which authentication would be based upon 
characteristic inter-keystroke latencies observed when subscribers dial numbers or 
otherwise interact with the keypad) are less recognised in the marketplace, but are 
considered particularly suited to non-intrusive application in a telephony context. 
The results showed a strong preference towards fingerprint analysis, with approximately 
three quarters of the respondents selecting this option. Voice print analysis and iris 
scanning also achieved good scores, albeit significantly lower than fingerprint analysis 
in both cases. The remaining three techniques were demonstrably less popular, 
appealing to just over a quarter of respondents in each case. However, any conclusions 
drawn fi-om these results should be tempered with the observation that the respondents 
are likely to have responded most positively to those ideas that they have already heard 
o f Fingerprints have long been known to provide a means of successftilly identifying 
people, and indeed such techniques are already being used in mobile phones. Voice 
print analysis has also attracted much attention through the media, computer software 
applications, and also in the phone industry (albeit in the context of voice recognition 
for dialling numbers, rather than as a means o f authentication). It is also fairiy easy to 
understand this authentication technique, as people generally sound different. 
Techniques such as ear geometry and typing style are newer, and less information is 
known about them. Although keystroke analysis techniques have been extensively 
researched for use in PC-based authentication [11,12], it is not a widely advertised or 
used technique. As for ear geometry, although it is not very difficult to imagine how this 
technique might possibly work, there are no current implementations on the general 
market, and knowledge about this technique would, therefore, have been very limited 
amongst the respondents. 
The point, therefore, is not to regard the results as a conclusive attitude towards one 
technique over another. The key observation that can be made is that all techniques 
were (to some degree) considered favourably, and that i f a technique were to be 
implemented that was less known about generally, a degree of education and awareness 
before wide scale adoption. 
One advantage of certain biometrics when compared to the PIN is that they offer the 
potential for authentication to be performed on a continual basis rather than as a one-off 
judgement. Respondents were, therefore, asked whether they would consider continuous 
authentication during a call to be acceptable. The results revealed that 4 1 % of 
respondents considered continuous authentication during a call to be a good idea, while 
24% were against the idea, and 35% were indifferent to the idea. However, the actual 
number of users willing to break during their call to authenticate themselves is likely to 
be low, which implies that any continuous authentication method implemented would 
have to be non-intrusive (without explicit action by the user). Certain authentication 
techniques will clearly lend themselves to this better than others, for instance voiceprint, 
as the user would be talking on the phone already. Techniques such as keystroke 
analysis would not typically be viable during a traditional voice call, but could 
potentially provide a measure of authentication as each call is initiated, or during the 
conduct of keypad-oriented, non-voice sessions. 
For all authentication techniques, including the PIN, some information needs to be 
stored so that a comparison is possible with the input data. The final objective of the 
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survey was to establish users' opinions on where this profile should be stored - on the 
phone or in the network. The advantage of storing the profile on the phone is that 
authenticafion can then occur completely on the phone, with the result that no personal 
details are communicated to and fi-om the network, and the network traffic overhead is 
minimised. However, the disadvantage is that the user is then restricted to being 
authenticated on the one phone. By having profile information stored on the network, 
users would be able to login at any network access point, thus enhancing their personal 
mobility. It would also enable the network operator to monitor the success or failure 
rates for possible misuse. Where a preference was expressed, the opinions fi^om the 
survey respondents clearly favoured the profile being held in the handset, with 52% of 
respondents selecting this option. By contrast, 26% favoured the network, while 20% 
did not mind and 2% did not understand the question. Given that the respondents were 
probably not be giving much thought to the issue of the network overheard, it is likely 
that their preference for the handset-based profile relates to the ability to retain control 
over their own profile data. 
Discussion 
Although the results have suggested the desire for a greater level o f security, this 
clearly represents something of a contradiction when it is considered alongside the 
fact that many respondents do not even use the current method that has been provided 
for them. This suggests that it is the security technique, rather than the concept of 
security, that users are rejecting, and as such a move towards non-intrusive methods of 
authentication may provide the protection that users are looking for, but without the 
associated inconvenience that is currently perceived. Although fingerprint scanning 
was a favourite technique, it does not necessarily lend itself to non-intrusive 
implementation, as the user would need to place his/her finger on the scanner. I f the 
scanner were to be placed in a natural area on the phone where a finger would 
normally be placed to hold the device, then the level o f intrusiveness would be 
arguable. Voiceprint lends itself to both one-off and continuous monitoring of voice 
communications, but would either lose its non-intrusiveness, or the ability to 
authenticate, on data communications. Keystroke analysis also lends itself to non-
intrusive authentication for one-off monitoring and would be more likely to facilitate 
continuous monitoring during the utilisation of keypad-oriented services. 
Since none of the biometrics discussed can provide non-intrusive authentication for all 
possible scenarios, and secondly cannot provide 0% false acceptance and false rejecfion 
rates, it would seem logical to provide a hybrid model o f authentication, using a number 
of non-intrusive methods as first/second line security, with the PIN (or some other 
knowledge-based methods) providing a fallback method i f needed. Current research is 
focusing upon the realisation and evaluation of such an approach, and the authors are 
investigating the application of biometrics in this context. A preliminary investigation of 
keystroke analysis has been conducted to assess whether it is possible to authenticate 
people fi'om the way in which they dial numbers on a standard GSM handset. Although 
the results are not conclusive at this stage (with false acceptance and false rejecdon 
errors of around 15% being observed), it is considered that refinement o f the technique 
may yield better performance. The full results fi-om this element of the investigation will 
be published in due course. 
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Conclusions 
The survey findings have indicated a weakness of the current security provisions on 
mobile handsets, in that the authentication technology is optional and, therefore, not used 
by a large proportion of users. However, subscribers have shown both the need and the 
desire for additonal security, and have responded positively towards a number of 
alternative authentication techniques. At the same time, the results showed that many 
respondents do not use the current security techniques that are available to them. In view 
of this, it can be assumed that a non-intrusive method of authentication may prove to be 
most acceptable and widely utilised by end users. 
With the introduction of the third generation phones, a range of new advanced services 
will become available, services that the respondents in the survey indicated that they 
would be keen to use. In this context, the protection of users' information must become a 
prime concern, especially when considering the possible sensitivity of the data, and the 
need for a sucessflil transition into a multi-billion dollar mcommerce market. Security is, 
essential, and approaches must be employed that subscribers will tolerate and use. 
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H9 Poster Presentation 
Third International Networking Conference (INC 2002) 
July 2002, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK. 
"Biometrics - Authentication You Are Born With" 
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HIO Poster Presentation 
Biometrics 2002 
November 2002, Excel Centre, London, UK. 
''Non-Intrusive Biometric Authentication for Mobile Devices " 
Poster awarded 'Best Student Prize' 
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H l l Additional Published Works 
Additional published works are expected to emerge from the HAT-related research. 
At the time of going to press a journal paper entitled, "A novel non-intrusive 
authentication mechanism for application in mobile devices " was in final draft, pending 
submission to the journal, Computers and Security (Elsevier Science). 
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11 Patent Proposal 360 
12 U K Patent Application - no. 2,375,205 364 
13 US Patent Application - no. 10/476,588 399 
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I I Patent Proposal 
Copy of an original patent proposal, based on the core PhD Research, 
presented to Orange lawyers (circa2001),for legal formatting and formal 
UK & US patent application submission. 
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Patent Proposal 
A B S T R A C T 
A proposal of an idea for a novel continuous, non-intrusive, biometric authentication technique; 
for initial application in a mobile communications environment. The technique will utilise wave 
propagation effects to extract and exploit a unique biometric based on the physiological 
modification of sound waves. The primary realisation of this technique will exploit the 
exclusive topography of the human head. 
AUTHOR 
Philip Rodwell, Orange PLC, Bristol. 
C O N T R I B U T O R S 
Prof. Paul Reynolds, Orange PLC, Bristol. 
Dr. Steven Fumell, Manager Network Research Group, D C E E , University of Plymouth. 
I M KODUCTION 
Security provisions within the current GSM European mobile telecommunications network are 
primarily aimed at secure communications through data encryption and terminal authentication 
via use of a smart card, the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The proposed services of 3'*^  
Generation (3G) mobile systems demand a more secure subscriber based authentication system 
in order to provide greater protection of more advanced and personal information in the event of 
a masquerade attack. 
Current security provision includes an International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI), to 
identify and protect the Mobile Equipment (ME) and a Personal Identification Number (PIN), to 
authenticate a user to and subsequently access the SIM. As the PIN technique is fundamentally 
Point of Entry (PoE) authentication, is not physiologically personal to the actual subscriber, and 
is based on transferable knowledge, it is vulnerable to masquerade attacks. This proposal 
presents a technique, which can potentially overcome the problems of the current system, being 
both suitable for continuous authentication and being based on subscriber's individual 
physiological signatures. Such biometric authentication approaches are advantageous in that 
they cannot be forgotten, lost or stolen in the same way that would be possible with approaches 
based upon secret knowledge or the possession of physical tokens. 
What is required is a biometric that can be applied effectively and non-intrusively in a telephony 
context. 
D E S C R I P T O R 
When a person hears a st^ und, owing to the unique 
topography and sensitivity of the inner-ear and auditory 
canal, individually, that person will perceive a different 
sound to a second person listening to the same sound'. 
The idea proposes a way of utilising this exclusivity as 
a novel means of biometric authentication; with an 
initial leaning towards mobile communications. 
Auditory Perception, A New Analysis and Synthesis. R.M.Warren, ©Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
361 
Appendix I : Patent Material 
While it is possible to identify numerous other physiological and behavioural biometric 
techniques (e.g. fingerprint recognition, face recognition), none are ideally suited to transparent 
and non-intrusive application within a voice telephony context. 
The closest usable biometric authenticator for telephony is speaker verification, in which the 
subscriber may be authenticated based upon the analysis of their voice characteristics. Some 
examples of work in this important area are the European Commission funded, C A V E ' and 
PICASSO^ projects. 
In practice, however, the speaker verification technique has several drawbacks that limit its 
application and the degree of protection that it can provide: 
<• Verification is most effective (accurate) when the user profile is constructed on the 
basis of known words or phrases. In this context (text dependent), authentication can 
only occur when the specific phrase(s) that have been profiled are then spoken - which 
may give limited opportunity in many scenarios. 
*> Continuous (text independent) verification is less reliable, which could lead to false 
rejections and, therefore, result in inconvenience to legitimate subscribers. 
• The technique requires the subscriber to be speaking before an authentication 
judgement can be made. In certain scenarios, this would not need to be the case in order 
for security to be compromised (e.g. retrieval of sensitive messages from a voicemail 
system may require no spoken interaction from an impostor). 
In developing a system to utilise the new proposed idea, one important criteria is the non-
intrusive nature of the technique. This system transparency presents the novel possibility of 
continuous authentication within the mobile telephony environment. 
There are a number of approaches to realising this novel biometric signature; 
*> The primary approach will use an inband (human auditory range) pulse of pink noise 
(band-limited white noise), of short enough duration as to be undetectable, or at least 
non-intrusive to the user. The resulting reflected spectrum will then be used as the 
authenticating signature. Using an inband pulse will prevent any onboard filtering from 
modifying the generated pulse and negate the need for modified hardware. The pulse 
will be initiated from the network as and when requested by the security architecture 
leaving control of security access to the network operator, hi addition, it is possible to 
signature the pink noise pulse by varying the amplitudes at selected frequencies, adding 
a further level of security to the system. This pink noise signature could possibly be 
used unique to the network/user or varied according to a specific algorithm. 
<• A second approach will utilise the telephones side-tone (via the ether) as a reference 
sound source, making a comparison with the same original sound as it is detected at the 
earpiece of a handset after traversing through the skull of the user to the ear. The 
modified sound, will have been subjected to, in addition to other effects, the wave 
effects of reflection, summing, differencing in addition to the absorption characteristics 
of the varying densities and thicknesses of the solids and fluids in the humaji skull. This 
difference spectrum from the direct/indirect path could be used as the authentication 
signature, being compared with a reference stored in either the terminal or the network. 
One disadvantage of this system is that it would require the user to speak, or at least 
make a sound into the system before authentication could take place, unless a suitable 
pink noise tone was utilised for initial PoE authentication purposes. 
The European CAller VErification Project. hltp://www.pn-telecom.nl/cave/ 
Picasso Project, http://www.picasso.kpn-telecom.iil/ 
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• A third approach is the use of frequencies in the out-of-band, ultra-sonic frequencies. 
This technique could adopt either of the first two principles of signature creations, being 
based either on reflection or modified transition owing to the skull. As this technique 
would be inaudible to the user, authentication would be completely transparent. 
All of the above systems would need to be able to update user authentication signatures 
dynamically as a users physiology changes with age and/or health. 
In detemiining the viability of the system for commercial application, research is addressing: 
• the practicality of the resultant system; 
• additional hardware requirements, specifically for mobile application; 
• system efficiency in extracting exclusive biometric signatures; 
• false Acceptance and False Rejection rates; 
• the level of transparency to the end user. 
IV\C K C R O U N D 
After conducting an extensive literature search, I 
am unaware of any research applying these 
techniques to the area of authentication security. 
The nearest area of similar research involves ear-
prints', based on outer ear geometry. This is 
applied in a similar way to the established 
biometric technique of hand geometry', where a 
unique signature is devised from a physical image 
of the user's hand, based purely on its 2-
dimensional shape. 
ANT1-MCUX 1 
A N ri T R A G U S 
CI tUS o r HfXlX 
TMAGUS 
ADDITIONAL C O M M E N T S 
Potentially such a system would be extremely secure, as working in continuous authentication 
mode, only an authorised users ear in close proximity to the ear-piece would pennit the system 
to release information. As an extension to the system, it should also be possible to develop the 
system to work with a separate earpiece for authentication purposes outside of the mobile 
communications arena, e.g. PC based user authentication. 
' Automatic Ear Recognition. - http: w a v w .isis.ecs.soton.ac.uk. 
Image, Speech and Intelligent Systems Research Group. 
Department of ElecU-onics and Computer Science, University of Southampton 
' Hand Geometry Website: http: www.hand-scan.com 
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12 UK Patent Application - no. 2,375,205 
Copy of UK Patent Application: "Determining Identity Data for a User " 
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D£TERMI^aNG roENTITY DATA F O R A USER 
Field of the Present Invention 
The present invention relates to determining identity data for a user of 
5 an electronic device using a biomctric technique. More particularly, but not 
exclusively, the present invention relates to using a biometric technique for 
authentication of a user of a telephony device. 
Background of the Present Invention 
10 Historically, there has been a general need for user authentication in the 
fields of electronics, data processing, computer nctx -^orks and 
telecommunications. For example, the user of an automated telling machine 
(ATM) will Domially be required to enter a personal identification number 
(PIN) before being allowed access to bank account services or funds. Similarly, 
15 for user access to private or public computer networks, such as an intranet or 
the Internet, typically the user will need to enter a user name and poss^ ^ord 
before being allowed access. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) typically 
implement authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) systems to a) 
ascertain who the user is (authentication), b) determine access rights for the user 
20 (authorisation), and c) set up the necessary charging mechanisms for the user 
(accounting). The processes of authorisation and accounting are both 
dependent on successful authentication. Similarly, individual network 
resources such as Web sites, and other services, may also implement 
conditional access systems using, for example, user name and password entry. 
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In the field of mobile commumcation3» in particular with second 
generation systems such as the Global System for Mobile communications 
(GSM)» security is implemented through data encryption and subscriber 
authentication via use of a smart card known as the Subscriber Identity Module 
5 (SIM). The mobile station may optionally be set to require entry of a PIN 
before allowing access to the data stored on the SIM and non-emergency calls. 
However, the technique of requiring a PIN is not truly personal to the 
subscriber and is based on transferable knowledge - i.e. the PIN code. Thus, 
the technique is vuhicrabte to masquerade attacks whereby a third party obtains 
10 or successfully guesses the PIN number and is able to masquerade as the 
subscriber. The same can be said of any technique requiring a password, such 
as the user name and password technique. 
Furthermore, PIN or user name and password techniques arc point of 
entry techniques, which only perform authentication periodically on the 
t5 occurrence of certain events, such as on switching on a mobile station. Thus, 
an unauthorised party obtaining a previously authenticated mobile station may 
not be required to undergo further authentication until the mobile station is 
switched off or runs out of powr. This problem is exacerbated with 
improvements in power capacity of mobile stations whereby mobile stations 
20 need hardly ever be switched off. 
Furthermore, the problems of point of entry authentication techniques, 
such as requiring a PIN code or a user name and password, are becoming 
exacerbated with the advent of "always on" telecommunications access 
whereby a user of a fixed or mobile telecommunications device is provided 
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with continuous access to network resources and services without having to 
periodically dial up a connection and undergo point of entry authentication. 
With the advent of third generation mobile conmiunications 
technologies, and with the convergence of fixed and mobile 
S telecommtmications and computer networks, more services of greater value will 
be accessible via both mobile and fixed stations. More advanced and 
potentially more sensitive information, such as bank account information, 
geographic location, private correspondence and so on, will be accessible from 
a multitude of telecommunications devices. For example, e^ruiil, e-commerce 
10 transactions, and location-based services may be available to users of both 
mobile and fixed teleconununications devices. 
Thus, it can be seen that there will be an increasing need for greater 
security in future mobile and fixed telecommunications systems and, in 
particular, a need for enhanced, truly persona], and continuous, user-based 
1S authentication. 
International publication no. WO 99/08238 discloses a portable client 
personal distal assistant (PDA) with a microphone and local central processing 
unit (CPU) capable of processing biomctric data to provide user verification. 
The device inchides a modem to provide direct commimications with peripheral 
20 devices and is capable of transmitting or receiving information through wireless 
communication. Optionally, a biometric sensor may be provided for collecting 
biomenic daUi such as a finger, thumb or palm print, a handwriting sample, a 
retinal vascular pattern, or a combination thereof, to provide biometric 
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verificatioo. Ho>*-cvcr, the document discloses a preference for biometric 
verification through voice data 
Intematioiial publication no. WO 99/45690 di^loses a protected access 
system for controlling access to networks such as telephone networks, ^Mbich 
5 may use biometric characteristics for subscriber identification. The document 
discloses using any of three biometric characteristics for authentication, namely, 
retina patterns, speech or voice characteristics of fingerprints. 
International publication no. WO 99/54851 discloses a device, such as a 
mobile telephone and SIM card, comprising sensors for detecting biomctric 
10 characteristics and a data processing device for determining authentication 
informatibn from the biometric characteristics. The docimicnt discloses using 
any of three biometric characteristics, namely, fingerprints, retinal patterns, and 
voice or speech characteristics. 
US Patent no. 5,872,834 discloses a telephone provided with a contact 
15 imaging device for obtaining biometric data to identify or authenticate the user. 
Contact imaging devices arc stated to include electrical contact imaging sensors 
such as capacimtive fingerprint imagers and optical contact imaging sensors 
siich as optical fingerprint imagers. The user must make physical contact with 
an electrical or optical component of the imager for biometric data to be 
20 obtainable. 
The CAVE project (CAller VErification in banking and 
telecommunications) and the follow up project PICASSO (Pioneering Caller 
Authentication for Secure Service Operation) arc known research projects in the 
field of speaker verification in which authentication of a user of a telephony 
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service is based upon an analysis of their voice characteristics. Both research 
projects focussed on text-dependent speaker verification, in the sense that the 
verification procedure assusnes that the text of the spoken utterance is known by 
the verification system. This results in more accurate verification* but requires 
S the user to utter known words or phrases for authentication may take place. 
One problem with voice or speaker verification techniques is that for 
accuracy, the subject must uner pre-dctermincd words or phrases, which may 
not be possible in many cases and may become inconvenient and tiresome for 
the subject. Furthermore, i f text dependent techniques are used, continuous 
10 verification is oot possible. In any case, whether text dependent or independent 
techniques are used, the subject is required to be speaking before an 
authentication judgement can be mode. These and other problems are solved by 
the present invention. 
15 Summary of the Present Invention 
According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a 
method of determining identity data in respect of a user of an electronic device 
such OS a telephony device, the method comprising the steps of: 
a) receiving an interacted sound signal resulting fiom an original 
20 sound signal interacting with a part of the body of the user, 
b) deriving a signature from at least the interacted sound signal, the 
signature being representative of a physiological characteristic of the user, the 
physiological characteristic not being a characteristic of the voice or speech of 
the user. 
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c) determining the identity data in dependence on the signature. 
The interacted sound sigiiaJs may be received more or l e ^ continuously 
and provide data fioro which a physiological characteristic of the user can be 
determined. Thus an enhanced, truly personal, and* i f desired, continuous, user* 
S based method of authentication is provided. 
According to a preferred embodiment of present invention, the 
electronic device generates the original sound signal. Preferably, the original 
sound signal is undetectable or non-intrusive to the user. The soimd signal may 
be outside the human auditory fiequency range or, alternatively, inside the 
10 human auditory ficquency range but of sufficiently short duration so as to be 
undetectable or unobtrusive. Thus, identity data may be determined by 
comparing an original sound signal, with known characteristics, to dbe received 
interacted sound signal, without disturbing the user. 
According to another preferred embodiment of present invention, the 
15 original sound signal has a pre-selcctcd characteristic, and the step of 
determining the identity data in dependence on the signature is dependent on 
the pre-selected characteristic. Thus, improved acciuacy of authentication may 
be achieved by selecting a sound characteristic appropriate to the physiological 
characteristic being used for authentication. 
20 Preferably, in a first determination of identity data, the original sound 
signal has a first pre-selcctcd characteristic, and in a second detenninatton of 
identity data, the original sound signal has a second pre-sclectcd characteristic 
different to the first pre-selected characteristic. For example, the soimd 
characteristic may be selected on a random or pseudo-random basis. Thus. 
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security is generally improved against, for example, masquerade attacks by 
providing a varying "challenge" to the user. 
Preferably^ the pre-selected characteristic is selected by a process 
performed externally to the electronic device. Thus security is further improved 
S against, for example, attacks in which the security processes of the electronic 
device have been determined by the attacker. 
Preferably, the pre*selected characteristic is selected in dependence on 
a) an identity or characteristic of an authorised user of the electronic device; b) 
an identity or charucteristic of an authorised user of a service accessible via the 
10 electronic device; and/or c) the identity or characteristic of a provider of a 
service accessible via the electronic device. Thus, a variable level of security 
may be selected appropriate to the particular circumstances of use. 
In a further embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a 
method according to the first aspect, comprising the step of: 
15 aa) receiving the original sound s\g^a\, wherein the original sound 
signal is produced by the user and the signature is derived from the interacted 
and original sound signals. 
For example, the original sound signal may be the voice or speech of the 
user. Thus, authentication may take place using an original sound signal 
20 generated by the user without the need for the electronic device to generate 
sound signals for that purpose. 
According to another preferred embodiment, the electronic device is a 
telephony device and comprises an earpiece for generating sound signals a 
mouthpiece for receiving soimd signals and other sound signal processing 
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apparatus. Thus, authentication of a user of the telephony device may be 
performed by receivmg aiid/or processing sound or signals representing sound 
using apparatus present in the device for other purposes, thereby taking 
advantage of existing apparatus in the telephony device. 
5 According to another prefetred embodiment, the physiological 
characteristic relates to the physiology of the auditory apparatus or head of the 
user. Thus, advantage is taken of the unique topographies of the human ear or 
human head to perform accumte authentication. 
The method of detemiining identity data may be carried out by a 
to telecommunications netwoik comprising an electronic device connectable to 
one or more network n o d ^ or by a stand-alone electronic device. The 
electronic device may be a telephony device such as a mobile station of a 
mobile telecommimications network. 
According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided 
15 a telephony device arranged to process sound signals for use in determining 
identity data in respect of a user, the telephony device comprising audio signal 
coding/decoding apparatus arranged to use a first data coding format for coding 
or decoding the voice or speech of a user and a second different data coding 
format for coding or decoding sound signals for use in determining identity data 
20 of a user. Thus, the data coding format used may be optimised to the 
characteristics of the sound signals used when determining identity data in 
respect of a user. 
According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a 
telephony device comprising a locally accessible data store, the data store 
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storing data rq>resenting one or more origina] sound signals, the telq)hony 
device being controUable by a icmote device to generate a original sound signal 
using data stored in the data store and to receive an interacted sound signal 
resulting from the origina) sound signal interacting with a part of the body of a 
S user for use in determining identity data in respect of the user. Thxis, die quality 
of original sound signal generated may be guaranteed and netvvoric traflSc 
reduced. 
According to a fouith aspect of the present invention, there is provided a 
telephony device comprising a loudspeaker for generating an original sound 
10 signal and a mioophone for receiving an interacted soimd signal resulting from 
an original sound signal having interacted with a part of the body of a user of 
the telephony device, the telephony device being arranged so that, when in 
normal operation by a user, the loudspeaker and microphone are located 
adjacfflt to an ear of the user. 
15 According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, there is provided an 
earpiece or headpiece for use with a telephony device, the earpiece or headpiece 
comprising a lotidspeaker for generating an original sound signal and a 
microphone for receiving an interacted sound signal resulting from an original 
sound signal having interacted with a part of the body of a user of the telephony 
20 device, the earpiece or headpiece being arranged so that, when in normal 
operation by a user, the loudspeaker and microphone arc located adjacent to an 
ear of the user. 
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According to a sixth aspect of the present inventioiu there is provided a 
method of dctenmning identity data in respect of a user of an electronic device, 
the method comprising: 
a) receiving a sound signal n ^ t m g from an original sound signal 
S ha\nng interacted with a part of the body of the user, 
b) determining the identity data in dependence on a characteristic 
derived firom the received interacted sotmd signal. 
Further aspects of the invention ore as set out in the appended claims. 
There now follows, by way of example only, a detailed description of 
10 preferred embodiments of the present invention in which;-
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a known mobile stadon of a mobile 
telecommunications network for use in the present invention; 
Figure 2 is schematic diagram of an adapted mobile station for use in 
the present invention; 
15 Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing the process o f determining 
identity data for a user in a first mode where the mobile station generates the 
original sound; 
Figure 4 is a schematic diagram showing the process o f determining 
identity data for a user in a second mode what the mobile station generates the 
20 original sound; and 
Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing the process o f determining 
identity data for a user in a third mode where the user generates the original 
soimd. 
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l>etailed Deacription of Preferred Embodiments of the Present Invention 
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a known mobile station of a second 
generation mobile telecommunications network, such as a GSM network, for 
use in the present invention. The mobile station 10 comprises a 
5 transmit/receive aerial 12, a radio firequcncy transceiver 14, a speech 
coder/decoder 16 connected to a loudspeaker 18 and a microphone 20, a 
processor circuit 22 and its associated memory 24, an LCD display 26 and a 
manual input port (keypad) 28, and a removable SIM 30. The loudspeaker 18 
and microphone 20 are both connected to the processor circuit 22 via speech 
10 codci/decodcr 16. Speech codec/decoder 16 comprises an analogue to digital 
converter (ADC) connected to nucrophone 20 and a digital to analogue 
converter (DAC) connected to loudspeaker 18. Mobile station 10 may 
communicate with a mobile teleconununications network using radio signals 
transmitted by transmit/receive aerial 12. 
15 Typically, coder/decoder 16 uses a digital coding fonnat optimised for 
efiEicicnt transmission of data reprinting voice or speech over low bandwidth 
communications channels. In particular, the coding foniiats used generally do 
not substantially represent sound at frequencies outside the hunum auditory 
range. Thus, in embodiments of the present invention using standard, 
20 unadapted mobile stations for second generation mobile networks, the process 
of determining identity data is preferably performed using in-band (Le. within 
the human auditory frequency range) sound signals. Alternatively, in 
embodimwjts of the present invention using out-of-band sound signals, m 
particular ultra-sonic signals, on adapted mobile station may be used in which 
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coder/decoder 16 is arranged to use a different data coding format, when being 
used for the piirposes of determining identity data, the different data coding 
format being suited to represent the sound signals at the freqtiencies used. 
Figure 2 is schematic diagram of on adapted mobile station for use in 
5 the present invention. The mobile station 10 of Figure 2 is as described with 
reference to Figure 1, save that an additional mi^ophone 32 is located at the 
earpiece close to loudspeaker 18 and also connected to speech coder/decoder 
16. A further AIX^ may also be provided in coder/decoder 16 connected to 
microphone 32 for separately converting the analogue signals received from 
10 microphone 32. Again, for embodiments of the present invention using out-of-
band sound signals, coder/decoder 16 may be arranged, when being used for the 
purposes of determining identity data, to use a data coding format suited to 
rc|Hesent the sound signals at the frequencies used. According to a further 
embodiment of the present invention, the functions of loudspeaker 18 and 
15 microphone 32 are both performed by a single sound transceiver located at the 
earpiece of mobile station 10. 
.Although Figures 1 and 2 show mobile stations using inbuilt 
loudspeakers and microphones, '^bands-free*' equipment consisting of a 
loudspeaker and/or microphone separate from but cormectable to the mobile 
20 station, may also be used in the present invention. Furthermore, an adapted 
hands-free earpiece or headpiece comprising a loudspeaker and microphone 
corresponding to loudspeaker 18 and microphone 32 of Figure 2 may also be 
used when connected to an adapted mobile station such as shown in Figure 2. 
377 
Appendix I : Patent Material 
13 
Alternatively, the loudspeaker and microphone of the adapted earpiece or 
headpiece may be combined into a single soimd transceiver as described above. 
The process of detennining identity data for a user of mobile station 10 
may be controlled by either processor 22, the processor of SIM 30, or by one or 
5 more nodes of the mobile telecommunications network. We shall refer to the 
entity controlling the process of determining identity data as the authenticating 
entity. In embodiments of the present invention in which original sound signals 
are generated by loudspeaker 18 of mobile station 10, digital data representing 
an original sound signal, formatted in a suitable data coding format, is sent by 
10 the authenticating entity to coder/decoder 16 for decoding and causing the 
generation of the original sound signal at loudspeaker 18. Conversely, 
interacted sound signab received by microphones 20 or 32 are coded into 
digital data by coder/decoder 16 and are sent to the authenticating entity. 
Where the authenticating entity is the processor of SIM 30, the data is sent over 
15 the mobile siation/SIM interface. Where the authenticating entity is a node of 
the mobile telecommunications networic, the data is sent over the radio interface 
via radio frequency transceiver 14 and transmit/receive aerial 12. 
In embodiments of the present invention in which original sound signals 
are generated by loudspeaker 18 of mobile smtion 10, a plurality of different 
20 original sound signals may be used. The authenticating entity may generate the 
data representing the original sound signal to be used, or select from one or 
more prc-gcnerated data items stored in a data store accessible to i t For 
example, where processor 22 is the authenticating entity, pre-generated data 
may be stored in memory 24. Where, the processor of SIM 30 is the 
378 
Appendix I : Patent Material 
14 
authenticating entity, pre-generated data may be stored in a memory of the SIM 
card. Alternatively, the authenticating entity may control the generation of the 
data representing the original sound signal by another device, or control another 
device to select from one or more pre-generated data items stored in a data store 
5 accessible to the other device. For example, where the authenticating entity is a 
node of the network, the node may choose a presletermined original sound 
signal to be used and control processor 22, or the processor of SIM 30, to 
generate or select pre-generated data representing the chosen signal. 
Figure 3 is a sdiematic diagram showing the process of determining 
10 identity data for a user in a first mode where mobile station 10 generates the 
original sound signal. Mobile station 10 is an ad^ted mobile station as 
described with reference to Figure 2. When in normal operotiort, a user holds 
mobile station 10 to his or her head 40 so that the loudspeaker 18 and 
microphone 32 of the earpiece are adjacent on ear 42 of the user. When 
15 authentication is required by the authenticating entity, coder/decoder 16 is 
controlled to cause loudspeaker 10 to generate an original sound signal 44. 
Preferably, the generated sound signal is pink noise (i.e. band-limited urhitc 
noise) within the human auditory range (approximately 20 - 20,000 Hz), so that 
the standard data coding format of coder/decoder 16 may be used. However, 
20 the signal is of short enough duration so as to be undetectable or at least non-
intnisive to the user. In on alternative embodiment, out-of-band (i.e. outside the 
human auditory range) sound frequencies may be used, in particular ulua-sonic 
frequencies wMch enable a higher physical resolution than lower frequency 
signals. Ultra-sonic frequencies would be undetectable to the user thus 
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resulting in completely transparent authentication. In thi^ case, coder/decoder 
16 is arranged to use a data coding format suited to the frequency range of the 
signals 44 and 46 as described above. 
Additionally, the original sotmd signal 44 may have a pre-determined 
5 signature. For example* a pink noise signal may be adapted by varying the 
amplitudes of the signal at selected frequencies. By selecting from a phirality 
of original sound signals with different signatures, further security is added to 
the system in that an attacker is presented with a varying "challenge". The 
sound signal 44 of pre-determined signature is preferably selected by the 
10 authentication entity. Selection may be on a random or pseudo-random basis, 
or in dep^dencc on a) an identity or characteristic of an authorised subscriber 
of the mobile network, b) an identity or characteristic of an authorised user of 
services accessible via the mobile station and/or c) an identity or characteristic 
of the provider of services accessible via the mobile statiorL For example. 
15 varying levels of security may be required by different users or by different 
telecommunications networks or by the providers of services or resources 
available using the mobile station. More specifically, a subscriber authorised 
for voice calls only, may, for example, only be required to imdergo low-level 
authentication, whereas a subscriber authorised to access highly personal 
20 information via the mobile station, such as bank account information or 
geographic or positioning information, may be required to undergo high-level 
authentication. 
The interacted soimd signal 46, having been reflected in the soft tissues 
of the inner car and auditory canal of the user, is then received by microphone 
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32 and converted into digital data by codei/decoder 16. The digital data output 
from coder/decoder 16 is then sent to the authenticating entity for analysis. 
Data representing the original sound signal 44 and the received interacted sound 
signal 46 are then compared to detennine a signature corresponding to the 
5 physiological topology of the inner ear and auditory canal of the user. This 
may be performed using known techniques of digital audio signal processing 
such as using Fast Fourier Transforms ^FTs) to obtain a frequency response, 
The generated physiological signature is then compared to a pro-stored 
physiological signature or statistical model for the authorised subscriber to 
10 determine authenticity. I f the determined signaturo matches within a 
predetermined level of tolerance, then the user of mobile station 10 is 
authenticated. However, i f the determined signature does not match within the 
tolerance level, then the user of mobile station 10 is not authenticated The 
process of determining the degree of match between the generated 
15 physiological signature and the pro-stored physiological signature uses known 
techniques of statistical pattern matching. 
The pro-stored physiological signature or statistical model for the 
authorised subscriber of mobile station 10 may be determined in much the same 
manner as for subsequent determination of identity data according to the present 
20 invention. More specifically, on registration, the subscriber may be required to 
undergo a process to determine the physiological signature or statistical model 
to be stored and used for subsequent determination of identity data. By 
generating a plurality of test original sound signals and receiving the 
corresponding interacted signals a single average physiological signature or a 
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more detailed statistical model indicating a normal range for the subscriber's 
physiological signature may be derived . Preferably, the test signals generated 
are sufficiently numerous so that an accurate average physiological signature or 
statistical model may be determined. Optionally, the test signals may comprise 
5 signals of dififerent sound signatures corresponding to the different soimd 
signatures that may be selected by the authenticating entity on subsequent 
determination of identity data. 
Furthermore, because the topography of the inner ear and auditory canal 
may change gradually over time, especially with children and through i l l health, 
10 the pre-stored signature or statistical model for a subscriber may be varied 
gradually over time in dependence on data determined during normal 
authentication procedures. For example, whilst a user presenting a radically 
different physiological topography will be rejected since the difference will 
exceed the predetermined level of tolerance, a gradual and consistent change 
15 within the predetermined level of tolerance may be interpreted as a normal 
change in the topography of the inner ear and auditory ^inal, and the pre-stored 
signature or statistical model for that subscriber altered accordingly. 
Figure 4 is a schctnatic diagram showing the process of determining 
identity data for a user in a second mode where the mobile station generates the 
20 original sound. Mobile station 10 is the standard mobile station as described 
with reference to Figure 1. The processes for determining identity data arc as 
described above for the first mode where the mobile station generates the 
original sound, save that the interacted sound signal 48 is received by the 
standard microphone 20 located at the mouthpiece of mobile station 10 rather 
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than by microphone 32 located at the earpiece. Thus, after lotidspeaker 18 has 
generated an original sound signal 44, the interacted sotmd signal 48 is received 
by mioophone 20 having traversed through the skull and soft tissues of the 
head of the user, and a signature is derived corresponding to the physiological 
5 topography of bone and soft tissues forming the user's head. 
Optionally, sound signals transmitted from loudspeaker 18 to 
miCTophone 20 directly dirough the body of mobile station 10 may be cancelled 
from the received sound signal using signal processing techniques. For a given 
make and model of mobile station, the physical arrangement of components of 
10 the mobile station in normal operation is fixed. Thus, for a given original sound 
signal, a cancellation signal corresponding to the sound transmitted directly 
through the body of mobile station 10 tnay be dctcntuned and subtracted from 
the signal received by microphone 20. Thus a sound signal corresponding to 
the interaction of the original soimd signal with substantially only the head of 
IS the user of mobile station 10 may be determined. In embodiments using hands-
free equipment, the effect of sound transmission through the body of the mobile 
station is greatly reduced and cancellation may not be necessary. 
Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing the process of detennining 
identity data for a user in a third mode where the user generates the original 
20 sound. Mobile station 10 is an adapted mobile station as described with 
reference to Figure 2. Whilst it has been described above how mobile station 
10 may be used to generate the original sound for determining identity data for 
a user, in this alternate embodiment, the original soimd signal is generated by 
the user of mobile station 10 - i.e. the original sound is the voice or speech 50 
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of the user. This original sound signal is received directly by microphone 20, 
located at the mouthpiece* and indirectly, having traversed the head of the user, 
by microphone 32, located at the earpiece. From these two received signals, a 
signature corresponding to the physiological topography of the bone and soft 
5 tissue of the user's head may be determined and the determination of identity 
data carried out as described above. 
When generating the pre-stored signature or statistical model for an 
authorised subscriber, rather than the mobile station generating a series of test 
soimd signals, as described above, the user is required to speak into the mobile 
10 station. Preferably, the user is required to recite a standard training passage of 
text of sufficient length and vocal variety to provide an accurate signature or 
model for the user. 
Whilst preferred embodiments of the present invention using mobile 
stations of a mobile telecommunications network have been described above, it 
15 will be fl^reciated that the present invention has application to fixed or mobile 
telecommunications stations, for example telephone stations in networks such 
as the public switched telephone network ^STN), fixed or mobile terminals or 
computing devices for access to private or public data networks, such as an 
intranet or the Internet, and in general to any electronic device v^ere user 
20 authentication is needed, ^A^ether the device is capable of telecommunications 
or not. Furthermore, whilst it has been described that the physiological 
characteristics used for determining identity data are the topography of the inner 
ear and auditory canal, or the head of the user, it will be apparent that other 
physiological characteristics may be used, such as the iopogrq)hy of other pans 
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of the body of the user or other physiological characteristics measurable using 
sound 
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CLAIMS: 
1. A method of determining identity data in respect o f a user of an 
electronic device, the method comprising the steps of: 
5 a) receiving an interacted sound signal resulting from an original 
sound signal interacting with a part of the body of the user, 
b) deriving a signature from at least the interacted sound signal, the 
signature being representative of a physiological characteristic of the user, the 
physiological characteristic not being a characteristic of the voice or speech of 
10 die user, 
c) determining the identity data in dependence on the signatme. 
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the electronic device 
generates the original soxmd signal. 
15 
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein the original sound 
signal is undetectable or non-intrusive to the user. 
4. A method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the frequency 
20 range of the original sound signal is substantially within the hurrmn auditory 
frequency range. 
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5. A method according to any of claims 2 to 4, wherein the 
frequency range of the original sound signal is substantially outside the human 
auditory frequency range. 
5 6. A method accordmg to any of claims 2 to S, wherein the original 
sound signal has a pre-selected characteristic, and the step of determining the 
identity data in dependence on the signature is dependent on the pre*setected 
characteristic. 
10 7. A method according to claim 6, wherein, in a first determination 
of identity data, the original soimd signal has a Erst pre-selected characteristic 
and in a second determination of identity data, the original sound signal has a 
second pre-selectcd characteristic different to the frrst pre-selected 
characteristic. 
15 
8. A method according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the pre-selected 
characteristic is selected on a random or pseudo-random basis. 
9. A method according to any of claims 6 to 8, wherein the pre-
20 selected characteristic is selected by a process performed externally to the 
electronic device. 
387 
Appendix I : Patent Material 
23 
10. A method according to any of claims 6 to 9. wherein the pre-
selected characteristic is selected in dependence on an identity or characteristic 
of on authorised user of the electronic device. 
S 11. A method according to any of claims 6 to 10, wherein the pre-
selected characteristic is selected m dependence on an identity or characteristic 
of an authorised user of a service accessible via the electronic device. 
12. A method according to any of claims 6 to 11, wherein the prc-
10 selected characteristic is selected in dependence on the identity or characteristic 
of a provider of a service accessible via the electronic device. 
13. A method according to claim 1, comprising the step of: 
aa) receiving the original sound signal; 
15 wherein the original sound signal is produced by the user and the 
signature is derived firom the interacted and original sound si^ials. 
14. A method according to claim 13. wherein the original sound 
signal is the voice or speech of the user. 
20 
15. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the 
electronic device is capable of telephony and comprises an earpiece for 
generating sound signals and a mouthpiece for receiving sound signals. 
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16. A method according to claim 15, wherein the interacted sound 
signal is received at the earpiece. 
17. A method according to claim IS, wherein the interacted sound 
S signal is received at the mouthpiece. 
18. A method according to any of claims 15 to 17, when dependent 
on any of claims 2 to 12, wherein the original sound signal is generated at the 
earpiece. 
10 
19. A method according to any of claims 15 to 17, when dependent 
on any of claims 2 to 12, wherein the original sound signal is generated at the 
mouthpiece. 
15 20. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the 
physiological characteristic relates to the physiology of the head o f the user. 
21. A method according to claim 20, wherein the physiological 
characteristic relates to the physiology of the auditory apparatus of the user. 
20 
22. Apparatus for performing the method of any preceding claim. 
23. A computer program or computer programs for performing the 
method of any of claims 1 to 21. 
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24. A teleconununications network comprising an electronic device 
connectable over a teleconununications link to one or more network nodes, the 
telecommunications netwoik being arranged to perform the method of any of 
claims 1 to 21. 
25. A telecommunications network according to claim 24, wherein 
the electronic device performs step a) and the one or more nodes perform steps 
b)andc). 
5 
10 26. A telephony device arranged to perform the method of any of 
claims 15 to 21. 
27. A mobile station of mobile communications network arranged to 
perfomi the method of any of claims 15 to 21. 
15 
20 
28. A telecommunications network comprising a telephony device 
and one or more network nodes, the telecommunications network being 
arranged to perform the method of any of claims 15 to 21 wherein the telephony 
device performs step a) and the one or more nodes perform steps b) and c). 
29. A telephony device arranged to process sound signals for use in 
determining identity data in respect of a user, the telephony device comprising 
audio signal coding/decoding apparatus arranged to use a first data coding 
format for coding or decoding the voice or speech of a user and a second 
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different data coding format for coding or decoding sound signab for use in 
deteimining identity data of a user. 
30. A telephony device comprising a locally accessible data store, 
S the data store storing data representing one or more original sound signals, the 
telephony device being controllable by a remote device to generate an original 
sound signal using data stored in the data store and to receive an interacted 
sound signal resulting from the original sound signal interacting with a pait of 
the body of a user for use in determining identity data in respect of the user. 
10 
31. A telephony device comprising a loudspeaker for generating an 
original sound signal and a microphone for receiving an interacted sound signal 
resulting firom an original sound signal having interacted with a part of the body 
of a user of the telephony device, the telephony device being arranged so that, 
IS when in normal operation by a user, the loudspeaker and microphone are 
located adjacent to an ear of the user. 
32. An earpiece or headpiece for use with a telephony device, the 
earpiece or headpiece comprising a loudspeaker for generating an original 
20 sound signal and a microphone for receiving an interacted sound signal 
resulting &om an original sound signal having interacted with a part of the body 
of a user of the telephony device, the earpiece or headpiece being arranged so 
that, when in normal operation by a user, the loudspeaker and microphone are 
located adjacent to an ear of the user. 
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33. A method of detemiming identity data in r^pect o f a user of an 
electronic device, the method comprising: 
a) receiving a sound signal resulting from an original sound signal 
5 having interacted with a part of &e body of the user; 
b) deternuning the identity data in dependence on a charact^stic 
derived from the received interacted sound signal 
34. Apparatus substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to 
10 Figures l o r 2. 
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ABSraACT: 
According to the present invention there is provided a method of; 
apparatus for> and computer programs for determining identity data in respect 
5 of a user of an electronic device, the method comprising the steps of: 
a) receiving an interacted sound signal resulting from an original 
sound signal interacting with a part of the body of the user; 
b) deriving a signature from at least the interacted sound signal, the 
signature being representative of a physiological characteristic of the user, the 
10 physiological characteristic not being a characteristic of the voice or speech of 
the user, 
c) determining the identity data in dependence on the signature. 
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ASSIGNMENT 
WHEREAS, wc. 
Philip M . RodweU, a citizen of Great Britain with an address at 17 Lower Fairfield, St Germans. 
Cornwall PL12 5NH. Great Britain, and Paul Reynolds, a citizen of Great Britain with an address of SL 
James Court, Great Park Road, Almondsbury Parte, Bradley Stoke, Bristol BS12 4QJ, Great Britain, 
ASSIGNORS, are die inventors of the invcnUon in DETERMINING IDENnXY DATA FOR A USER, 
for which we have executed an application for a Patent of the United States, which was filed in the United 
States on October 31.2003 as application no. 10/476.588. 
WHEREAS, ORANGE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES U M I T E D , a 
British company having a place of business at St James Court. Great Parte Road. Almondsbury Parte, 
Bradley Stoke, Bristol BS12 4QJ, Great Britain, ASSIGNEE, is desirous of obtaining our entire right, title 
and interest in, to and under the said invention and the said application: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) to us in hand paid, and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, wc, the said 
ASSIGNORS, have sold, assigned, transferred and set over, and by these presents do hereby sell, assign, 
transfer and set over, unto the said ASSIGNEE, its successors, legal representatives and assigns, the entire 
right, title and interest in, to and under the said invention, and the said United States application and all 
divisions, renewals and continuations thereof, and all Patents of the United States which may be granted 
thereon and all reissues and extensions thereof; 
AND WE HEREBY authorize and request the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks of the 
United States, to issue the same to the said ASSIGNEE, its successors, legal representatives and assigns, 
in accordance with the terms of this instnmient; 
AND WE HEREBY covenant and agree that we have full right to convey the entire interest 
herein assigned, and that we have not executed, and will not execute, any agreement in conflict herewith; 
AND WE HEREBY further covenant and agree that we will communicate to the said 
ASSIGNEE, its successors, legal representatives and assigns, any facts known to us respecting said 
invention, and testify in any legal proceeding, sign all lawful papers, execute all divisional, continuing, 
and reissue applications, make all rightful oaths, and generally do everything possible to aid the said 
ASSIGNEE, its successors, legal representatives and assigns, to obtain and enforce proper protection for 
said invention. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigoa^ invcptgj? hayp^affixed tb<i?5iJ!natures. 
26^ MAY 2O0it 
Date PhUjpM.RodwcU 
On this 2 6 day of ^^^V 2004, before me appeared PhlUp M. RodwcU. to 
me known and known to me to be the person of that name, who signed and sealed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed. 
Date O Witness 
DocictND. 59015-00601 I of 2 
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BIS • ^ PauK&oynolds 
On this .day of; 
known and known'lo me to be the person of that name,^  who ^gricd and sraled the foregoing instrument, 
and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed. 
Date Witness 
Docket No. 59015-00601 
.or 
2 of 2 
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PMemuidTndeiiwVOfTict: UiDEPARTMETfTOF C0BO4ERCE 
tnvrxo us. t>i*ufiM« «f c « « 
Attorney Dodot KuiDba S9015-00601 
Fim Ntmcd Inventu- PhUip IM. RodweD 
COMBINED DECLARATION (37 CFR 
1.63) AND POWER OF ATTORNEY 
COMPLETE IF IWOWN 
FOR UTILITY OR DESIGN 
PATENT APPLICATION 
AppLicatioa Numba 
Filing Date October 31.2003 
Group An Unit Unknown 
1 1 DccUraiioD OR | X | Declaration 
Submitted SutHniocd after 
with Initial FiltnR Initiil Filtnfl 
Eummcr Name Unknown 
As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that 
My residence, naiUng address, and citizenship are as stated bekw next to iny name. 
1 believe 1 am the original, fust aod sole inventor (if only one name is listed betow) or an original, first and joint inventor (if 
phiral names are listed betow) of the sobject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled: 
DETERMDSTNG TDENTITY DATA FOR A USER 
the specification of which 
I 1 is attached hereto 
OR 
| X | TO filed on 03MavI002 
{Tale of the Invention) 
.as United States Application Number or PCX International 
J (if applicable). Application Number PCT/GB02/02074 and was amended on (MMyDD/YYYY) | 
I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above identified spcdfication. including the claims, as 
amended by any amendment specifically refenxd to above. 
I acknowledge the duty to disclose infonnatim which is material to patentability as dcfiiKd in Title 37 Code of Federal 
Regulations. § 1.S6. 
I hereby cUim foreign priority benefits under Tide 35, United States Code § 119 (aHd) or § 365(b) of any foreign 
applicaiion(8) for patent or inventor's certificate, or fi 365 (a) of any POT international application which designated u least 
one country other than the United Stales of America, listed below and have also idcntified below, by checking the box. any 
foreign application for patent or invemoi's certificate, or of any POT international application having a filing date before that 
of the application on which ^or i ty is chimed. 
Prior Foreign 
Application 
Numbcr<s> 
CCmntiy Foreign Filing Date 
(MMrt)D/YYYY) 
Priority 
Not Chimed 
Certified Copy Anached? 
YES NO 
011093U Great BriUin OS/03/2001 1 j [ 1 
1 1 
IX 1 
1 1 
( I 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
11 1 1 » I 
1 1 
1 I 
I 1 Additional foreign application numbers arc listed on a supplemental priority sheet attached hereto 
[Page 1 of 31 
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DECLARATION Pace I 
I hereby cUim the bcneOt under T i i k 35, Uniicd States Code § 119(c) of any United States provisional appli 
below. 
itioo(s) listed 
Apptotion Number(») Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY) I Additional pnvisioDal apphcatioa 
numbcn arc listed on a supplemenlal 
shed atucbed bereto. 
I hereby claim the benefit under Title 33, United States Code § 120 of any United Slates applicatioiKs), or § 365(c) of any 
PCT inlcmdonal applicatitm designating the United States of America, listed below znd. insofar as the subject matter of 
each of the claims of this applicaticm is not disclosed in the pnor United States or PCT inteniational application in the 
manner provided by the f int paragraph of Title 35. Uniicd States Code § 112,1 acknowledge the duty to disclose 
infonnation which is maerial to patentability as defined in Title 37, Code of Federal Regulations § 1.56 which became 
available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT inteniational filing date of this 
application. 
U.S. Parent Application 
Ninnbcr 
p e r Parent 
Nuniba-
Parcnl Filmg Date 
(MMmP/YYYY) 
Parcia Patent Number 
( l / f lpp/ iCfl&fe) 
I I Additional U.S. or PCT intcmariMBl application mmriben are listed op a 5 ^ 
As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following attomey(s) and/or agent(s) to prosecute this application and to transact 
all business m the Patent and Trademait Office connected therewith: 
Name Registration 
Number 
Name Registration 
Number 
David R. Yohannon 
John N . Coulby 
Seth A.Watldns 
37,480 
43,565 
47,169 
Christopher M . Tobin 
MarkW.Rygle l 
Gregory M . Murphy 
40^90 
45371 
52^494 
1 I Addinonal attorQe>'(B) and/or aKent(s) named on a supplemenal sheet attached hereto. 
Please direct all coirespondence to: 
Christopher M . Tobin 
Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC 
30S0 K Street NW, Suite 400 
Wasbfneton,D.C 200D7 U.SA. 
Telephone | (202) 342-8508 1 Fax 1 (202) 342-8451 
I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are tiuc and that all statements node on information 
and belief are believed to be true; and ftirtbcr that ihese suicments were made with the knowledge that wil l ful false 
autemcnts and the like so made arc punishable by Hnc or inqirisonmcnt, or boib, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code and that such wiMt l false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued 
thereon. 
Name of Sole or First Inventor: I I 1 A petition has been filed for this unsigned inventor 
Given 
Name PbUlp 
Middle 
^Initial M . 
Family RodwcU Sufiix 
Inventors 
Signature XG. HAY. looU-
Cornwall Great Bntain Great Britain 
Mailmg Address 17 Lower Falrneld 
Mailing Address S L Germans 
CornwBU PL12SNH Country Great Bri tain 
I X I Additiooal im.-eniors are bcina named on supplemental sheetfs) attached hereto 
[Page 2 of 3] 
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DECLARATION ADDITIONAL INVENTOR(S) 
SDppIfTTifntal Sheet 
Name of Additional Joint Inventor, if any: I A petition has betnfOai for thiaimsigttdinveDiOT 
Given 
Name Paul 
Middle 
Initial 
Fainfly 
Name Reynolds 
Suffix 
InvcDtort 
Signature Date 
Residence: City Brbtol State Country I Grcmt Britain Citizenship at Britain 
Mailing Addieu St. JanKS Court, Great Park Road 
Mailing Address Almondsbury Park, Bradley Stoke 
City Bristol State Zip BS124QJ Country 
Name of Additional Joint Inventor, If any: ] A perition has been filed for this onsigped inventor 
Given 
Name 
Middk Fanily 
I n i r i i l Name 
Suflix 
Invemoi's 
Signature Date 
Residence; City State Country Citizenship 
Mailing Address 
Mailing Address 
aty State Zip Coontiy 
NameofAdditlonaJ Joint Inventor, tf any: | | | A petition has been filed for this muigped invcntOT 
Given 
Name 
Middle Family 
Initial Name 
SufTnt 
Invenior^  
Signature 
Date 
Residence: City State Coumry Citizenship 
Muling Address 
Mailing Address 
City State Zip Country 
I I Additional inventors are being nairgd on supplemental sheet(s) attached hereto 
[Page 3 of 3| 
404 
Notes 
Notes 
405 
Tabic A-4: Thesis Statistics 
(Notes) 
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Chapter Pages Words Figures Tables | 
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Chapter 8 7 2143 0 0 
Total (Core) 231 48056 127 12 
Total (Thesis) 437 80034 131 15 
Table A-5'. Development System 
Hardware Description 
Processor AMD Athlon XP2400+ (2000MHz) 
Memory 1GB Corsair TwinX 3200C2PT (133) 
Harddisk Hitachi 250Gb, WD 200GB; 7200rpm 
Graphics cord Asus A9600 (ATI core) 
Soundcard Creative Audigy2 
Monitor Sony CPD-4201G (19") 
Printer Epson Stylus Photo 950 
Mouse Logitech MXIOOO (laser) 
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